English Translation of Wikibaghdady
Original compilation in Arabic: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1wEQ0FKosa1LcUB3tofeub1UxaT5A-suROyDExgV9nUY/edit#heading=h.lj64lmm09zs1
List of translators:
/u/GeorgeBushDontCare /u/UncleSassy /u/hideonbush
/u/gahgeer-is-back /u/Arab_Moroccan /u/Amirmk97
/u/PaulOfPauland /u/Boom5Boom /u/rotateclockwise
/u/Auegro /u/Rondref /u/fauz87
Edited by /u/Clutos
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi is a real person with a fake nickname and title. All those close to al-Baghdadi also use fake nicknames and titles. 100% of those on his shura council are Iraqis. Those of other nationalities aren't allowed to be on the shura council because he doesn't trust anyone. The number of people on Baghdadi's shura council fluctuates between 8 and 13 men, and this shura council is led by three men who used to be in Saddam's army and who are members of the Baath Party. The leader of these three men is Brigadier General Haji Bakr, who was an officer in Saddam's Baathist army.
Who is Haji Bakr? What is his relationship to al-Baghdadi and when did they first meet? We will discuss this in the next few hours. God willing.
In the meantime, who is writing in the name of IS? Here are the names of some aliases:
1 - Abudjana @almohajer8225
2 - al hazbr @Alhezbr_
3 - Haqiqat al Sororia @hnt1433
4 - Quryn Kalash @K_L75
5 - Gharib @kmkmmmsmsm
6 - The Salafi from Iraq @abdalrahmaniraq
7 - al-Sororia Tabor Khames @bmr8000
And the list goes on. Every so often we will publicly disclose five aliases.
14/12/2013
As we wrote, there are three leaders in al-Baghdadi's shura council. Those three are led by a former officer in the Baath party named Staff Colonel Haji Bakr.
Staff Colonel Haji Bakr joined the Islamic State of Iraq [AQI / ISI] when it was led by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, back then he was a member of the military who offered his experience in the Baathist army to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi's organization. Haji Bakr demonstrated his commitment and repentance from the Baath party and was considered to be one of the most important military leaders and very close to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi.
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi did not know him previously, he was recommended to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs al-Muhajir by middlemen.
Haji Bakr was accepted into the organization so that IS could gain a connection and obtain useful information from leaders in the former Iraqi Baathist army. He became close to leaders in IS and acted as a military advisor to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs al-Muhajir. He provided the leadership of IS with military information and plans, and linked them to former military commanders from the remnants of the Baath Party. Within a few weeks, he became closer and closer to the leadership of IS because the leaders considered him to be a military treasure and made him an important commander.
The strange thing is the leader of IS today, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, wasn't on the shura council of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, and only become a leader within IS around the time of Abu Omar's death. Al-Baghdadi was in IS but was not a leader within the organization. He resided in western Iraq, specifically in the city of Fallujah in al-Anbar province.
Haji Bakr had been a commander and advisor to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs al-Muhajir for only 50 days when tragedy struck IS. Abu Omar and Abu Hafs were targeted and struck by an enemy shell and everyone died. Haji Bakr was not harmed but the entire leadership and the top commanders of IS were all killed in the strike, leaving Haji Bakr as the only remaining leader.
A friend of Haji Bakr's, named Colonel Mazen Nuhir, visited him frequently. Colonel Mazen was an AQI / ISI collaborator, but not a member of the organization. On one occasion, both went together to visit Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Haji Bakr regarded Colonel Mazen as trustworthy, and claimed that Colonel Mazen didn't appear with the State's leadership so that he could be used later to penetrate the Iraqi regime.
After the assassination of the leaders of IS, Colonel Haji Bakr told people close to him that he gave bay’ah [swore allegiance] to a new emir to lead the organization, and that new emir was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This news was a surprise to everyone!
In our next meeting we will talk about IS under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his constant companion Colonel Haji Bakr.
Addendum: Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, the companion of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, was Egyptian and his name was Abd al-Moneem Izz al-Din Badawi. He had two other nicknames before he joined AQI / ISI: 1. Abu Ayub 2. Abu Hafs.
15/12/2013
A few hours after the deaths of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hafs al-Muhajir, Haji Bakr held a meeting with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and offered him the place of Emir. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi expressed his concerns on his qualifications for the position, but Haji Bakr assured him saying that he would support and help from behind the scenes. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi told friends that were close to him that this arrangement with Haji Bakr had been in place since the beginning of his leadership.
This began a new era for AQI / ISI with two leaders, the public leader in the front, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and the secret leader who operated from the shadows, Colonel Haji Bakr.
AQI / ISI members were worried about the closeness of the relationship between Haji Bakr and the leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The image of the clean shaven Colonel so close to the Emir disturbed members of IS and both leaders noticed it. Haji Bakr started to grow a beard, changed his appearance and the way he talked in the first few weeks of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as Emir. No members were allowed to question anything about the leadership, because questions plant doubts, and planting doubts can break the ranks which might permit the spilling of blood or assassinations.
Nobody in IS knew Colonel Haji Bakr until two months before the beginning of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's emirship.
Colonel Haji Bakr began to meet privately with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to restructure the organization [AQI / ISI]. They agreed to focus on two issues: First a security apparatus that could protect IS from any threat. And second a financial apparatus that guaranteed financial resources.
-First the security apparatus:
*The first security steps were taken by Haji Bakr who prevented Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi from meeting with subcommanders because he thought that those meetings were too dangerous. [But really] Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was prevented from meeting other commanders in order to prevent the other commanders from influencing him. Additionally, the Emir's orders only came through the shura council which was formed by Haji Bakr later. Colonel Haji Bakr became a permanent fixture next to the Emir, not leaving his side, as if he was his personal minister. But in reality, they were so close because Haji Bakr was the leader behind the scenes.
*The second step in creating the security apparatus was to set up security detachments that would carry out secret assassinations. These detachments were established by Haji Bakr, and initally had a total of 20 members. Within a few months these detachments swelled to 100 members, taking their orders directly from the leadership and not following any regional Emir. The members of these security detachments were selected by Haji Bakr himself, being most of them former members of the dissolved Baathist Iraqi Army. These members were highly trustworthy and their mission was to secretly eliminate anyone showing signs of dissent or disobedience. The victims could be members of IS, field commanders, or even sharia judges. So that the assassination orders didn’t go through the chain of command in the State and risk being leaked, Haji Bakr appointed a former Army officer colleague named Abu Safwan Rifai to lead these security detachments. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi began to feel very safe, and was grateful for what Haji Bakr had done, and began to view him as indispensible. This appreciation was such that Abu Bakr felt he couldn’t remain in control without Haji Bakr, who played a role in both the defense and intelligence ministries.
