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The US strategy in the fight against AQ

Part 3. Strategic insight

We saw a very small number of Al-Qaedah operatives, at the time, being surrounded in Tora Bora. The whole world had gathered around them. Without a strong strategy, ideology and doctrine Al-Qaedah wouldn’t have grown from a very weak and small group, surrounded by the whole world in Tora Bora, to the worldwide legendary organization that we know of today. The source of Al-Qaedah's success didn’t, and doesn’t, lie in the amount of men or force they had, or have. In contrary to IS that owes its recent success exclusively to momentum and cheer force. The success of momentum and force could disappear, and could be pushed back, especially if success depends solely on these factors, and/or are handled with carelessness. Force can also do more harm than good without proper guidance and organization. A small force on the other hand, led with wisdom and proper management, could achieve great victories. More than a thousand Mujahideen from IS reportedly died in the meaningless battle for Kobani. This is on the one hand due to the intensified US airstrikes on IS troops, but also due to the carelessness with which IS handles Muslim lives –including their own men. It wasn’t, and isn’t, wise to sacrifice that many troops in a battle of secondary priority.

Worldly success is also not the standard by which we measure correctness. When IS was small and weak, in their initial phase in Iraq, it was nevertheless supported by Al-Qaedah and praised for their noble causes and correct actions at the time. IS became however much bigger and stronger, but in this phase they were nevertheless criticized by the same Al-Qaedah leaders who’ve praised IS in its period of weakness in the past. So if power and worldly success is the standard, the Mujahid leaders would’ve praised IS in their period of strength more than they did in their period of weakness. But we saw the opposite, because the wise Muslim uses divine standards, in contrary to worldly standards, for success. Allah named Martyrdom for example Al-Fawzul Kabir (the great victory). But according to worldly standards, being killed is neither considered a victory nor success.

However, this does not mean that our lives are easily disposable, it does not contradict the fact we must preserve our- and other Muslim lives. Each statement must therefore be taken in its proper context (this is a principle in Usool Al-Fiqh ‘li kulli maqam maqal’). We have a mission and a duty. Like Muslim As-Shishani, the Emir of Jund As-Sham, once said “If you only came here to die, then leave me. But if you came here to raise the Word of Allah, then stand with me!” Throwing the lives of your men- or your own live away on the battlefield, under the pretext of seeking martyrdom, knowing that this will not achieve any strategic or tactical goals whatsoever, like it happened in Kobani, is considered recklessness or cheer selfishness. As a Mujahid you came to the battlefield to sacrifice your live with the goal of protecting the Muslim community and raising the Word of Allah, and not to just simply die a Martyrdoms death; even thought this is the ultimate end goal, as paradox as it may seem.

The live of a Muslim has great value. Umar ibn Khattab would therefore never appoint a commander who was known to be hasty; even if he had a reputation of begin courageous and powerful. That’s why Umar ibn Khattab said to Abu Ubayda At-Thaqafi, who he appointed as a military leader “Do not be hasty in your judgments or actions, because (military) leadership is only suitable for a calm person who knows when to grab an opportunity.” That’s why Al-Muthanah ibn Harith was angry when Abdullah ibn Marthad cut the ropes of a bridge, in the battle against the Persians, enthusiastically shouting “O people die for what your commanders have died!” Abdullah wanted to prevent the Muslims from (a tactical) retreat, but his hasty decision cost the Muslim army many lives; many of them drowned or died in the battle. So Al-Muthanah became very angry, he even hit Abdullah, and ordered the troops to reconnect the bridge. The Muslim army retreated after the bridge was tied again.

The Muslim Ummah was very happy when the tribes of Ahl Sunnah in Iraq, along with IS, freed mayor cities in Iraq from the tyrannical US-installed puppet regime, mid 2013. We were anxiously waiting to see them liberate Baghdad as a great rejoice for the Ummah. However, our happiness was soon followed by several disappointments when IS took a big u-turn to fronts of a secondary priority, like the Yazidies in Iraq, and the Kurds in Iraq and Syria. There is in fact an explicit narration of the Prophet (SallAllahu Alayhi wa Selam) in Sunan Abi Dawood, saying “Let the Turks alone as long as they leave you alone.” Add to this the disproportionate mass executions of Sunni tribes, like the 900 members the Shu’aytaat tribe in Deir Zor, Syria and the 300 members of the Albu Nimr tribe in Al-Anbar, Iraq. The Prophet (sallallahu alaihi wa Selam) tried to win over hearts and save people. But it seems the Islamic State is doing exactly the opposite.

