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The third principle

 

Listen carefully. In the usool al-fiqh, there are matters of general [العام] and specific [الخاص]. For example, if I were to tell someone to pick up any student, that would be a general instruction. However, if I were to ask someone to pick up a particular student, that would be a specific instruction. Additionally, there are matters of unrestricted [المطلق] and restricted [المقيد]. For instance, when Allah ordered the Bani Israa'eel to sacrifice a cow during the time of Musa (peace be upon him), He initially commanded them to sacrifice any cow without restrictions. However, when they asked Allah which specific cow to sacrifice, He made it more difficult for them by imposing restrictions, thus making it harder to find the required cow. This demonstrates the concept of unrestricted and restricted matters.

 

These concepts of general, specific, unrestricted, and restricted are applicable to understanding all sciences of knowledge in Islam, including the Qur'an, Sunnah, hadith, and specifically in fiqh. For example, when discussing rulings that are either unrestricted or restricted. In usool al-fiqh, there are also matters of entirely clear [المحكم] and not entirely clear [المتشابه]. While you may be familiar with what constitutes entirely clear [المحكم], let's consider the matter of something not entirely clear [المتشابه]. This occurs when Allah or the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) says something with a specific intent, but linguistically, the wording may have alternative interpretations. However, the correct meaning is only what was intended, not the other possible meanings. The wisdom behind this lies in the trial [الابتلاء] from Allah, as He tests whether you will adhere to the matter that is not entirely clear [المتشابه] by referring it back to what is entirely clear [المحكم], following the truth (haqq), or if you will follow a different interpretation that aligns with your own desires. This relates to entirely clear [المحكم] and not entirely clear [المتشابه].

 

In usool al-fiqh, we also encounter matters of abrogation [الناسخ] and what is abrogated [المنسوخ]. Furthermore, there are matters of nass [النص] (explicitly clear [textual] words) and apparent [الظاهر] meanings, which may have the potential for other interpretations. However, these alternative meanings are not taken into consideration.

 

Madkhali considers those matters applicable only to the Kalaam of Allah and the sayings of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), specifically the Qur'an and the Sunnah. He does not consider these matters applicable to the sayings of the 'ulama'. In fact, he falsely considers the application of these matters to the sayings of 'ulama' as bida'ah and claims it to be a matter of Ahlus-Sunnah foundation. Furthermore, he does not even regard this subject matter within the realm of usool al-fiqh but rather as a matter of usool Ahlus-Sunnah. Consequently, he immediately declares those who hold contrary opinions as mubtadi'ah (innovators). He expressed the opinion that those who believe usool al-fiqh can be applied to the sayings of the 'ulama' are defending Sayyid Qutub and his concept of wahdatul-wujood (unity of existence). (Relevant) The 'ulama' have stated that when faced with ambiguous statements, one should refer to clear statements in order to understand the intended meaning. However, Madkhali considers this approach as an innovation (bida'ah). He further claims that it is a defense of Sayyid Qutub and argues that none of the 'ulama' have ever stated that usool al-fiqh cannot be applied to the sayings of other individuals, including the 'ulama'. Madkhali perceives this perspective as the foundation of Ahlus-Sunnah. (Relevant)

 

We offer a firm response to this claim. Firstly, with regard to consensus (ijmaa'), not a single scholar has ever stated that this matter belongs among the usool of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah. This consensus holds true for scholars throughout history, including those who wrote about the foundations of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah during the time of Imam Ahmad and Imam al-Bukhaari, as well as those who came later, such as Ibn Taymiyyah and those before and after him. Furthermore, during the time of shaykh Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab, Siddeeq Hasan Khan, and even contemporary scholars like shaykh ibn Baaz, ibn 'Uthaymeen, and others, no one has ever regarded this subject matter as a matter of 'aqeedah. However, Madkhali falsely claims that it is a foundational principle of 'aqeedah. This is the first point we would like to emphasize in our response.

 

Another significant point to highlight is the clear indication of the limited level of knowledge possessed by the individual making this claim. Why is this the case? The concepts of general [عام], unrestricted [مطلق], and restricted [مقيد], among others, are extensively discussed by the 'ulama'. These discussions primarily take place within the framework of usool al-fiqh. The majority of scholars, particularly those who came later, provide an introduction that emphasizes the foundations of usool al-fiqh. Nearly all of them mention that usool al-fiqh is built upon the Arabic language, just as we should analyze general matters in light of specific ones and consider the transition from unrestricted to restricted rulings. The 'ulama' recognize these principles as fundamental aspects of the Arabic language. It is essential to note that the 'ulama' employ this understanding not only when interpreting the Qur'an and the Sunnah but also in comprehending pre-Islamic Arab traditions. Although they may not explicitly mention it, they acknowledge and apply this linguistic perspective as it aids in understanding the speaker's intent.

 

The third point to consider is the potential negative outcome of Madkhali's specific opinion. Let us refer to the words of Ibn Taymiyyah, who states that if one takes general statements of the 'ulama' and statements lacking restrictions without referring them back to clear and detailed statements, it can lead to an unsound and ugly madhhab (understanding). This is precisely what has occurred in Madkhali's case. It is important to note that this issue extends beyond whether Sayyid Qutub discussed wahdatul-wujood or not. The problem is much more significant.