-Second the financial resources:
*Under the leadership of the former Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi IS made great strides in bringing in lucrative financial resources by doing the following:
First: Confiscate all money belonging to Shia, Christian, and Druze minorities, and confiscate all money belonging to regime agents even if they were Sunnis.
Second: The takeover of oil wells and oil resources, as well as power stations, government factories, and any governmental financial resource.
Third: Any companies that have contracts with the Maliki regime are considered agents of the regime, whether it's a maintenance or cleaning company, fuel station, or telecommunication company. And if something can't be seized completely, the owner receives a death threat or a threat to blow up property if monthly taxes are not paid to the State.
Fourth: Placing checkpoints on long roads to take money from commercial trucks, with fees as high as $200 in some cases.
Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr, IS came to possess large sums of money that allowed for increased salaries and greater rewards for military operations. With this increase in financial stature and a large income, many individuals jumped at the opportunity to join IS, and made Iraqis more loyal to IS. A financial command was put in place for IS and oddly this command was handled by Haji Bakr, who handled the military leadership as well with 5 other administrators.
During this time Colonel Haji Bakr put together his advisors into a group, and called it the Shura Council of the State. There were between 7 to 13 members, all of which were Iraqi because of a lack of trust of those from other ethnicities.
I will now move to: What is the origin of the idea for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham [ISIS]? Who suggested that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi enter Syria 3 weeks prior to the announcement of ISIS? And where did Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi live while in Syria? Why was the announcement on the formation of the ISIS rushed? And why did Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi choose to live close to the Turkish border before the announcement? And why did Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi choose to live in a portable room made from steel not far from refugees? And what was the threat Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent to Abu Muhammad al-Julani before the announcement on the formation of ISIS? Did Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ask al-Julani to renounce or dissolve al-Nusrah Front?
There's a picture of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi with his advisors taken at the Turkish border a week before the announced formation of ISIS and dissolution of al-Nusrah Front. We'll publish that picture later if it helps you. We'll answer all these questions in a coming meeting.
Goodbye.
17/12/2013
The Syrian Revolution began and it caught the attention of members of the State, especially the non-Iraqi and the Syrian members. Colonel Haji Bakr feared losing members of IS to the Syrian revolution, which would cause them to weaken and fracture. The Syrian revolution would also provide an excuse for some members and commanders within IS who were looking to defect to use the Syrian revolution as their escape card.
Colonel Haji Bakr advised Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to instruct all commanders not to think about going to Syria, and that anyone who went would be considered a defector and outsider. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi followed Haji Bakr's advice and threatened members not to go to Syria, justifying this threat by claiming that the situation in Syria was not clear, and that they should hold off for now.
There was a great deal of excitement among members of IS about events in Syria. As time went on, the possibility of defections to go fight in Syria increased, especially among the non-Iraqis. This excitement was beginning to get out of control, so Colonel Haji Bakr suggested the formation of a group of non-Iraqis that would go to Syria under the command of a Syrian, in order to prevent any commander of IS from going to Syria. This would protect IS from defections, and the new command in Syria would be responsible for bringing in non-Iraqis and attracting new members from other countries.
Al-Nusrah Front was established and started to grow under the leadership of Abu Muhammad al-Julani. As this growth continued al-Nusrah Front and al-Julani gained international recognition. Many mujahidin from the Gulf, Tunisia, Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Europe, and Yemen started to flock to al-Nusrah Front in great and frightening numbers. This surge in numbers was alarming to Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi because none of the members of al-Nusrah Front had any loyalty to the State or to Baghdadi himself.
Colonel Haji Bakr was afraid of the increase in popularity of al-Nusrah Front and al-Julani, and worried that they might threaten IS and Baghdadi due to the fact that neither him nor al-Baghdadi were present in Syria. Haji Bakr then compelled Abu Bakr al Baghdadi to order al-Julani to announce on a public audio clip that al-Nusrah Front officially belongs to the State and is under the direct command of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Al-Julani promised to think and ponder the matter. He took days without releasing anything. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent al-Julani a rebuke and censure, and he responded that he needed to consult those around him including the mujahidin and the scholars. Al-Julani then sent al-Bahdadi a letter that said that an announcement saying that al-Nusrah Front is subordinate to IS would not be in the best interest of the Syrian revolution. He informed that everyone on al-Nusrah Front's shura council agreed with this decision.
Colonel Haji Bakr was outraged, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was very angry. They sent spies in the disguise of mujahidin and shura council members from the State to get close to al-Julani and monitor his movements. Al-Julani became very worried about the prospect of unwanted orders to merge with another group, and started limiting his movements and actions. He also praised IS and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to those he spoke with. Al-Julani made a pretense of complimenting Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as a practice of 'taqiya', but feared that mistrust in him would grow and that he would get assassinated.
At about this time, America started to think about adding al-Nusrah Front to the terrorist list, and put al-Julani at the top of the most wanted list. America's action gave al-Julani an excuse to go into hiding and not meet with people sent by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to monitor him. He isolated himself among a closed command circle of people of his choosing. America adding al-Nusrah Front to the terror list and al-Julani to the most wanted list increased the fears and worries of Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi about al-Nusrah Front being a legitimate competitor to IS.
Abu Muhammad al-Julani acted like a rational politician trying to walk a thin middle ground in an effort to reassure Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. But the fears of Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi outweighed all of al-Julani's assurances.
Colonel Haji Bakr began to consider advanced steps to merge al-Nusrah Front and IS. He advised Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to direct al-Julani to carry out a military operation against the commanders of the Free Syrian Army during any meeting in Turkey that contained a target from the Free Syrian Army that could be attacked. In accordance with this advice, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent an urgent letter to al-Julani ordering him to carry out two bombings, one in Turkey and one in Syria, the two of which would target gatherings of the Free Syrian Army commanders. He claimed that it was justified to target the Free Syrian Army because the FSA was the future Sahwat [Awakening members], and agents of America. Baghdadi argued it was best to eliminate them before they built themselves up in Syria and before their popularity became strong. Commanders of the Free Syrian Army were specified for assassination by name, but we will withhold those names.