If we disagree on theological issues with IS, then let us at least agree on strategic basic principles; these are of course also part of Islamic theology, but nevertheless, let’s think of them as being outside the realm of theology just for the sake of argument. Then the question remaining is: what strategic wisdom is there, at this period in time, in keeping ourselves busy with Yazidi slave markets, for example? We are engaged in a collective defensive Jihad to liberate the Ummah from the internal and external enemy: meaning the Western installed tyrannical puppet regimes that govern our countries, the Western-backed Zionist occupation, and the Western-led coalition wars. All of our time and energy must be totally invested in this project. We simply do not have the luxury to waste our precious time and energy with slave markets or fronts which do not deserve any strategic priority whatsoever.

IS already has the ambition to print their own currencies, this is a typical example of the haste, with which they act and their priorities, which they misplace. Even the first generation of this Ummah did their transactions in the Roman and Persian currencies, even under the Caliphate of the Prophet (SallAllahu Alayhi wa Selam) and Caliphate of the Companions (Khulafaa Ar-Rashideen). It was until 77 years after the Hijrah that the Islamic Dirham and Dinar currency were printed, under the Caliphate of Abdul-Malik ibn Marwan. We haven’t even yet liberated our Muslim countries. So is the Ummah really in need of a symbolic currency printed by a symbolic Caliphate, with which you cannot pay nor exchange anywhere in the world? Furthermore, if a Muslim is in possession of such a currency, he will most likely be put in jail, while being accused of (supporting) terrorism. There is narration of the Prophet (SallAllahu Alayhi wa Selam) in At-Tirmidhi, which says: “Deliberation comes from Allah, and hastiness comes from the Shaytaan.” So we must manage our ambitions and expectations.

IS behaves as if we are in a time of Jihad At-Talab (offensive jihad), as if all our countries are already liberated. While all Muslims agree that we are in Jihad Ad-Daf ' (defensive Jihad). Even IS will agree to this. However, it is not seen in their behavior. Fighting under a clear Islamic banner for example, is not one of the binding conditions of a defensive jihad. But yet we see the spokesperson of IS, Abu Muhammad Al-Adnaani, force all fighting factions to join the banner of IS. Including battle groups which are much larger than IS, like the Taliban.

We see the Western media respond on the major strategic miscalculations of IS with schemed cunningness. We saw this very well concerning the battle for Kobani. The media spoke constantly about the attack and advance of IS on Kobani, portraying this as something big and important, while Kobani virtually has no strategic value, for both the Muslim Ummah and the enemies of this Ummah. The Mujahideen in Syria have literally reached the borders of Israel; with the great conquests they made on the Golan Heights. This gets however very little coverage in the media. Is the Western media really trying to fool us into believing that the West is more worried about Kobani, than these conquests made by the Mujahideen on the borders of Israel? The Kurds are exploited and fooled since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and now we’re suppose to believe that the West is genuinely worried about the Kurds in Kobani? So much so, that they even overshadow the Zionists in Israel? Many people think that the Western media is constantly lying to us, but the lie many times does not consist of what they’re saying. Rather we must see the things they’re not saying, here is where the deception is hidden a lot of the times. The Media uses the power of suggestion and one-sided news coverage.

Kobani has been given a very symbolic- rather than a strategic value. It symbolized the struggle between IS and the US. Honor and reputation were on the line because of the extensive international media coverage, this made emotional decisions prevail over strategic decisions, which made IS sacrifice more men than Kobani was really worth. If this number would have been sacrificed in Syria against the Nusairi and Raafidhi murder gang of Bashar, where the priority really lies, then the last breath of the Syrian regime would have approached drastically. Force without proper guidance and organization could work non-productive, and this is exactly what delayed the Jihad in Syria. More than 2000 Mujahideen were killed by IS in Syria, including 200 soldiers from Jabhat An-Nusra. This could have been prevented by wise leadership, strategic insight and correct doctrine.

When Umar ibn Khattab asked the Prophet (SallAllahu Alayhi wa Selam) whether he could kill the leader of the hypocrites in Medina (Abdullah ibn Salool), the Prophet replied: “No, so that people won’t think that Muhammad kills his companions.” The Prophet did not just say it isn’t allowed to kill him, he also showed Umar that this would be strategically unwise. He weighed the benefits against the consequences, and considered the general interests of the Muslim Ummah. This is the strategic wisdom that we, as followers of the Prophet, should have.