 

This mistaken principle, as expressed by Madkhali, has far-reaching consequences that affect not only 'aqeedah but also fiqh, usool al-hadith, and all other fields of knowledge studied by his students. There is a significant risk that a student will come with misinterpretations. Why? When a student reads a particular instance, they may take it at face value without considering other instances where the matter has been clarified or specific restrictions have been mentioned. The student treats these instances as separate matters. Consequently, the conclusion reached will be flawed and align with the unsound understanding mentioned by ibn Taymiyyah. This is why Madkhali's opinions are often viewed as strange and ugly.

 

Madkhali's particular opinion, which he considers as one of the foundations of Ahlus-Sunnah, has been clearly refuted by ibn Taymiyyah in his fatawa. Ibn Taymiyyah states that this opinion is an innovation (bida'ah) and goes against the consensus (ijmaa') of the scholars. Despite this, Madkhali continues to regard it as foundational in Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah. It is evident from these facts how strange and misguided his opinions are in most cases.

 

Now, let's address your point about the practice of the 'ulama' regarding this matter within their books. The answer is affirmative. In fact, I have extensively studied various books written by scholars from different schools of thought, including Hanafi, Maaliki, Shafi'ee, and Hanbali. Especially in comprehensive fiqh books, the 'ulama' have discussed these matters in detail. They can be found in topics such as talaaq (divorce), oaths (aymaan), and legal judgments (qadaa), among many others. For instance, they have addressed situations where a person utters a statement with a specific intent while swearing by Allah or when an ambiguous statement needs to be understood correctly. These discussions are not theoretical but practical in nature.

 

Moreover, this subject matter is even covered in the Sharh 'Umdatul-Ahkaam by ibn Qudaamah, which is an introductory fiqh book widely studied by the Hanbalis. This demonstrates that Madkhali's ignorance regarding these matters is substantial or that he is driven by his personal desires. It does not require extensive research to come across these discussions as they are found in the works of scholars like ibn Taymiyyah, ibnul-Qayyim, ibn Rajab, Abdurrahman as-Sa'di, and many others. I mentioned these names specifically because they belong to the Hanbali madhhab. Madkhali being from the Arabian Peninsula and studying there, where the Hanbali madhhab is prevalent, highlights either his inadequate knowledge or his inclination to follow his own whims and desires.

 

So if Madkhali is like that, when it comes to whether Sayyid Qutub actually said anything about wahdatul-wujood, Madkhali insists that he did, despite the fact that Sayyid Qutub's specific statement was ambiguous. In other instances, Sayyid Qutub provided clear statements that clarified his beliefs, but Madkhali disregards those clear statements and sticks to the ambiguous one. According to his own erroneous principle, Madkhali solely relies on the ambiguous statement and ignores the clarified statement. Is this practice limited to Sayyid Qutub alone? No. Madkhali applies this false principle to everyone. For instance, if someone unintentionally makes an ambiguous statement, and the shaykh becomes aware of it through students who point out, "I don't think you meant to say such and such," the shaykh clarifies himself and explains that he meant something different, acknowledging the mistake. However, Madkhali refuses to accept such clarifications as valid excuses.

 

The fourth principle

 

The fourth principle pertains to the statements of the salaf and how Madkhali applies them in all circumstances of our time. It is important to note that practicing what the salaf have said is obligatory in certain circumstances. Here, I am referring to the salaf in general, which implies consensus (ijmaa'). However, practicing their statements in all circumstances is not obligatory. The Quran and the Sunnah are what should be universally practiced, as they are applicable in all circumstances and situations.

 

Nevertheless, it is crucial to understand that the statements of the salaf vary. Some of their statements were made in a general context, and therefore, should be understood and applied in a general sense in all circumstances. However, there are also statements made by the salaf in specific contexts. In such cases, if we intend to apply those statements, we should do so only in similar circumstances and not in all circumstances or situations.

 

Let us provide some examples. One of the foundations of Ahlus-Sunnah is to distance oneself from innovators (mubtadi'ah), to oppose them, and to warn against them. Unfortunately, countless Sunnis and Muslims are unaware of this foundation. It is intertwined with the principle of enjoining good and forbidding evil. However, there are exceptions to this principle. Ahlus-Sunnah adheres to that what is mentioned in the foundation. When Ahlus-Sunnah is stronger and Sunni beliefs are widespread among the people, they treat the innovators as the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) treated the hypocrites after the conquest of Makkah, when the companions were in a position of strength.

 

However, if the opposite occurs and Ahlus-Sunnah becomes weak, either generally or in certain locations, and innovations (bida'ah) become widespread, along with widespread ignorance of the Sunnah among the Muslims, in such circumstances, Ahlus-Sunnah treats the innovators as the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) treated the hypocrites before he gained strength in Madinah. They approach them with ease, while considering specific conditions and not opening this approach to everyone.

 

Madkhali, on the other hand, takes all that Ahlus-Sunnah has said and how they have dealt with the innovators in their respective circumstances, and applies it strictly in all situations, especially in the present time. We can observe that in our current circumstances, the prevalent practices are predominantly characterized by bid'ah instead of the Sunnah, and ignorance prevails over knowledge. Thus, we witness the followers of Madkhali isolating themselves from people and distancing themselves from everyone. This behavior is evident among almost everyone associated with them.

 

Likewise, they have taken certain statements from ibn Salah and ibn Taymiyyah, which are indeed true, regarding the greater danger posed by innovators (mubtadi'ah) compared to the disbelievers themselves. The reason behind this is that while the disbelievers attack the physical bodies of Muslims, the innovators target their hearts and beliefs. However, can we apply this same principle in the present day? Is the situation the same as it was before? The answer is no.