These orders were received by al-Nusrah Front's shura council like a lightning strike, all were stunned. A meeting of their shura council was convened and the order was rejected. A detailed reply was sent to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi stating that al Nusrah Front had rejected the order and that the shura council justified the rejection of the order on the basis that commanders of the Free Syrian Army are Muslims, and stated that Turkey cannot be targeted because it is a very sensitive country and a strong supporter of the Syrian revolution, and an attack on Turkish soil would disrupt the jihad. Al-Nusrah Front's shura council also said they saw the reality of the situation up close.
This response caused Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to become extremely angry, as they saw it as an explicit rejection of an order. A strongly worded letter was sent, giving al-Julani an ultimatum: either execute the orders or al-Nusrah Front will be dissolved and replaced with a new entity.
Al-Julani stopped replying, and Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi waited a long time for a reply. He was reasonable in ignoring them because he had no good options. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent a messenger to meet with al-Julani and speak to him, but Al-Julani did not meet with the messenger, and tried to apologize for not meeting claiming his situation prevented it. The messenger waited a long time, and went back without meeting him.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi viewed these events as very dangerous, since al-Nusrah Front saw itself as a bigger entity than IS and outside his control. In response, Colonel Haji Bakr suggested to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi the following: an Iraqi subdivision commander will meet with subdivision commanders in al-Nusrah Front to see how popular the idea of dissolving the group was, and to see how popular Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was among al-Nusrah Front's subcommanders. Al-Baghdadi followed this advice, and along with Haji Bakr sent ten Iraqis to al-Nusrah Front and ordered them to join the ranks of the mujahidin for 2 weeks. These Iraqis met with the mujahidin in al-Nusrah Front and a few influential people, particularly those from the Gulf, especially Saudis.
The feedback was mixed between support and rejection [for Baghdadi's plan to merge the State with Nusrah and form a new entity]. There was a large group that supported the ambition of the general Islamic dream of a state that stretched from Iraq to Syria under one leadership. And the most supportive group of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's proposition were new members of al-Nusrah Front, and those who had a history of conflict with the leaders in al-Nusrah Front. These conflicts arose out of leaders in al-Nusrah Front preventing members from acting takfiri and punishing those that did so. These individuals expressed support for a new entity that would give them more freedom to speak their minds.
Al-Nusrah Front imprisoned, punished and confiscated the weapons of those members who propagated a takfiri ideology. Those imprisoned included the Tunisians Abu Ritaj al-Sussi and Abo Omar al-Abadi; the Moroccans Abu DamDam al-Husni and Abu al Hajaj al-Nuri; and the Saudi Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani. The Saudi Omar al-Qahtani was punished by al-Nusrah Front who took away his weapons and imprisoned him 3 times on account of spreading a takfiri and inflammatory ideology against those who opposed al-Nusrah Front. Those that were punished by al-Nusrah Front, and people like them formed the core of support for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's plan, but still the plan found little support inside of al-Nusrah Front.
The Saudi Omar al-Qahtani became a general Sharia councilor in Baghdadi's ISIS later on and was the first to defect when Baghdadi announced the dissolution of al-Nusrah Front.
Two weeks later, the 10 spies sent by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi returned to Iraq with an unclear picture on the opinions of al-Nusrah Front members regarding the idea of dissolving the group and the formation of a group under one name. Colonel Haji Bakr suggested to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to not make any immediate decisions, and stated that they should travel to Syria to see the situation on the ground for themselves. He also said that the announcement of the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham [ISIS] would have more flare and attract more followers if al-Baghdadi made the announcement when he was in Syria, arguing that the people will want to see Baghdadi and his personal presence would be a deciding factor in getting recruits to join the newfound group. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi accepted the idea and sent some associates to arrange a secure and secret residence for him. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was notified when a safe place near the Turkish border was selected. The departure from Iraq was arranged for his personal bodyguard, Colonel Haji Bakr, and only three others.
What did al-Baghdadi do after entering Turkey, what locations did he stay in specifically? And how many days was he in Syria before announcing the dissolution of al-Nusrah Front? What did Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi do before the announcement? Did al-Julani know about Baghdadi's arrival? And who did Baghdadi meet with before the announcement?! You will see all these details here soon.
Goodbye.
18/12/2013
When did Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi enter Syria? Where did he live? Who did he meet with? And how was the announcement on the dissolution of al-Nusrah Front made? And what role did Saudi officer Bandar Shaalan play in creating Baghdadi's new group?
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Haji Bakr and their security entered Syria 3 weeks before the dissolution of al-Nusrah Front. They headed directly to the arranged residence close to the Turkish border. The preparations were as follows: portable metal rooms were reserved in a place not too far from a Syrian refugee camp that was more secured and away from prying eyes.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his company lived in these portable metal rooms in order for Baghdadi to meet with al-Nusrah Front's subdivision commanders and make them feel like he was loyal to them. He was keen not to show any hostility or disputes between him and al-Julani in order to keep everyone satisfied. The State sought to show everyone that al-Nusra Front acknowledged IS's leaders as well as the legitimacy of IS’s advisers. IS claimed that the al-Nusrah Front needed to return to its status of being under its leadership.
There were two ways in which al-Baghdadi met those who had influence on al-Nusrah Front members:
-The first: Baghdadi met with senior leaders in the Front face to face and introduced himself and talked with them.
-The second: al-Baghdadi did not meet personally with junior leaders, but instead met with them in group settings consisting of about ten people. During these meetings someone would say “'al-Baghdadi is with us in the meeting and he hears our concerns!'”
Al-Baghdadi claimed he came to unite the ranks and to build one entity and that this will happen very soon. He said they needed to form one group to strengthen their unity against the enemy and to prepare for the dangers of a possible Awakening Movement.
Abu Mohammed al-Julani stayed silent and did not display any feelings of dissonance or dispute between him and al-Baghdadi. He also didn't let on that he was aware al-Baghdadi was coming to Syria, but he knew about al-Baghdadi's meetings with those who had influence on members of al-Nusrah Front. The leaders of al- Nusrah Front were worried about what al-Baghdadi planned to do next.