Armed conflicts between Mujahideen could take place, this occurred frequently in the Islamic history. It happened even between the most noble people; the Companions. These conflicts must be resolved, however, with wisdom. Several clashes occurred between armed groups in Syria, which eventually were solved with wisdom, we must learn from these incidents. Even if you were right and the other was wrong, still you must weigh the benefits against the consequences, and consider the overall interest of the Ummah. If a Mujahid is indeed willing to sacrifice his life for the Ummah, then it is even easier to sacrifice your rights for the Ummah. A conflict is not resolved by declaring an all-out war against almost all the combat groups in Syria. Abandoning all battle positions in Iraq and Syria, so you could take up arms against several combat groups in Syria, something the spokesman Abu Muhammad Al-Adnaani openly threatened with in January 2014, and partially indeed did, was at the very least a big mistake made by IS concerning the correct priorities. How can you, as a Mujahid, leave the battle positions against the attacking enemy, and leave innocent Muslim civilians to their bloody fate, just so you can retaliate in a conflict with other factions? This does not demonstrate any wisdom at all.

The beheading of aid workers and journalists in Syria was also very unwise and testified of little strategic insight. While the Mujahid scholars have rejected this, we will leave aside the question whether it’s Islamically allowed or not. Because even if something is permitted, the question remains; is it wise or not? The tyrant Al-Hajaaj ibn Yusuf once asked the Companion Anas ibn Malik what the worst punishment was, which the Prophet (SallAllahu Alayhi wa Selam) had carried out. But Hassan Al-Basri shunned Anas ibn Malik when he answered this question. Anas ibn Malik was not suppose to answer this question. It was not wise because Al-Hajaaj would only abuse this knowledge. So Anas ibn Malik regretted his answer; while spreading knowledge is permitted or even obligatory. The beheading of Western journalists and aid workers in Syria was in the least case very unwise, because it gathered the world in a coalition war against the Mujahideen in Syria. IS did not achieve anything else with these beheadings. The US of course had the intention already to attack the Mujahideen in Syria long before the beheadings, but it was very hard for them to sell to the world because of the sensitive Syrian situation at the time. It was obvious that the Syrian regime was committing inhuman crimes against its citizens, and it was clear that the Mujahideen took up arms against these crimes. But the reckless actions of IS made it very easy for the US to convince the world of their airstrike campaign. The reckless actions of IS, with a little help from the media, made the world forget all about the inhuman atrocities committed by the Syrian regime.

It is not wise to give our enemies a symbolic weapon, with our hands, with which they can fight against us. The legendary number of Mujahid troops, and the enormous amount of war spoils conquered by the Mujahideen since the Arab Spring, worried the West a great deal. Especially in Syria; an unprecedented number of soldiers gathered there and conquered unprecedented quantities of war spoils. This situation provided an excellently change; we could unnoticeably build a large base in the region, which could create a realistic military capability of defying international superpowers in the future. This opportunity now, however, seems wasting since the West is given green light, in Syria, to reduce all of this with airstrikes.

IS made a major misstep when it dissociated itself from the Mujahid scholars and leaders; who are known for their experience, knowledge and wisdom; without a correct alternative. A few months before the US announced an international coalition against IS, the Mujahid leader of Al-Qaedah Shaykh Ayman Ad-Dhawahiri gave a remarkable advice in the sixth part of the series “Days with the Imam” –a biographical series about Shaykh Usama bin Laden. He advised all Mujahid groups to dig bunkers. A strategy which proved very successful for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. This saved many lives when they were attacked by the US and NATO forces. However, many in Syria didn’t listen to this advice; they’d put his remark aside and thought that the Shaykh was living in the past, and that the Tora Bora period of Jihad is something ancient. However, this advice proved to be very valuable. Only a few months after this advise, the US announced an international coalition against the Mujahideen in Syria.

Shaykh Ayman Ad-Dhawahiri predicted with the announcement of the Islamic State, before the Caliphate, that this would only invite yet another international rain of missiles, this time on the innocent Muslim citizens of As-Shaam. Something which could be avoided. This was the reasons why the Shaykh did not agree with the announcement of a state in Syria at the time. He also wanted to secretly build a Jihad base in Syria which could defy the intentional superpowers in the future. So it was important not to draw attention from world powers, that’s why the presence of Al-Qaedah in Syria was kept a secret, until IS forced Al-Qaedah to come out in public. If IS would’ve listened to the experienced and wise Shaykh at the time, this would have spared thousands of (their own) lives, khair inshaAllah. Our Mujahid leaders and scholars, who have sacrificed their lives and freedom for this Dawah, do certainly not speak empty words. We must take their advice at heart and study their words carefully. The Prophet (SallAllahu Alayhi wa Selam) also said: “Fear the insight of a believer, for he sees with the Light of Allah.” (At-Tirmidhi)