 

In the current era, especially after the capture and imprisonment of Louis IX in Egypt, the disbelievers recognized that waging direct warfare against Muslims only strengthened their faith and resolve. As a result, they realized that the solution was to attack the belief system of the Muslims. Since that time, the disbelievers have learned from their experiences and have employed various methods to undermine the beliefs of Muslims. These include promoting secularism, democracy, and communism, utilizing orientalists who specialize in studying Muslims and their beliefs, influencing Muslim individuals through education in foreign countries such as France or England, and then placing them in influential positions in their home countries where their opinions are followed. They also attack the hearts and beliefs of Muslims through television programs, movies, universities, and schools. For instance, in many educational institutions, the theory of evolution (Darwin's belief) is taught. All of these efforts constitute an attack on the hearts and beliefs of Muslims. The disbelievers' approach has evolved from solely attacking the physical bodies of Muslims to targeting both their bodies and beliefs.

 

Therefore, in today's context, we cannot make a generalized statement that innovators are worse than disbelievers, as the salaf had previously asserted. The dynamics and strategies employed by disbelievers have changed over time, making it necessary for us to reassess and evaluate the current realities we face.

 

One can understand from this why the Madaakhilah (followers of Madkhali) never take into consideration the actions of the U.S. against Muslims worldwide. They also fail to acknowledge the harm caused by Democrats, secularists, communists, and nationalists towards Muslims in our world. If they do address these matters, it is done in an insignificant manner compared to the attention they give to what they perceive as innovators (mubtadi'ah).

 

These four principles outlined above encompass Madkhali's beliefs and are derived from what he explicitly mentioned in the first three principles, as well as from the way he treats others. The fourth principle can be observed in his actions and how he applies the opinions of the salaf superficially, without delving into the deeper context. Although it is important to warn against innovators, this should always be done with justice and knowledge. Unfortunately, Madkhali lacks both knowledge and justice in his approach.

 

I will postpone discussing the rulings of the 'ulama' and the salaf regarding the matters that Madkhali has addressed. This will be addressed later, insha'Allah, and it will provide further clarity, particularly when we explore his other serious errors and judgments against others.

 

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Murji’ah sect

 

Madkhali once discussed the Murji'ah. Who are the Murji'ah? The Murji'ah constitute several groups, some more extreme than others, but all agreeing that action (عمل) is not part of eemaan, implying that one could abstain from every prescribed action in the Deen and still be considered Muslim, according to Murji'ah belief. Madkhali spoke of two well-known groups: the Ghulaat al-Murji'ah (those who exaggerate in irjaa’) and the Murji'ah al-Fuqahaa’, actual fuqahaa’ who had fallen into this serious deviancy.

 

Madkhali made an initially correct statement, saying that the 'ulama' of Ahlus-Sunnah consider the Ghulaat al-Murji'ah as kuffaar, a general judgment not specifically applied to each individual. Additionally, he stated that the 'ulama' of Ahlus-Sunnah have not made takfeer against the Murji'ah al-Fuqahaa', a correct statement.

 

However, when he tried to explain why Ahlus-Sunnah refrained from making takfeer against the Murji'ah al-Fuqahaa', he claimed that both Ahlus-Sunnah and Murji'ah al-Fuqahaa' agreed on two matters: action is a condition of eemaan and that Allah will certainly punish the kuffaar as He has promised [انفاذ الوعيد في اهل كبائر]. This latter statement is one of the five principles of the Mu'tazilah.

 

Regarding the assertion that action is a condition of eemaan, there are three possible interpretations of 'condition': (1) a requirement for the matter to be correct, as standing in 'Arafah during the hajj, (2) a requirement for something to be obligatory (waajib), like the time for salah. When fuqahaa' use the term 'condition', they typically refer to these two meanings, not a third interpretation that has emerged recently: that it is a condition for something to be perfect.

If Madkhali's usage was meant to be a condition of something being obligatory, he either meant that action is a condition for eemaan being correct (meaning if one abandons all prescribed actions, they become a kaafir), or he meant that action is a condition of eemaan being perfect (meaning if one abandons all actions, they remain Muslim).

 

Did the Murji'ah say that abandoning all actions makes one a kaafir? No, they claim one is not a kaafir even if they abandon all prescribed actions. So, Madkhali must have meant the latter interpretation, which aligns with the Asha'irah and is not the view of Ahlus-Sunnah. This is what scholars like al-Ghazzaali and az-Zabidi, who are Ashaa'irah and mutakallimeen, have said.

 

Both the Qur'an and Hadith, even by ijmaa’, assert that if one abandons all actions, they become a kaafir. Who stated this ijmaa'? It was ash-Shaafi'ee. Who said that one should not do takfeer against those who have left all the prescribed actions? It was ibn Taymiyyah in al-Iman al-Awsat.

 

Could Madkhali say these things, despite scholars like shaykh ibn Baaz, shaykh Bakr Abu Zayd, shaykh al-Fawzan, and others, such as the Council of Senior Scholars, having issued fatwas against this meaning three or four times? This meaning, stating it is against the Qur'an, Sunnah, Ijmaa', is a claim made by the Murji'ah. Yet, could Madkhali have fallen into this trap? There is a high likelihood he did. Why? Because one of the people against whom the Council of Senior Scholars issued a fatwa was Hasan ibn ‘Ali al-Halabi, whom Madkhali fervently defended, even after the Council's fatwa.