Al-Baghdadi requested an urgent meeting with al-Julani but he refused to meet. Al-Julani was worried about being assassinated because he knew that Baghdadi was very angry, so he refrained from attending meetings and maintained tight security around himself, which prevented al-Baghdadi from determining his exact location.
Al-Baghdadi then sent a message to al-Julani telling him that the dissolution of al-Nusrah Front would happen soon, and that for the sake of unity al-Julani should make the public announcement of the dissolution of al-Nusrah Front himself. Al-Julani sent a clear and explicit message to al-Baghdadi that was clearer than previous messages informing that it would be a fatal error to dissolve al-Nusrah Front and combine it with IS. In his message al-Julani stated Baghdadi's plan would destroy the popularity al-Nusrah Front had built, and that the people of Syria would categorically reject this decision. Al-Julani said it would be better for Baghdadi to return to Iraq and let al-Nusrah Front handle matters in Syria.
Colonel Haji Bakr told Al Baghdadi that he [Baghdadi] would have to issue a public statement dissolving al-Nusrah Front because al-Julani clearly wouldn't. He said that if al-Baghdadi issued the statement in his own name it wouldn't isolate al-Julani which might allow al-Julani to return to the fold after al-Nusrah Front is dissolved. Colonel Haji Bakr requested Baghdadi delay the statement until a battalion of fighters could be prepared inside Syria. This battalion would provide security for al-Baghdadi to protect him from al-Nusrah Front supporters after Baghdadi announced the dissolution.
Colonel Haji Bakr summoned leaders loyal to IS within al-Nusrah Front and arranged for them to use their soldiers to form a battalion which would be the nucleus of Baghdadi's new group. These soldiers would also react positively to Baghdadi's announcement in an effort to encourage others in al-Nusrah Front to follow Baghdadi. Within 3 days Colonel Haji Bakr managed to prepare leaders with nearly a thousand fighters beneath them. Haji Bakr secretly notified these leaders when the announcement of the dissolution of al-Nusrah Front would occur.
One day before the announcement, Colonel Haji Bakr told the rest of al-Nusrah Front's leaders that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was in Syria. He did this so that the leaders could prepare to accept Baghdadi's announcement, and be ready to pledge bay’ah directly to him. During this period a statement was being drafted that would officially announce the dissolution of al-Nusrah Front and the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham [ISIS]. Zero hour for the announcement had come.
The announcement was made and the supportive leaders cheered the announcement and demonstrated their joy for the dissolution of al-Nusrah Front by giving bay’ah [pledging allegiance] to al-Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi met with these leaders to reassure them about the legitimacy of the announcement and so that they would discuss the meeting with their people and encourage others in al-Nusrah Front to pledge allegiance to Baghdadi.
Colonel Haji Bakr advised al Baghdadi that the moment immediately after the announcement was a very important stage and that the circumstances outweighed security concerns. Haji Bakr encouraged al-Baghdadi to personally meet with al-Nusrah Front members so they could pledge bay’ah to him face to face, explaining that personal meetings would make people feel comfortable, especially since al-Julani was in hiding and even senior leaders in al-Nusrah Front had no contact with al-Julani. Haji Bakr argued that al Baghdadi's presence would have a large psychological impact and attract a large number of recruits.
After the announcement al-Nusrah Front members were divided 3 ways: half of them wanted to join al-Baghdadi, a quarter wanted to stay with al-Julani, and a quarter chose to remain neutral.
Al-Baghdadi felt the danger from the half who did not want to join him. Colonel Haji Bakr sent a serious threatening message to al-Julani which said the following: Anyone who remained loyal to al-Julani and didn't join Baghdadi's group would be killed because those who didn't join Baghdadi were splitting the jihadi ranks and explicitly disobeying an order. Haji Bakr argued the punishment for these crimes in Islamic Sharia law is death.
Initially al-Julani did not receive Haji Bakr's message because he had recently changed his location, but the message's contents were relayed to those who were at his residence.
Colonel Haji Bakr began to send delegates in Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's name to the leaders in al-Nusrah Front who wished to remain loyal to al-Julani. The delegates threatened the leaders saying that if they did not join Baghdadi's group they would be considered dissenters, and everything they owned would be seized since it is rightfully the property of the State. The leaders who wished to remain loyal to al-Julani were given an ultimatum: either pledge allegiance to Baghdadi or surrender the weapons and leave Syria.
Colonel Haji Bakr had those with influence over al-Nusrah Front members meet with the members who wished to remain loyal to al-Julani. He arranged these meetings so that those who wished to remain loyal could be bought off with money or intimidated into pledging bay’ah to al-Baghdadi.
In the meantime, the name of the former Saudi officer Bandar al-Shaalan began to appear. Shaalan had maintained good relations with IS since the era of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. He played an important role in IS during two periods, the first: the time before Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's emirship; the second: during Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's emirship. Bandar al-Shaalan was among the most influential members of IS before Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's was elected Emir. During this time, Shaalan was a military commander in Iraq. Then, he returned to Saudi Arabia and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over as Emir of the State. During this time, Shaalan had a good connection to IS, but was not an operational member; nonetheless he continued his support for the State both before and after the dissolution of al-Nusrah Front. After Baghdadi formed ISIS, Shaalan introduced Baghdadi to influential members who were formerly in al-Nusrah Front.
Shaalan first introduced Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Shaalan introduced al-Qahtani as a Saudi scholar of Sharia who could help the mujahedeen. This was an opportunity for the Saudi Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani to go from being a prisoner frequently jailed by al-Julani because of his takfiri opinions to directly treating with the Emir, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Al-Qahtani met with al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr and pledged bay’ah to them immediately. He also expressed his willingness to talk to al-Nusrah Front members who hadn't pledged allegiance and win them over. He said he would especially focus on Saudi members. Al-Qahtani was not previously known previously to IS's leadership, but they saw that he had a strong influence on the Saudi members that still remained loyal to al-Julani. Al-Qahtani began a new stage in his jihadi career going from being a soldier and prisoner to being a close confidant to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
What did al- Baghdadi do with those who remained neutral towards him and Al-Nusrah Front? What did al-Baghdadi do to al-Julani? What happened before al-Julani announced his pledge of allegiance to al-Zawahiri?! What was Colonel Haji Bakr's reaction towards al-Julani's pledge of loyalty to al-Zawahiri? What was of Colonel Haji Bakr's reaction to al-Zawahiri's statement? And how was al-Zawahiri's decision ignored? We will answer all this in our next meeting.
