Ukraine Update
The pace of Ukraine's attacks slowed down but Russian casualties remain high and Russian artillery in the south is suffering heavy losses. Ukraine's plan in the south is to reach the sea by October. The pressure in the north is heavy but manageable.
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A military doctrine is how a nation decides to fight a war. It's based on culture and capabilities. It is a plan, but no plan survives contact with the enemy, at least not completely, and the theoretical doctrine that was devised in peacetime will always evolve to some sort of functional doctrine based on the experiences and evolving capabilities created by war.
Previous Soviet doctrines created combined arms at the regimental and divisional level, where infantry, armor, artillery and other assets work together with their unique capabilities to achieve an objective. In the 80's, the Soviets decided to create a combined arms capability at the battalion level called the Battalion Tactical Group (BTG). The concept was eventually dropped partly because trained junior officers and capable non-commissioned officers (NCOs) were required for battalion-level combined arms mission and the Soviets had neither.
In the 1980's I had a company commander that participated in a NATO exercise observed by Soviet officers. One of them expressed shock that a squad leader carried a map, saying no one under the rank of captain had a map in the Soviet army. Neither the Soviets, nor the Russians developed the military culture where initiative was encouraged instead of punished.
In 2012, Russia revived the BTG doctrine but never developed a capable NCO corps, and they did not develop junior officers trained to use their initiative. Indeed, in many units, soldiers didn't know basic individual skills, and as an army that discouraged and punished low-level initiative, they were unable to react to the unexpected resistance they faced. As a result, generals went to the front and were killed trying to straighten out problems that a captain, major or colonel should be able to fix.
In order to operate with their actual capabilities, they switched to a functional doctrine massed infantry, or sometimes small groups of armored vehicles, to assault while supported with artillery. The top-down driven Russian army isn't flexible, but at very narrow points on the battlefield they can potentially create enough pressure to break through if there's a crack in the defense, and they can rush a mass of reinforcements to a narrow breach in their own defenses to plug that hole.
Last September, the Russian army was in the strategic offensive mode and Ukraine noticed a sector in Kharkiv that was weakly defended by separatist forces and that there was only one Russian regiment in reserve. The Russians observed the Ukrainian forces assembling for four days but did not react to it. It took a couple of days for Ukraine to break through overwhelm the front line and reserve forces, and the Russian army still did not effectively react to it. The result was a total collapse of the Russian defenses and continued lack of effective responses from Russia.
Very few Ukrainian units were actually involved in the exploitation that recaptured so much territory. The only thing that stopped the Ukrainian army was their limited logistics capability. Once after Ukraine stopped to refuel, rearm and reorganize, the Russians were finally able to establish a coherent defense.
Since then, Russia has been on the strategic defense, even with the advances made on Bakhmut and the attacks in the north. Yes, they've had time to dig a lot of trenches and the mines are very important to slow down Ukrainian movement and giving the very slow Russian command time to react. But the biggest change for Russia was stacking units in a second line behind the front not to defend a second line, but to react to any breach in the front line and plug the hole.
If that hole wasn't immediately plugged and Ukraine had room to move in between the first and second lines, they could potentially create a very fluid situation, and Russia's top-down, communication-impaired army doesn't function well in fluid situations. The more static the situation, the better the Russians are able to function. To counter that, the Ukrainian army is starting to widen the fronts where they've already made some progress. The wider the front, the more fluid the situation, the worse for Russia.
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Ukraine inherited the Soviet mindset of orders driven from the top with individual initiative discouraged or punished. Before Zaluzhny became the top commander and took over the office, he hated visiting that room because it reminded him “that any commander who took his position was in fact a feudal lord over his subordinates.”
“These walls were soaked in this,” Zaluzhny said. “When you came in here, you immediately understood that it was a mistake to be born, it was a mistake to come here.” He became commander-in-chief seven months before the 2022 invasion and was determined to change the culture of the army. He still believes in discipline and accountability, but he says, “I do not mock people, I do not oppress them, I do not humiliate them.”