 

As we've stated before, Madkhali has claimed that both the Murji'ah al-Fuqahaa' and Ahlus-Sunnah agree that action is a condition of eemaan. It's implausible that the Murji'ah intended 'condition' here to mean eemaan is correct, they likely meant eemaan is perfect. In other words, according to them, if one were to abandon all actions, they would still be considered a Muslim. This is the viewpoint held by the Murji'ah.

 

Firstly, I wouldn't dare say that Madkhali definitively meant this because I lack clear and unequivocal evidence. However, I believe there's a high probability that it reflects his opinion. I say this because I'm convinced that Madkhali did not intend to express this. He aimed to convey something else which ibn Taymiyyah had mentioned. The words are very similar, but his memory appears weak, and he struggled to express what he wanted to say accurately. This led to a rather peculiar statement.

 

One of the reasons for this confusion is that ibn Taymiyyah discussed a topic that both the Murji'ah and Ahlus-Sunnah agreed upon. Madkhali attempted to express these same words, but not in their original meaning, and unfortunately, he didn't articulate it well. Therefore, I assert that there's a high probability that this misunderstanding caused Madkhali's odd phrasing.

 

Why do I believe this? Because scholars like shaykh ibn Baaz, Bakr Abu Zayd, Fawzan, and the Council of Senior Scholars have issued fatwas against the book of ‘Ali al-Halabi. These scholars have issued three fatwas against ‘Ali al-Halabi. The first was against a book by ash-Shukri, which ‘Ali al-Halabi wrote an introduction for. The other fatwas were against two books written by al-Halabi, one expressing his own opinion and the other defending it.

 

Regarding the second book, ‘Ali al-Halabi mentioned in the Islamic magazine, Majallat al-Furqan [مجلة الفرقان], that he presented the book to several ‘ulama’. He named about four, and one of them was Rabee’ ibn Haadee al-Madkhali. Normally, when one endorses a book that defends another, it implies agreement with the first book's opinion. In this case, al-Halabi explicitly asserted that action is merely a condition of eemaan being perfect, a belief that aligns precisely with the Ash’ariyyah. Thus, if Madkhali said this, he would clearly be a Murji'.

 

Applying his own principles against him, what would he be? According to his principles, he would undoubtedly be a Mu’tazili and Murji'. His position asserts that one cannot apply ambiguous interpretation to clear statements. These are his principles, not ours.

 

His level of knowledge

 

The next point that indicates his level of knowledge comes from his discussion about the Murji'ah's opposites, the Khawaarij. He once claimed that neither the early Khawaarij nor the contemporary ones ever fell into shirk within 'ibaadah. Is his statement accurate? The contemporary Khawaarij that exist today don't share the same foundational beliefs entirely as the early ones, just as it is with the Ash'ariyyah, for example. However, they're still considered new Khawaarij except for one group: al-'Ibaadiyyah. During the time of shaykh Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab, 'Ibaadiyyah fell into major shirk, as documented in the books of Da’wah an-Najdiyyah. These books are authored by scholars from shaykh Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-Wahhab's school, such as Durar as-Saniyyah.

 

It's perplexing that Madkhali did not read this. Regrettably, most Salafis don't have in-depth knowledge of the 'ulama' books. They are familiar with Kitab at-Tawhid, Thalaathatul-Usool, Kashf ash-Shubuhaat, Nawaaqid al-Islam, and other smaller texts. However, they have limited understanding of the more extensive volumes. I have ample evidence that some of the significant 'ulama' have stated things that contradict what the 'ulama' of Da’wah an-Najdiyyah have said, especially on topics like taaghoot, takfeer, jihad, among others.

 

This next point is where Madkhali discussed the Khilafah. There are some people who have greatly exaggerated the importance of the Khilafah, regarding it as one of the most significant matters in Islam and something the prophets (peace be upon them) were sent for. This is inaccurate; the prophets (peace be upon them) were sent to preach Tawheed. The Khilafah is merely an instrument to practice Tawheed. Unfortunately, Madkhali, often stunned by others' views, was taken aback by people who exaggerate about the Khilafah. He didn't articulate his stance very clearly, but the way he presents it in writing suggests that the Khilafah is a means to practice Islam. He downplays it, contrary to its actual significance.

 

For example, when scholars say that this salah is naafilah, it's mustahabbah, they're not suggesting it lacks weight. Rather, it carries substantial weight, though not to the level of waajib. There is a significant difference between a scholar saying that salah is mustahabbah and a layperson who dismisses it as merely mustahabbah. The scholar's statement is not equivalent to the layperson's.

 

Similarly, when scholars say that the Khilafah is a means (وسيلة), they do not imply it's meaningless. When one reads what Madkhali has written in a sentence, one notices that he undermines the significance of the Khilafah. He then asserts two points: that there has been consensus (ijmaa’) on the obligation to establish the Khilafah, which many have acknowledged; and that there is no clear evidence for this consensus, which is also correct.

 

Scholars have disagreed about whether the obligation to establish the Khilafah is based on Shari'ah or 'aql (intellect). This disagreement is valid, as scholars have discussed it. But here's the issue: Those who mentioned the consensus but noted disagreement over whether the obligation was based on Shari'ah or 'aql are referring to an earlier consensus. The majority who said that the Khilafah is obligatory based on 'aqli evidence were either from the mutakallimeen or greatly influenced by them. Madkhali did not discuss this just to inform; he did so to downplay the significance of those who have exaggerated the Khilafah.