Goodbye.
20/12/2013
Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi were informed that al-Julani would not listen to the decision to dissolve al-Nusrah Front, and there was a possibility that he would issue a public statement rejecting the decision in the media. Colonel Haji Bakr suggested to al-Baghdadi to quickly form a security squad that had two tasks:
The first: Seize all the warehouses of weapons held by al-Nusrah Front. Anyone who refused to hand over his weapon would be killed immediately. This would deprive Al-Nusrah Front of all weapons and ammunition, forcing their members to join ISIS.
This first task was successfully completed and a large group of mujahedeen in al-Nusrah Front who guarded the warehouses refused to hand over their warehouses so they were killed.
The second task was more dangerous: To form an assassination squad to go after leaders in al-Nusrah Front starting with al-Julani and his associates, including al Muhajir al-Qahtani.
Colonel Haji Bakr formed an assassination squad consisting of fifty people, led by a former Iraqi officer. The assassination squad first sought to find where al-Nusrah Front leadership was located. Next the assassination squad planned on monitoring the movements of this leadership. The assassination team would kill al-Nusrah Front leaders by placing sticky bombs under their cars. These bombs would be detonated with a timing device, causing the car to explode and killing those in it. The assassination team researched and investigated al-Julani’s location by arresting some of his close associates, but the assassination squad was unable to determine where he was hiding.
Colonel Haji Bakr's assassination team monitored the movements of a military General in al-Nusrah Front, named al-Muhajir al-Qahtani. Colonel Haji Bakr was personally informed about his location and movements and that al-Muhajir al-Qahtani always traveled with companions, and he had never been monitored alone. The decision was made to assassinate him along with those who traveled with him. Al-Muhajir al-Qahtani traveled with two individuals in his vehicle: Abu Hafs al-Najdi Omar al-Mahiseni and Abu Omar al-Jazrawi (aka Abdul Aziz al-Othman). The assassination squad put a sticky explosive on the vehicle and the vehicle began to travel towards one of al-Nusrah Front's sites. Al-Muhajir al-Qahtani exited the car to meet with a member of al-Nusrah Front in one of the buildings and he requested his companions to wait for him. In the meantime, the car exploded with both inside, and al-Muhajir al-Qahtani only survived thanks to God's will [luck]. He knew that he was the intended target, and after investigating the wreckage and confirming that his companions had died, disappeared in case of another ambush.
The news that al-Muhajir al-Qahtani and his companions had been killed was joyfully relayed to Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. They were pleased that the second most important member al-Nusrah Front that hadn't joined ISIS was killed in secrecy. For a full day ISIS was confident that they had successfully murdered him, and it was only until al-Nusrah Front members revealed al-Muhajir al-Qahtani was still alive that ISIS realized that the operation had failed. Colonel Haji Bakr requested an urgent meeting with the leaders of the assassination squad and severely rebuked them for their failure. Haji Bakr was very angry because this failed operation would delay the execution of any similar operation for several months.
Al-Julani’s refusal to dissolve al-Nusrah Front remained the biggest threat to al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr since they formed ISIS. The Colonel told al-Baghdadi that he would deal with al-Julani’s disloyalty. Abu Bakr was worried about al-Julani contacting Ayman al-Zawahiri to settle the dispute. In fact, al-Julani had already contacted Zawahiri. In his message to al-Zawahiri, he included the recommendations of 3 people that supported the position of al-Nusrah Front. These recommendations were written by one Saudi and two Syrians (we will withhold their names).
Al-Zawahiri requested a period of time to find a solution to the impasse. He sent a letter to the leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Nasser al-Wahayshi. In his letter Zawahiri requested that Wahayshi attempt to mediate the issue, so as to avoid having to make public statements embarrassing al-Qaeda. Al-Wahayshi sent a written message to al-Julani and al-Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi didn't reply with a single word. Al-Julani replied to al-Wahayshi with the same justifications he expressed to al-Baghdadi and al-Zawahiri, stating that the presence of al-Baghdadi in Syria was the single biggest mistake in Syria's revolution. Al-Wahayshi told al-Zawahiri that the mediation had been a failure and recommended that al-Zawahiri himself issue a statement. When al-Baghdadi received Wahayshi's letter Baghdadi realized that the impasse was starting to escalate.
During these times al-Baghdadi was very depressed and emotionally weak. He relied upon Colonel Haji Bakr because of his coherence, strength and steadfastness.
The Kuwaiti Hamed Hamad al-Ali met with al-Julani to mediate and defuse the crisis. Al-Julani expressed his justifications and firmly stated the seriousness of al Baghdadi's presence in Syria. The Kuwaiti was convinced by the justifications and sided with al Nusrah Front. Al-Ali became convinced that the existence of ISIS in Syria was a political error and Sharia mistake, so he asked a close friend of al-Baghdadi's, Abu Ali al-Anbari to arrange a meeting. This meeting was held and documented by an audio recording.
During this meeting al Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr justified the legitimacy of ISIS. The Kuwaiti al-Ali expressed the importance of unity in jihad and that the ISIS was causing separation and dispute. Eventually they agreed to: Wait for what al Zawahiri decides, and then document al-Zawahiri's statement in the media. Colonel Haji Bakr expressed his unwillingness to abide by a decision by al-Zawahiri but al-Baghdadi told him to remain calm. The Kuwaiti left the meeting, and Colonel Haji Bakr stressed to al-Baghdadi that he could not link the fate of their State to al-Zawahiri's decision and that Zawahiri had tried to get Nasser al-Wahayshi to mediate the dispute. He requested to be allowed to end al-Nusrah Front, and remove al-Julani and other leaders from the picture, saying that he would even accomplish this through legitimate methods.
Colonel Haji Bakr discussed this plan:
-First: activate the assassination squad.
-Second: recruit influential Muftis who would pledge bay’ah to al-Baghdadi, thereby increasing ISIS' legitimacy.
-Third: increase online propaganda by strongly praising ISIS and al-Baghdadi in media, highlight ISIS operations, and spread false rumors against al-Nusrah Front and its leadership online.
The assassinations team continued operations, but stopped using sticky bombs and started using professional snipers to target leaders of al-Nusrah Front.