It takes a long time to change an institution and the change began in 2014. Faced with an unofficial Russian invasion, the Ukrainian army could not be a smaller version of the Russian army and survive. It had to become a better army. Over the years, it was influenced by western trainers, and its younger members support the concept of low-level initiative. At the higher levels of command opinions are mixed between the traditional top-down directives that must be followed and encouraging initiative to adapt to changing battlefield conditions.
Every operation needs a plan that states how an attack (or defense) will be conducted. In the US military, that is called an operations order. But a key element in an op order is the "commander's intent". This makes clear what the objective of the operation is and implies if all the plans go to hell, do what you have to do to accomplish this objective. Without that concept, a plan that is stopped by the enemy will stay stay in a failed state until a new plan is communicated from higher command. This takes time and operations are more likely to be successful if units can quickly adapt to a fluid situation. You want to seize the initiative and force the enemy to react, and you want to act quicker than he can react.
Over the years, particularly since 2022, the Ukrainian army has been trending towards supporting low-level initiative in their army. In fact, in the chaos of February and March of 2022, there were times when Ukrainian brigade and battalion commanders had no idea where their company or platoons were until they managed to check in. This was due to ineffective communication systems that have since been improved. But the fact is, these brigades were very effective at stopping Russian forces that outnumbered them by as much as 6:1. Low level initiative, like training and other factors, is a force multiplier. These factors made one Ukrainian soldier more effective than six or more of his Russian counterparts.
But, like all armies, Ukraine has some problems. One is the lack of consistency among its units. There will always be some level of inconsistencies based on leadership and personnel differences, training opportunities and other factors, but the differences between some Ukrainian units can be large. One brigade panicked and ran, which contributed to the fall of Soledar. It's currently 50 km from the front line and probably undergoing training. Another unit, the 3rd Assault brigade, sends out a lot of videos. And why not? For months now they've been spearheading a push on the southern flank of Bakhmut that doesn't just gain territory, but chews up Russian units in the process while losing few troops of its own. With its fellow brigade to its left and right, they've managed to reclaim 1-6 km on a 12 km front since May 10th, and the Russian casualties are more important than the territory gained.
The reasons for the inconsistencies can be varied. One is different training facilities and standards. Territorial defense units cannot train at national guard bases. Some units train on their own, others are trained by different foreign nationals. Some units are formed by the Ukrainian government, some units are raised privately and integrated into the army. Some units allow women and others do not. There are different sub-cultures, different leadership and a vast array of different equipment, more than in any other army, and the best way to use this equipment can vary significantly.
The officers set and maintain standards and objectives, but the NCO's, the sergeants, are the backbone of any army that uses low-level initiative. In the US army it takes years to develop an NCO. They begin as a private and learn individual skills while participating in fire team and squad activities. After a couple of years they can become a team leader, then a squad leader. A platoon sergeant usually has 15 years time in service and then there's the company first sergeant.
Ukraine hasn't even been at war for 15 years. They don't have the luxury of developing leaders in peace, so people leave whatever peacetime occupation they had, accept a leadership position and learn their military occupation while they learn to lead, often while under fire. Some are better than others and don't need years to be effective. Then there are others that never display the qualities needed to lead. This is true in any army, but Ukraine adapts, just as Russia adapts, each in their own way.
One combat multiplier that Ukraine is missing at the higher levels is combined arms. It's not just having the elements of infantry, armor and artillery present on the battlefield, it's having a plan for them to work together initially, and, more importantly, being able to communicate in order to adapt to changing situations on the battlefield. There's been instances of infantry being unable to communicate with armored vehicles, and sometimes artillery fire can arrive 3-5 minutes after a request, and other times a runner has to be sent with a request.