 

If we were to consider others because their foundation was according to 'ilmul-kalaam or were greatly influenced by it, we wouldn't excuse Madkhali for it because we know he studied in Saudi Arabia. In Saudi Arabia, especially in this context whether it pertains to Shari'ah or 'aql, it is clearly stated, even in Ibn Taymiyyah's books and other scholars' writings. What is the issue here? Listen, Madkhali said that there is no clear evidence. But, this is in usool al-fiqh, and unfortunately, many who claim to be scholars are weak in this area, resulting in ugly and grievous errors.

 

Abu Ishaaq ash-Shirazi and Ibn Taymiyyah have mentioned that there can never be consensus on something not present in the Qur'an and Sunnah. So if there's consensus on something, it will exist in the Qur'an and Sunnah. This evidence can sometimes be clear, understood by all or most, or sometimes unclear, understood only by a few scholars. And what does Madkhali say? That's one thing. The other thing is, who even says that the evidence should always be clear? It can be clear and sometimes unclear. Therefore, sometimes scholars use consensus as evidence because they can't find an Ayah, while others can. Is consensus not enough for you? That's one aspect. The other aspect is that evidence is evidence, whether it is clear or unclear.

 

So, what are those unclear evidences for the obligation to establish Khilafah? It's all those hadiths that talk about bay'ah as obligatory, where scholars in usool al-fiqh say that when something is obligatory, what leads to it is also obligatory. Meaning, if something depends on others and it cannot exist without those others, then when something is obligatory, what it depends upon is also obligatory. This means if bay'ah is obligatory, is bay'ah not dependent on the existence of the Khalifah? Then establishing the Khilafah is also obligatory. There is this principle that says: what is needed to complete an obligatory duty also becomes obligatory. But Madkhali only wants clear evidence as if he doesn't want to accept the evidence of the unclear which was otherwise proven in usool al-fiqh.

 

This is about usool al-fiqh on matters of consensus, also concerning clear and unclear matters. The third matter he mentions is that the scholars have agreement, and he acknowledged it as if it was alright. This is coming from someone who regards himself as the imam of al-Jarh wat-Ta’deel, one of the foremost Salafis in the world today, a leading figure demonstrating he is Sunni, etc. He acknowledged that there had been disagreement about if the Khilafah is obligatory according to Shari'ah or 'aql...

 

Firstly, to answer this, we need to digress to introduce a topic: Ahlus-Sunnah believe that Shari’ah can never contradict [pure] ‘aql just as it never opposes the fitrah, and doesn't conflict with scientific discoveries or the Qadar of Allah. Shari’ah will never contradict these and it will never oppose ‘aql. When Allah mentioned the kuffaar who are in hell, what were they saying?

وَقَالُوا۟ لَوْ كُنَّا نَسْمَعُ أَوْ نَعْقِلُ مَا كُنَّا فِىٓ أَصْحَـٰبِ ٱلسَّعِيرِ

And they will say: "Had we but listened or used our intelligence, we would not have been among the dwellers of the blazing Fire!" (Al-Mulk 67:10)

Allah, in many Ayat, said [أَفَلَا تَعْقِلُونَ] "Will you not then take thought?". So, Shari’ah will never oppose ‘aql. If there come some examples in which one believes that Shari’ah is opposing ‘aql, then what is the answer? The answer is, either he claims that it’s according to his ‘aql, but in reality, it’s inaccurate and wrong according to ‘aql. This is the first answer. The second answer is that what he claims is what the Shari’ah is, but in reality, it’s not what was intended by the Shari’ah, as he misunderstood it. The third answer is that it’s not correct, meaning the hadith is weak [ضعيف] and he believed that it was authentic [صحيح]. However, if the evidence is authentic, meaning it’s in either the Qur’an or Sunnah Saheehah, and the understanding therein is correct according to ‘aql, these can never contradict each other. All of this is because Allah has revealed Shari’ah so that it could be understood. He has revealed it as hidaayah (guidance), not to confuse people. Therefore, there are countless evidences in the Qur’an according to ‘aql, and this is something that a pure ‘aql and fitrah could notice. Like when Allah mentioned that if one regards ‘Eesa (peace be upon him) as unusual [in regards to his birth] then it would be more unusual in regards to Adam (peace be upon him) because ‘Eesa (peace be upon him) has only a mother without a father, while Adam (peace be upon him) has neither mother nor father. Therefore, Allah compared ‘Eesa with Adam (peace be upon them both) as the example of ‘Eesa is like that of Adam. When the kuffaar regarded the angels as the daughters of Allah, what did Allah say to them?

أَفَأَصْفَىٰكُمْ رَبُّكُم بِٱلْبَنِينَ وَٱتَّخَذَ مِنَ ٱلْمَلَـٰٓئِكَةِ إِنَـٰثًا ۚ إِنَّكُمْ لَتَقُولُونَ قَوْلًا عَظِيمًۭا

”Has then your Lord (O pagans of Makkah!) preferred for you sons, and taken for Himself from among the angels daughters? Verily you indeed utter an awful saying.” (Al-Israa’ 17:40)

As ibn Katheer explained in his tafseer: “meaning, in your claim that Allah has children, then you say that His children are female, which you do not like for yourselves and may even kill them by burying them alive. That is indeed a division most unfair!”

 

Allah has mentioned some evidences that align with our 'aql, asserting that He will resurrect mankind on Judgment Day after they have died, much like plants springing up from barren earth (cf. al-Hajj 22:5). There are many other evidences where what Allah has revealed conforms to our 'aql.