The Iraqis Abu Ali and Abu Yahya al-Anbari, as well as the Saudi Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani led recruiting efforts. The two Iraqis focused on attracting people from the Maghreb and the Levant. The Saudi Al Qahtani focused on attracting people from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, working day and night to encouraging Saudis to pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi. He made contact with prominent jihadi figures, one of which was Saudi and another was from the Gulf, but was unsuccessful in contacting a Moroccan jihadi. Al-Qahtani also met with prominent jihadi scholars, and worked to persuade them to pledge allegiance. He met with the Saudi, Othman al-Nazih and persuaded him to join the ISIS. Al-Qahtani reported every success to the ISIS leader Abu Ali al-Anbari.
Al-Anbari wanted prominent leaders in ISIS to be Iraqi, and he requested to meet with the Saudi Othman al-Nazih to see how much al-Nazih supported ISIS. Al-Anbari found al-Nazih's level of support to be totally different than what al-Qahtani claimed, so he informed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that Othman al-Nazih was not suitable to be a leader within ISIS because al-Nazih had a weak personality, and lacked the ability to adequately preach the Sharia. Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Ali al-Anbari requested that the Saudi Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani focus on getting Saudi sharia scholars to issue fatwas on the legitimacy of ISIS.
We'll stop here!! And soon, how did Sharia scholars recruit for ISIS?! And which Sharia scholars recruited for ISIS?! And what was their overall goal?! And who is the head of the Sharia scholars that work for ISIS, both in the Gulf and Syria?!? Coming here soon.
Bye.
24/12/2013
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's failure to dissolve al-Nusrah Front was made even worse when al-Zawahiri ruled to maintain al-Nusrah Front and dissolve ISIS. Al-Nusrah Front became stronger and more internally unified as a result. Abu Bakr and those around him were very disappointed by their failure, and he felt that he should go back to Iraq, but the following two people strongly insisted for him to stay: Colonel Haji Bakr, who categorically refused to accept al-Zawahiri's ruling, saying that he would stay in Syria even if al-Baghdadi left. Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani, who realized that he could not return to al-Nusrah Front, because they did not want to work with him and because they had imprisoned him in the past due to his takfiri opinions.
Al-Qahtani's relationship with al-Nusrah Front further deteriorated when he caused a split among al-Nusrah Front members from the Gulf and Saudi Arabia by telling them that sharia scholars had issued fatwas to leave al-Nusrah Front and join ISIS. Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani promised Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that sharia scholars from Saudi Arabia would issue fatwas in an effort to keep members in ISIS, and defy al-Zawahiri.
Personally, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi did not want to leave Syria because he had freedom of movement and many followers in Syria. His situation in Syria made him feel like an important and powerful leader. In Syria, he did not have to live in hiding as he did in Iraq. Al-Baghdadi's freedom of movement quickly convinced him that he should stay in Syria.
Meanwhile, the Saudi Abu Bakr al-Qahtani was busy desperately trying to recruit important sharia scholars and media personalities to lend support to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi to reinforce ISIS. He took two to approaches to increase support for ISIS: First, contact jihadis with relationships in the Gulf and urge them to support ISIS. Second, form a media team to promote ISIS online.
The first approach: Al-Qahtani contacted Saudi jihadis to find fatwas supporting ISIS and Al Baghdadi based on the sharia. These attempts ended in failure, so he contacted the Saudi former officer Bandar al-Shaalan, and requested for him to be ISIS representative in Saudi Arabia. He wanted Shaalan to form a nucleus of individuals that would increase the legitimacy of ISIS and al-Baghdadi in the Gulf. Shaalan agreed to the task of being ISIS's representative in the Gulf and frequently coordinated his work in the Gulf with al-Qahtani who remained in Syria. He began his role by holding meetings with supporters of ISIS and al-Baghdadi and telling al-Qahtani what he learned in these meetings. He reported that the first sharia scholar to state his support for ISIS was Nasser al-Thaqeel. Shaalan met with Nasser al-Thaqeel several times as part of his efforts to increase the popularity of ISIS and al-Baghdadi. His efforts broadened to include those in Bahrain, and he communicated with the Bahrain-based Turki al-Binali, who expressed his support for ISIS and al-Baghdadi.
Al-Shaalan worked long hours every day to further the popularity of ISIS and al-Baghdadi in the Gulf. Eventually, he formed a committee devoted to this task. The committee was made up of relatively unknown people. Their names were: Nasser al-Thaqeel, Turki al-Binali, Allioui al-Shammari, Hamoud al-Mutairi, Hamad al-Rayes, Saleh al-Hudaif, Abu Bilal al-Harbi, Abdul Aziz al-Omar and Ali al-Jabali. The common denominator between all of these individuals is that they are relatively unknown among sharia scholars and unknown in the media.
Al-Shaalan's efforts were of minimal impact, but they did give Abu Bakr a glimmer of hope that ISIS would succeed. Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani considered Shaalan's efforts to be very significant and the later told Shaalan to arrange regular meetings with sharia scholars so that they would be aware of the latest developments in Syria. This would also allow ISIS to be ready to mitigate public relations damage should the sharia scholars have any criticisms of ISIS.
Sharia scholars were afraid to publicly announce their support for ISIS and al-Baghdadi because they feared negative repercussions from regimes in the Gulf. For example, Turki al-Binali expressed his willingness to issue a fatwa that called for a pledge of bay’ah to ISIS and denounced al-Nusrah Front as illegal according to sharia, but refused to issue the fatwa in his real name. So when Turki al-Binali issued his fatwa titled 'Extend the hands and give bay’ah [pledge of allegiance] to ISIS', he did so under the name Abu Humam Bakr bin Abdul Aziz al-Athari. Ali al-Jabali expressed a similar opinion in a fatwa that was given to Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani. Al-Qahtani gave the fatwa and an update on the progress of Shaalan's meetings in a report to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, demonstrating his dedication, loyalty, and effort in support of ISIS.