Even with full, unjammed communications, brigade level coordination is a high-end skill that is difficult to achieve. In the US army they have an annual cycle of training built on the concept of "crawl, walk, run". It starts with a refreshing of individual skills, such as marksmanship, first aid, etc. Then it moves to squad and platoon level functions in which the leaders practice moving their subordinate elements in various circumstances. The company commander has an annual exercise in which he is graded on how well his unit performs, and the battalion commander is graded on his own battalion-level exercise.
Brigade level exercises are less common, and while the lower level exercises make it fairly easy to move battalions around, I never trained when electronic warfare was involved, it's difficult so simulate counter-battery operations, and the largest obstacle breach (mines, vehicle barriers, etc.) I ever practiced was platoon-sized, even in the midst of a battalion exercise.
Within this annual training cycle, all the building blocks are there for a brigade-sized combined arms operation, but in the event of a near-peer conventional conflict there would be a significant learning curve to overcome, as there is in any war. It doesn't mean the US wouldn't be successful as it learned. That all depends on its capabilities compared to their opponents.
The point is that high-level combined arms is a difficult skill to master under any circumstances and Ukraine doesn't the same range of equipment as the US, it doesn't have the same level of integrated communications, nor does it have the same luxury of peacetime training. Like everything else, this is something they'll have to learn while they fight with whatever they have on hand. The 3rd Assault brigade, with a documented history of success, says that their coordination between infantry, tanks, drone operators and artillery is "improving". That trend will likely extend to most all Ukrainian units at varying rates as the war continues.
It is easy to maintain a doctrine or institution: Just keep doing what you've been doing for years, or even decades. But Ukraine's inherited doctrine didn't work for its smaller population and democratic culture. Before 2014, it didn't have to change. Since then, it needed to change to survive, but it didn't have years of peacetime to test out theories. It had to evolve while fighting a conflict that varied from low to high intensity. And it will continue to evolve.
“The assumption that this would be a war between a big Soviet army and a small Soviet army was wrong in many countries,” Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said. “That’s why they told us that Kyiv would fall in three days and Ukraine in three weeks. But this is no longer a Soviet army.”
I'm convinced that if aliens invaded from another world, humans would put aside a lot of their disagreements to combat them. Aliens did invade Ukraine from another country and a lot of internal differences have been set aside to meet the threat. As hard as it is to change an institutional doctrine, it's just as hard to change the bureaucracies that run a government or industry, but we're slowly seeing changes there, as well. If the west keeps providing equipment, Ukraine will figure out the best way to use it.
A profile on Zaluzhny, from which I have quoted:
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The North
The Ukrainian government says that Russia has 100,000 personnel, more than 900 tanks, more than 555 artillery systems, 370 self-propelled guns in the area from Kupiansk to Kreminna. “The situation is complicated. Hot battles are going on now.”
Russia's supply lines are shorter in the north and its infrastructure isn't there under the same threats as it is in the south, but 100,000 personnel in a region that small is more than it's been able to support in the past.
To date, Russia has made limited gains in three locations and have lost a lot of personnel in the process.
Some Ukrainian units that only had Soviet artillery are given 155mm artillery so they can fire cluster ammunition, which kills not only personnel but armored vehicles over a very wide area. Various studies say cluster ammo is 4-7 times more effective than normal HE rounds. Since a round can cover three football fields/pitches, it is very effective at stopping assaults, among other tasks.
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Bakhmut
A small amount of territory was gained, a small amount was lost, but Russian casualties in the area remain high. The 3rd Assault brigade has been conducting raids that killed all the Russian defenders with no loss of their own. After collecting Russian weapons and setting boobytraps, they then withdraw until new Russian forces occupy the defenses and then they raid again. Normally their assaults are limited to light infantry, but they conducted at least one with IFVs and tanks, as well.