 

There were some from Ahlul-Hadith in the past who were taken aback by the Jahmiyyah and those involved in ilmul-kalaam, those sects were exaggerating in ‘aql and some of the Ahlul-Hadith, unfortunately, reacted by disregarding ‘aql as an evidence completely. Ibn Taymiyyah also talked about it and said that what they [some of the Ahlul-Hadith] said was wrong and a grave mistake, also that one shouldn’t handle it the opposite way after being stunned, and this was something they have done. Therefore, one shouldn’t make erroneous statements about ‘aql in general, though dealing with it as an misunderstanding according to ‘aql and dealing with it as an exaggeration in ‘aql [hence in this regard not outright rejecting ‘aql as evidence]. So what is the deciding factor in the end? ‘Aql in relation to Qur’an is like eyes in relation to light. Eyes cannot see without light, so it’s the same in regards to ‘aql, hence ‘aql cannot see without the light of Qur’an and Sunnah. Just like eyes have limited sight, ‘aql also has limitations. ‘Aql cannot comprehend what the soul (روح) is as Allah says:

وَيَسْـَٔلُونَكَ عَنِ ٱلرُّوحِ ۖ قُلِ ٱلرُّوحُ مِنْ أَمْرِ رَبِّى وَمَآ أُوتِيتُم مِّنَ ٱلْعِلْمِ إِلَّا قَلِيلًۭا

And they ask you, [O Muḥammad], about the soul. Say, "The soul is of the affair [i.e., concern] of my Lord. And you [i.e., mankind] have not been given of knowledge except a little." (Al-Israa’ 17:85)

So, what is the deciding factor in the end? It's Shar' [شرع]. While our 'aql acknowledges that Islam is the truth, once this truth is known, does 'aql decide? No, we should submit and surrender to Allah. Similarly, Muslims [أهل الحل والعقد] can initially decide who the Khalifah should be, but afterwards, can they decide they no longer want him as the Khalifah? No, it's final, just like 'aql. After recognizing that Islam is the truth, 'aql should submit and follow this truth because the Qur'an and Sunnah contain the true knowledge. This is the only path to salvation; otherwise, one could end up being misguided. Therefore, ibn Qudaamah al-Maqdisi and other 'ulama' have mentioned that there is no waajib according to 'aql, but there is waajib according to Shari'ah, which will never contradict 'aql.

 

Hence, "the imam al-Jarh wat-Ta’deel" and "the imam of Ahlus-Sunnah" in this era, namely Rabee' ibn Haadee al-Madkhali, couldn't comprehend or possess knowledge about this. This, once again, shows his level of knowledge in usool al-fiqh to be quite weak, despite this field of study being significantly important.

 

 

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The last point [in this first lecture]

 

The discourse isn't really unique to Madkhali; it's about tawheed al-hukm or tawheed al-haakimiyyah. Madkhali stated that the salaf, including ibnul-Qayyim and Abdurrahman ibn Hasan, the one who wrote the explanation for Kitab at-Tahweed, titled Fath al-Majeed, divided tawheed into three categories: ar-Rububiyyah, al-Asmaa’ was-Sifaat, and Uloohiyyah. According to Madkhali, no one has added a fourth category, asserting that adding one would be an innovation [بدعة].

 

In response to this, it's crucial to note that this viewpoint is not exclusive to Madkhali; other 'ulama' share it as well. Tawheed al-Hukm is a statement, and when discussing Islamic terms, some exist in the Qur'an and Sunnah; these are the ones to adhere to. Other words, which are not directly derived from these sources, may still be permissible to use if they are clear and contextually correct. Words that have several interpretations, some correct and others incorrect, could be deemed bida’ah. In such cases, one needs to clarify which interpretation is accurate and acceptable and which isn't.

 

A word can also be considered bida’ah if it can be used with several different meanings: one person may use the word intending the correct meaning, while another person may use the same word intending an entirely different meaning. The third type, which is clearly bida’ah, is a word that has an incorrect or false meaning in Islam.

 

These three types of words should not be used and are regarded as bida’ah. They are often found in philosophy and 'ilmul-kalaam. Ahlus-Sunnah often encounters these types of words when discussing Allah's Beautiful Names and Lofty Attributes. Regrettably, this issue persists today, and examples include words like diplomacy, democracy, and nationalism. Some Islamists might use these words intending a correct meaning in Islam, or it could be bida’ah, or it could even be kufr. The intended meaning is known best by Allah. In such situations, one should use clear words that relate to Islam. So Tawheed al-Hukm, despite its clear meaning, if it were incorrect, we would state that those words are incorrect, but we wouldn't declare them as bida’ah as Madkhali and others have done.

 

Those who consider it bida’ah argue that the salaf never used these words in this way. However, listen to the answer. Ibnul-Qayyim, in his Madaarij as-Saalikeen, after explaining three Ayat in Surah al-An’aam (cf. 6:114, 14, and 164), stated that these three are the pillars of tawheed and that you should not regard anyone besides Allah as Rabb, Ilaah, nor Hakamaa. He considered Tawheed al-Hukm as one of the three pillars of tawheed. It was Ibnul-Qayyim himself who stated this, not someone else.

 

Usually, when discussing the three categories of tawheed, namely ar-Rububiyyah, al-Asmaa’ was-Sifaat, and Uloohiyyah, we find several subcategories. For example, tawheed al-Uloohiyyah (or al-’Ibaadah) implies that one should only worship Allah alone. Tawheed ar-Rububiyyah signifies that the attributes of ar-Rabb apply only to Him concerning what He does and not to anyone else. When discussing tawheed al-Asmaa’ was-Sifaat, it exclusively pertains to Allah. So, where does tawheed al-hukm fit into these three categories? It actually falls under all three.