In addition to forming groups in support of ISIS in the Gulf, al-Qahtani also formed groups in Syria that supported and worked to increase the legitimacy of ISIS. They consisted of the following individuals: himself, Abu Ali al-Anbari, Abu Jafar al-Hattab Tunisi, and Abu Ali Ibrahim al-Sultan al-Najdi. The fifth member was Othman Ibn Nazih, whose job was to protect group cohesion among ISIS members. Nazih enforced the rule that any ISIS member that leaves the group should be considered a dissenter and killed, to promote group cohesion a statement was made showing the positive attributes of al-Baghdadi and the advantages of being in his group. A book written by Abu Jafar al-Hattab Tunisi was distributed to ISIS members that gave several justifications for their continued participation in ISIS (reasons included: the importance in Islam of honoring a pledge of bay’ah to one's leader, and the commitment members had made to fight for the people of Syria).
Although Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi did not really trust Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani, he thought it was useful to have him around because as a Saudi he had a positive influence on Gulf members of ISIS. Al-Qahtani worked hard to justify al-Baghdadi's confidence in him by going after anyone that challenged ISIS or gave speeches critical of al-Baghdadi, working to alienate those who criticized ISIS by accusing them of being Sahwa [Awakening members] or agents of the West. No negative information on ISIS was permitted, allowing al-Baghdadi to put a positive spin on his actions to those in Syria and abroad. To gain international support there was an urgent need to form a media wing that would focus on presenting ISIS and al-Baghdadi in a positive light.
Who are the members of the media wing and how is it organized on the internet?! Who leads the media wing?! And how did they set their plan in motion?! And who gave them a fatwa saying it is religiously justified to lie in a time of war to trick one's enemies?! We will stop here!! We will answer these questions in an upcoming meeting.
Bye.
27/12/2013
Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi realized that there was an urgent need for a media wing that would work 24/7 to promote ISIS and defend it from criticism. They recognized that those in Saudi Arabia were most susceptible to believing negative information about ISIS. As a result, it was decided to include those with Saudi names in the media committee. Since Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani knew many eligible Saudis (he was a Saudi himself), it was agreed that he would form the media committee as quickly as possible.
Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani proposed that two committees be formed: the first would be comprised of Saudis who were on the ground in Syria, and the second would be a committee of Saudis still in Saudi Arabia. He called these committees "The Supporters of the Mujahedeen (media wing)" and appointed a leader in each committee. These committees had members who worked day and night. Al-Qahtani contacted the former Saudi officer Bandar al-Shaalan, since he owed his high level position in ISIS to him and requested that Shaalan speed up the formation of the media advocacy committees. Shaalan responded positively and told Qahtani he would be contacted when the committees were ready.
The media committee in Saudi Arabia was formed and a report on the committee was submitted to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. He ordered that Abu Dujana lead the committee. Abu Dujana is Saudi and his real name is Ryan Abu Himd, and his twitter account is (@almohajer8225). The shura council of the media committee in Saudi Arabia was led by the Saudi Abdullah al-Fayez. Al-Fayez's twitter account is @a_alfaiz but he also maintains several fake accounts to criticize the so called al-Sororia which we will discuss later. The membership of the media committee is controlled by the Saudi Adel al-Khalidi Abu Omar al-Najdi (also known as al-Sarouria Tabor Khames @bmr8000). The media committee attracted the attention of a lot of enthusiastic young people online. Al-Fayez was a former fighter for AQI / ISI. He was injured while fighting in Iraq and subsequently jailed in Saudi Arabia. When al-Fayez was released from prison he became a key foreign supporter of ISIS and al-Baghdadi. Several of the members of the Saudi media committee had already reached out to Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani to see if there was any way they could help ISIS. They were very excited to work when the media committee was formed.
The other media committee was focused on advocating support for ISIS and al-Baghdadi from inside Syria. This internal media committee was led by Qareen al-Kalash (@K_L7) and managed by the Saudi Abdul Majeed al-Thubaiti al-Otaibi. This internal media committee included Saudis in Syria who advocated for ISIS from the front lines. Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani made sure that the media committee did not speak to educated individuals or anyone who spoke critically of ISIS or al-Baghdadi. Membership in the internal media committee was controlled by Abu al-Leeth Aldegmi (@abo_aleeth). The activities of this committee were managed by the Saudi Mohammed Falah al-Dwairy al-Shammari. Other members of the internal media committee included Abu Gabal (@abojabal2012); the Saudi Muaz Bin Mohammed al-Shamrani; and Abdul Rahman Marzouki (@a_s_m2010).
A group was formed that closely linked the two media committees allowing them to coordinate closely on news reports and swiftly attack opponents. Al-Qahtani spread a fatwa to the two media committees advising them that the concept of 'taqiyya' [tricking the enemy in the time of war] allowed for them to lie in support of ISIS and al-Baghdadi. This fatwa was issued by the sharia scholars Turki al-Binali and Nasser al-Thaqeel.
The media committees worked very hard, but Colonel Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi felt that not enough was being done to promote ISIS and counter the negative distortions others used against ISIS, so they emphasized to al-Qahtani the importance of obtaining fatwas in support of ISIS from prominent sharia scholars. Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani worked hard to obtain these fatwas by communicating with those who knew Saudi sharia scholars. In particular, Qahtani tried to get fatwas from the Saudi Sulaiman al-Alwan and the Saudi Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi, but all his efforts ended in failure.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr realized ISIS was becoming increasingly unpopular and discontent was growing. ISIS reputation was especially damaged when they accidentally killed civilians, and the extent of ISIS unpopularity reached unprecedented levels when they killed Mohammed Faris by decapitation. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr met with the Saudi Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani and reprimanded him for failing to adequately promote ISIS in the media, threatening him with imprisonment. Since al-Qahtani had failed to recruit qualified people to promote ISIS among Saudis, Qahtani was forced to use his own Twitter account in support of ISIS, defending the killing of Mohammed bin Faris using religious justifications and blaming Haji Bakr's leadership for his death.
The erroneous killing of Mohammed Faris had a profound impact on ISIS, and Colonel Haji Bakr was extremely angry because the incident greatly affected ISIS members. He contacted those who killed Mohammed Faris and asked the killers to deny their affiliation with ISIS in a video that would be publically disseminated. Haji Bakr told the killers that if they did this, the killers would be protected from prosecution, but the killers categorically refused to deny their association with ISIS, and stated that the killing of Mohammed Faris was carried out based on the order of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The killers said they were not to blame for Faris death.
With ISIS becoming increasingly unpopular, Colonel Haji Bakr summoned Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani and reprimanded him. Haji Bakr asked Qahtani to use the media committees to do anything they could to counter the negative information directed at ISIS and to focus on preventing sharia scholars from issuing fatwas against ISIS.