With good timing and accuracy, one artillery shell takes out two soft-skinned vehicles:
There were unverified reports of Russia using chemical weapons in Mariupol. It is verified that CS gas, sometimes used in riots, was used in Bakhmut and unverified reports of other chemical agents. Using CS gas isn't illegal and does degrade a soldier's performance with snot and tears. To avoid that, he can simply wear a mask, but that degrades his performance, as well. Having spent 12 hours in a mask, and having been in a gas chamber twice without a mask, I can attest that both options suck.
Russia regularly used chemical weapons in Syria. There's been a few isolated reports of chemical weapons being used in Ukraine, the latest being Bakhmut, but whether it is CS or something more serious has yet to be verified.
The 3rd brigade, proficient in both combat and public relations, keep pushing the Russians back. They also clear mines. Sometimes anti-personnel mines are placed under anti-tank mines to kill sappers, so rope is used to drag the anti-tank mine that's laying on the surface and it is defused later.
The Ukrainian air force uses a gliding bomb to hit a Russian HQ.
An LPR brigade commander was killed on the northern flank of Bakhmut by the 10th Mountain brigade.
JDAM in Soldedar:
Ukrainians are targeted with cluster munitions. You can see how deadly they are:
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Avdiivka
For those of you that haven't seen a Javelin kill recently. This is from two weeks ago:
A Russian tank was damaged by a drone when the ammo stored in the turret was destroyed.
Ukrainian air defense system destroyed by Lancet:
A Russiian attack from Krasnohorivka is repelled:
On the southern flank of Avdiivka, the 59th brigade continues to attrit Russian forces, in this case, a 240mm mortar:
A Russian-occupied village is hit with cluster munitions:
Makarivka
North of Pryiutne, 2 Russian tanks and a BMP are destroyed by the 23rd brigade.
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Robotyne
Ukrainians are slowly clearing trenches in the hills to the northeast of Robotyne. After defeating two Russian attacks, Ukrainian forces to the east of Robotyne avoided mines by taking the same path through a minefield that the Russians took when they were attacking, leading to a significant advance.
Another Russian artillery piece is destroyed. Russian artillery in this sector suffered huge losses this week.
A very brief video showing a Bradley and infantry of the 47th brigade clearing the hills east of Robotyne and moving a POW to the rear.
As indicated on the map (below), an 8km view overlooking the valley, which is as far as Ukraine advanced after a failed Russian attack from Verbove. Verbove is 9km away towards the left.
Captured Russian positions:
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Kamianske
Urkaine crossed the dry river, maybe as part of a raid.
That dry patch of ground was an inlet before the reservoir drained:
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Kherson
A four-man Ukrainian patrol at the Atonovsky bridge draws artillery fire in their vicinity.
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Bradleys and Leopards
About 30 percent of the Bradleys and Leopards have been destroyed or damaged. The 47th is the only brigade to receive Bradleys and a dozen have been destroyed. Some are repaired in the field in hours, others in days. About a dozen were heavily damaged and stripped for parts before being sent to Poland for major repairs. The biggest cause of damage is anti-tank mines, which will break a track and maybe destroy one of the wheels that moves the track. Some vehicles have been damaged and repaired more than once.
The Oryx tracking site says that 24 Ukrainian tanks were lost in June, ten of which were Leopards and they probably belonged to the 33rd brigade that was fighting alongside the 47th.
The Ukrainians want to repair the vehicles as quickly as possible because they save lives. Soldiers have died in these vehicles, but there are many reports of the crew and passengers walking away with wounds, concussions or no injuries at all. Some have walked away from damaged vehicles more than once.
Ukraine has adjusted its tactics since the beginning of the offensive. Not mentioned here: Most attacks are carried out by dismounted infantry, and more often in the night, because of Ukraine's advantages with night vision devices.
Leopards arriving in Poland for repairs:
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The Grain Deal
About the same time the Kerch bridge was hit for the second time, Russia pulled out of the Black Sea Grain Initiative. In it, Russian, Ukrainian, Turkish and UN inspectors would make sure only empty ships went into Ukrainian ports and only grain came out of them. Russia claims that western sanctions are preventing the shipment of their grains but the reality is that western shipping companies don't want to move Russian products because of the war.