 

Tawheed al-Uloohiyyah means making tawheed to Allah with one’s actions, and tawheed al-hukm is similar as you must practice Shari’ah. Tawheed ar-Rububiyyah implies making tawheed to Allah concerning what He does, meaning you believe He is the only One who provides sustenance, the only One who creates, etc. Tawheed al-hukm aligns with this as you believe that the only One who legislates is Allah.

 

Does tawheed al-hukm come under tawheed al-Asmaa’ was-Sifaat? Yes. The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) said [إن اللهَ هو الحكمُ ، وإليه الحكمُ]. (Source) This is one of Allah’s Beautiful Names, al-Hakam.

 

Shaykh ibn Baaz mentioned that some ‘ulama’ have added a fourth category of tawheed but did not specify who they were. However, it was indeed both ibnul-Qayyim in Madaarij as-Saalikeen and ibn Abil-’Izz al-Hanafi who called this fourth category tawheed al-mursal, referring to the One who sent this revelation, meaning Allah. Tawheed al-mursal means accepting the message. What do the ‘ulama’ mean by this? They didn't imply that one should worship the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him), which would be shirk akbar. Instead, they meant that one should only follow him (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him). They considered that as the fourth category of tawheed.

 

According to Madkhali, this would be bida’ah because it doesn't fall under the three established categories. Does this fit under tawheed al-hukm? Yes, it does, and ibn Abil-’Izz al-Hanafi clarified in [شرح العقيدة الطحاوية] that tawheed al-mursal, the tawheed of the one who received the message, is to accept judgment and legislation. Thus, tawheed al-hukm falls under all the other tawheed categories. (Source)

 

So what's the problem with considering it a standalone category despite ibnul-Qayyim not having specifically mentioned it? Given that there is a lot of shirk currently being committed, such as many political parties ruling by something other than what Allah has revealed and giving themselves the right to legislate, also allowing people to choose whether to follow Islam or other religions! This is clear kufr as it allows individuals to choose between being Muslim or a kaafir. This is the reality of democracy.

 

Since this mindset has spread throughout the world and it's clear that it constitutes shirk and opposes tawheed, what's the problem with focusing on this subject and calling it tawheed al-hukm, just like how salaf focused on tawheed al-Asmaa’ was-Sifaat when bida’ah came, and how the salaf focused on tawheed al-Uloohiyyah when shirk occurred? By doing so, one follows the salaf and does not introduce bida’ah.

 

As mentioned earlier, ibnul-Qayyim discussed similar matters, highlighting the importance of tawheed al-Asmaa’ was-Sifaat. From this category, you understand tawheed ar-Rububiyyah; and from both tawheed ar-Rububiyyah and al-Asmaa’ was-Sifaat, you understand tawheed al-Uloohiyyah and tawheed al-Hukm.

 

How and why does shirk spread in the first place? Shirk spreads due to two reasons: one is due to ignorance about the principles of Islam, and the other is the proliferation of doctrines such as 'ilmul-kalaam. In 'ilmul-kalaam, practitioners often disbelieve in many of Allah's Beautiful Names and Lofty Attributes, claiming that describing Allah as He has described Himself is akin to comparing Him to His creation. If one denies these concepts and then encounters practitioners of witchcraft, they might believe that these practitioners are awliyaa’. Additionally, some people share fictional stories, like claims that if you call upon a wali, you will receive help. What do those who do not know who Allah is do in such situations? They inevitably fall into shirk! This process repeats itself in the realm of legislation. When people do not understand Allah's Beautiful Names and Lofty Attributes, His Wisdom, His Knowledge, His Power, and that everything is His dominion, they may come to believe that enlightenment and security come from Europe, not Allah. This lack of understanding often results in blindly following non-Islamic legislation. This demonstrates the importance of understanding Allah's Beautiful Names and Lofty Attributes. It's not enough to merely read about 'aqeedah like rules and principles. One should delve deeper into 'aqeedah to see how it impacts their own life. The four principles that we avoid, namely distorting, denying, likening Allah to His creation, and discussing how the Lofty Attributes are, are all important, but one should also learn the objectives and how the Beautiful Names and Lofty Attributes influence the Shari’ah and one's personal life.

 

On the topic of Madkhali, despite his grave errors, is he Sunni? The question is how one can identify a Sunni or mubtadi’. By default, all Muslims are considered Sunni until proven otherwise. If one becomes aware of actions or beliefs that contradict Sunni Islam or Islam itself, then a judgement can be made. What actions or beliefs would cause one to be considered a non-Sunni? There are three key factors. The first, which is widely accepted with consensus (ijmaa’), is if one believes in something that contradicts one of the major foundations of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa’ah. The second factor, as ibn Taymiyyah mentioned, is that many Ahlus-Sunnah might commit minor errors in 'aqeedah but not in the foundations. If one declares these 'ulama’ as mubtadi’ah due to minor errors, then one could unjustly declare many 'ulama’ Ahlus-Sunnah as non-Sunni, which is unacceptable. If one commits acts of al-walaa’ wal-baraa’ due to these minor errors and making tabdee' or takfeer due to these minor errors, they would be considered mubtadi’ah.

