In a sexual harassment case, plaintiff ex-employee challenged the decision of the Superior Court of Alameda County (California), which granted defendant employer's motion compelling plaintiff to undergo a examination to test the true extent of her injuries. Plaintiff then sought review of the Court of Appeals decision denying her writ of prohibition.
After plaintiff ex-employee was fired by defendant ex-employer, she filed a complaint against alleging sexual harassment, wrongful discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant filed a motion to compel plaintiff to undergo a medical and psychological examination to test the extent of her injuries and to measure her work abilities. After the trial court granted defendant's motion, plaintiff petitioned the appellate court for a writ of prohibition to direct the trial court to forbid the examination, claiming that it violated her right to privacy. The appellate corporate lawyer Los Angeles denied plaintiff's petition. The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision with directions to issue a peremptory writ of mandate compelling the trial court to limit the scope of the mental examination. The supreme court held that mere initiation of a sexual harassment suit, even with the extreme mental and emotional damage being asserted by plaintiff, did not act as waiver of all plaintiff's privacy rights, exposing her to unfettered mental probing by defendant's experts. The court further found that plaintiff's attorney was not required to be present during the mental examination.
The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision denying plaintiff ex-employee's petition which sought to compel the trial court to limit the scope of defendant ex-employer's mental examination of her. The supreme court held that to allow defendant an unfettered examination of plaintiff would violate her rights to privacy.
Petitioner doctor and respondent board each appealed from the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) that commanded respondent, on writ of mandate, to set-aside its order under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2384 and 2390 (1970) revoking petitioner's medical license for using marijuana, a narcotic under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11001 (1970), and remanded the matter to respondent for further proceedings.
After petitioner doctor was convicted of possession of marijuana, disciplinary proceedings were commenced before respondent board. At the time, marijuana was classified as a narcotic under Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11001 (1970). Respondent found that use of a narcotic was per se unprofessional conduct under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 2384 and 2390 (1970), which made a physician's personal use of narcotics and a narcotic conviction itself misconduct. On writ of mandate, the superior court ordered respondent to set-aside the revocation and remanded the case for further proceedings. Both parties appealed. In reversing in part and remanding with directions to issue a peremptory writ compelling respondent to vacate its order and dismiss the proceeding, the court noted that § 11001 had been amended to eliminate marijuana as a narcotic and ruled that petitioner was entitled to the benefit of that amendment. The legislature could constitutionally provide for disciplining of physicians on the basis of personal use of narcotics, due to the physician's role in controlling dangerous drugs, but because marijuana had been declassified, its use was no longer per se misconduct.
The judgment was reversed and the case was remanded with instructions to issue a peremptory writ mandating respondent to vacate its decision and dismiss the proceeding because, pending review, the applicable statute had been amended to eliminate marijuana as a narcotic and petitioner was entitled to the benefit of that mitigating amendment, such that marijuana use no longer was per se professional misconduct.