Russia then announced that any vessel in Ukrainian waters would be considered a military target, regardless of the flag it flew. Ukraine responded that any ship in Russian waters or in the waters of Russian-occupied Ukrainian ports would be considered a military target. Russia then told the US that they had no plans to attack any civilian ships. There is intelligence that suggests that Russia will try to mine the shipping lanes to Odessa.
The grain deal were two separate agreeements, one between Turkey and Russia and another between Turkey and Ukraine. It is unclear if Turkey and Ukraine will continue to ship out grain under that deal. Because of the Russian threat, insurance for the ships and the safety of the crews has to be considered. NATO has previously rejected proposals to protect ships in Romainian and Bulgarian waters.
Repetitive strikes on Odessa and Myklaiv overwhelmed the air defense systems and is destroying Ukraine's ability to ship grain from the ports Some of the shipping infrastructure will take a year to rebuild. If the facilities are destroyed then no ships will arrive to pick up grain. 60,000 tons of grain was destroyed, enough to feed 270,000 people for a year. Grain exports are a leading source of income for Ukraine and 70% of their grain was exported through the Black Sea. Grain can be exported by rail but the costs will rise.
From July 2022 to July 2023, more than a thousand shipments carried more than 33 million tons of grains and food products to 45 countries.
Ukraine reacting to Russia's threat to all ships in Ukrainian waters, regardless of flag:
The port and grain storage facilities were targeted throughout the week in the heaviest missile/drone attacks of the war in the Odessa/Mykolaiv area:
More destruction of agricultural products and infrastructure:
Same attack. This was a couple's livelihood, something they built from scratch. :
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BRICS Summit
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa started organizing and collaborating in 2006 based on the premise that they were fast-growing economies that would dominate the global economy in 2050. This year's summit is in South Africa but the International Criminal Court (ICC) issue a warrant for Putin because of the thousands of Ukrainian children he deported to Russia. South Africa is a member of the ICC and would be obligated to arrest him if he arrived. By "mutual agreement", Putin announced that the foreign minister would represent Russia in his stead.
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Misc.
A good 74-minute video that discusses the state of artillery on both sides:
This person returned from the front with opinion's on the offensive:
The Kerch vehicle bridge was damaged by naval drones. The earliest possible repair date is in September. The rail bridge was undamaged, and normally the Russians would carry most of their equipment by rail and then off load it into trucks in Crimea, but such train-to-truck off loads have been attacked by longer-ranged missiles, so Russia had been driving supplies by truck over the Kerch bridge. Since the vehicle spans were damaged, this will have an impact on their logistical capabilities:
The attacks on Russia's logisitical infrastructure continues:
Stefan Korshak describes what might be the largest ammo dump explosion of the war:
Morale of different Ukrainian units is discussed. If things are going well, morale is good. If the fighting is difficult, there is an expectation of casualties...but they don't stop:
There are many examples of Russian vacationers not being deterred by war. An Su-25 splashing down is just one more thing to talk about. The pilot did not survive after ejecting.
Chechins fighting for Ukraine go on patrol in the Belgorod area and ambush a Russian truck.
Switchblade kamikaze drones have capabilities that make them the only option for some missions, while FPV drones are used for other missions. They have a 70-80% success rate and there are too few of them. Based on experiences, manufacturers have already improved their performances with subsequent production models. An interview with an operator:
A Ukrainian air defense vehicle saved by a branch:
There is a trend of some Russian widows, I don't know how many, that pose in photos wearing their husbands military jacket draped over their shoulders. But this is the most bizarre and disturbing version I've seen:
A Russian agent was arrested in Mykolaiv:
Russia's war on children:
Russia has been pulling 60-year-old tanks out of storage. Now they are sending old trucks to Ukraine, another indication of how hard their logistics have been hit.
Life can be really simple...
So long ago...
I mean, there's no fuse in it...