 

Applying these principles to Madkhali, we find that while not all apply, most do. Madkhali is known to align with a government that aligns itself completely with the USA; a government that has developed the FN. Madkhali supports them unequivocally while opposing Muslim groups. Anyone who opposes that government will find Madkhali ready to work with the government intelligence service, providing information about these individuals and willingly handing them over. Madkhali and his followers, who exist worldwide, are known to side with those who call themselves secularists, democrats, or even communists. Despite his own opposition to these beliefs, Madkhali does not speak against his followers who do. His stance is clear when it comes to those who oppose his beliefs, especially Muslim groups, whether they are actually mubtadi’ah or Sunni, who oppose these kinds of governments. Madkhali also treats some branches of the Deen as foundational, or treats these branches as foundational in the manhaj or in the foundations of Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa’ah. He declares those who do not agree with him in these issues as mubtadi’ah. This behavior is typical of mubtadi’ah. Furthermore, Madkhali considers some topics, which could be seen as minor errors, as very important. He either considers these topics as part of the manhaj - and we've discussed what manhaj means to him - or he considers it as part of the foundation of Ahlus-Sunnah, therefore making tabdee' and incorporates it into al-walaa’ wal-baraa’, judging Muslims based on their deeds. Ultimately, he regards them all as kuffaar, even if he refrains from saying so explicitly.

 

So, what ibn Taymiyyah said applies completely to Madkhali. The third way Ahlus-Sunnah regards a person as mubtadi’ is when a person commits numerous minor errors on the topic of ‘aqeedah, such as on matters of eemaan, al-Qadar, al-Asmaa’ was-Sifaat, and the Sahaabah, etc. In this aspect, I hesitate to say that it applies completely to Madkhali, but some of it does.

 

Madkhali, despite echoing the foundations of Ahlus-Sunnah, practices some of them incorrectly. Additionally, he introduces elements not found in the foundations of Ahlus-Sunnah and uses them to build his notion of al-Walaa’ wal-Baraa’. It’s quite clear. We are either discussing a jaahil, who is not an ‘aalim, and against whom one must warn, regardless of whether he is Sunni or not. Alternatively, we are discussing an 'aalim, if that claim holds true, but one who follows his whims and desires. Thus, it’s clear that he is a mubtadi’. One must delineate this clearly, providing evidence of his innovation, because it’s critically important as it pertains to our Deen and can affect other people's lives. If someone claims to be from Ahlus-Sunnah when the contrary is true, one must expose this person for others to see, just as one exposes people who claim to be Muslims while the opposite is true. This is as important as when the kuffaar Quraysh claimed that prophet Ibrahim (peace be upon him) was one of them and belonged to the false Deen they followed, but Allah rejected their claims:

مَا كَانَ إِبْرَٰهِيمُ يَهُودِيًّۭا وَلَا نَصْرَانِيًّۭا وَلَـٰكِن كَانَ حَنِيفًۭا مُّسْلِمًۭا وَمَا كَانَ مِنَ ٱلْمُشْرِكِينَ

Ibrâhîm (Abraham) was neither a Jew nor a Christian, but he was a true Muslim Hanîfa (Islâmic Monotheism - to worship none but Allâh Alone) and he was not of Al-Mushrikûn (See V.2:105). (Aali ‘Imraan 3:67)

The Kuffaar Quraysh, along with Christians and Jews, only claimed that, but Allah has rejected their claims.

People can easily be manipulated by mere names or terms, such as those claiming they want to enact islaah [إصلاح], as munaafiqeen have claimed:

وَإِذَا قِيلَ لَهُمْ لَا تُفْسِدُوا۟ فِى ٱلْأَرْضِ قَالُوٓا۟ إِنَّمَا نَحْنُ مُصْلِحُونَ

And when it is said to them: "Make not mischief on the earth," they say: "We are only peace-makers." (Al-Baqarah 2:11)

It’s like how George Bush claimed [translator's note: which I think was around the time the recording was made. In other words, one shouldn’t automatically believe someone claiming to be from Ahlus-Sunnah, who goes around declaring themselves as Sunni and Salafi. This isn't a matter to be taken lightly, requiring little thought. That’s not how it works. If a person presents themselves with all kinds of titles and is undeservedly elevated in status, misleading and misguiding people in the process, it can lead people to become mubtadi’ or kaafir. The manipulation of semantics should not be underestimated. Consider how Iblees deceived Adam and Hawwaa (peace be upon them both) into eating from the tree, even though they were both forbidden to do so.

فَوَسْوَسَ لَهُمَا ٱلشَّيْطَـٰنُ لِيُبْدِىَ لَهُمَا مَا وُۥرِىَ عَنْهُمَا مِن سَوْءَٰتِهِمَا وَقَالَ مَا نَهَىٰكُمَا رَبُّكُمَا عَنْ هَـٰذِهِ ٱلشَّجَرَةِ إِلَّآ أَن تَكُونَا مَلَكَيْنِ أَوْ تَكُونَا مِنَ ٱلْخَـٰلِدِينَ وَقَاسَمَهُمَآ إِنِّى لَكُمَا لَمِنَ ٱلنَّـٰصِحِينَ

Then Shaitân (Satan) whispered suggestions to them both in order to uncover that which was hidden from them of their private parts (before); he said: "Your Lord did not forbid you this tree save that you should become angels or become of the immortals." And he [Shaitân (Satan)] swore by Allâh to them both (saying): "Verily, I am one of the sincere well-wishers for you both." (Al-A’raaf 7:20-21)

The Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) also said that there would be among his Ummah those who would allow zinaa, silk, alcohol [khamr] and musical instruments. Alcohol was deemed permissible by being referred to with another name. Once again, the manipulation of semantics should not be underestimated, as it can be extremely dangerous. This is what Iblees does.

 

[Translator’s note: this is the end of the first lecture]