Al-Qahtani truthfully stated the media committees he had formed had no sharia scholars and had little public influence. Al-Qahtani revealed that the leaders of the media committees were young and inexperienced; because there were no senior jihadists willing to publically support ISIS. He suggested to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Haji Bakr that they use covert and underhanded methods to counter those spreading negative information about ISIS. He suggested two specific projects:
-His first project would be a public campaign to spread information that the critics of ISIS were Sahwa [Awakening members].
-His second project would be to record private conversations with respected individuals to obtain blackmail to be used against them.
How did Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani start his two projects to support ISIS and al-Baghdadi?! And how did he plan to use rumor and distortion against those critical of ISIS?! And how did al-Qahtani recorded private conversations with influential individuals critical of ISIS to obtain blackmail that could be used against these influential individuals?! And who did Qahtani work with to obtain these blackmail recordings?! How did al-Qahtani use these recordings?! And what was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's opinion regarding al-Qahtani's work?! We'll stop tweeting here!! And will answer these questions in a coming meeting.
Bye
29/12/2013
Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani informed his leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that he would start the two projects: the spreading of false rumors against critics of ISIS; and the project of recording influential people to blackmail them into refraining from criticizing ISIS. He would begin working by recording members of ISIS praising the organization. If the member latter deserted ISIS the recording would be used against him. This project was very sensitive because Qahtani planned to record prominent figures without their knowledge.
Qahtani asked Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi for permission to impersonate his voice in a phone call with the Saudi Sheikh Suleiman al-Alwan. Al-Baghdadi gave al-Qahtani permission to impersonate him in phone calls. The goal of the call would be to record al-Alwan giving al-Baghdadi compliments, respectful statements (greetings considered standard by society), and portray the statements as Alwan's official opinion. Al-Qahtani contacted the Saudi Sheikh Suleiman al-Alwan who was told beforehand to expect a call from Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. When Qahtani made the call, he identified himself as Baghdadi. The Saudi al-Alwan was excited to receive the call, which lasted 16 minutes and was filled with respectful, courteous compliments. The call was recorded and Qahtani gave it to al-Baghdadi. The blackmail recording was made more credible by ISIS computer specialists who cut out Qahtani's voice and digitally replaced it with Baghdadi's voice. ISIS planned on publishing the video at an opportune time. This was Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani's first success in his efforts to silence the critics of ISIS.
Next Abu Bakr al-Qahtani formed a cell to document and record pro ISIS statements from current ISIS members. This cell consisted of four Saudis: Ryan Abu Himd, Abdullah al-Fayez, and Adel al-Khalidi, all under the leadership of the Saudi officer Bandar al-Shaalan. Al-Qahtani informed al-Baghdadi that the cell had been formed and had begun working, and discussed which statements from influential individuals they should seek to record. It was decided that the cell would seek to obtain the following statements, in order of importance:
1) Recommendations to pledge bay’ah directly to Al Baghdadi;
2) If this wasn't possible, then they would seek statements that praised giving bay’ah to ISIS and advocated joining the organization.
3)If they could not obtain the above two types of statements, the cell would try to record: Insults, challenges, and questioning statements directed at al-Julani, Zahran Aloush [leader of the Islamic Front and Jaysh al Islam], Abu Abdullah al-Hamwi [leader in Ahrar al-Sham; member of Islamic Front], or their groups.
The cell began its task by making frequent visits to influential individuals and recording them with high precision recording devices. The members of the cell met a wide cross section of influential people, but the most prominent was the Saudi Suleiman al-Alwan. The cell asked Alwan questions designed to produce a pro ISIS response. Al-Alwan was recorded several times, at an estimated five meetings, with the longest recording being a half hour. These recordings were edited together to make it sound like al-Alwan stated the following: Praise for ISIS and the vilification of the leaders of some rebel groups, especially Zahran Aloush. A warning that some rebel brigades are similar to the Sahwa [Awakening movement]. One recording described the Islamic Front, in particular, as a Sahwa [Awakening] group. These recordings were sent to al-Qahtani, who in turn sent them to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, which told him that was very happy with the recordings because he could use them against the critics of ISIS.
Al-Qahtani suggested that Baghdadi inform al-Alwan of the existence of the recordings through intermediaries. This way al-Alwan would avoid criticizing ISIS altogether. Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani told Baghdadi that he managed to obtain a recording of al-Alwan criticizing [Egyptian President] Morsi as well. The recording of Alwan criticizing Morsi was published and Alwan was prevented from publically supporting Morsi or the Egytian Muslim Brotherhood. Al Baghdadi authorized al-Qahtani to contact Alwan. So al-Qahtani sent an anonymous letter notifying al-Alwan that ISIS had a recording of him praising Baghdadi, and that ISIS was willing to publish it. Colonel Haji Bakr objected to the publication of the recording because he was worried that the Kuwaiti Hamed al-Ali would publish damaging recordings he had of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Al Alwan was initially worried when he was contacted by ISIS, but Alwan's fears were relieved when al-Ali mailed Alwan a copy of an incriminating recording of al Baghdadi.
To blackmail al-Alwan, Colonel Haji Bakr suggested that al-Alwan be told that the recording of al-Alwan praising ISIS was in the hands of a young jihadist. He advocated for saying the recording was not in the possession of ISIS so that al-Alwan would think the recording could be released at any time and would stay silent. This is what actually transpired. This also removed suspicion from ISIS and Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani, allowing them to deny that they made the recording.
The spying cell continued its work by targeting the Saudi Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi, the Kuwaiti Hamed al-Ali, and the Moroccan Omar al-Haddoshi. The Saudi Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi is an influential jihadi who was outspoken in his criticism of ISIS.Tarifi is popular among jihadis because he speaks out against secular governments, and is clearly not being paid by any state. The Kuwaiti Hamed al-Ali is an influential jihadi who is popular in the media. Al-Ali was a member of al-Nusrah Front who refused to pledge bay’ah to ISIS and Baghdadi. The Moroccan Omar al-Haddoshi is an influential jihadi from the Maghreb, he was popular among those from Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya in particular.
The cell wrote to Abu Bakr al-Qahtani telling him the difficulty of recording and documenting convictions on these three. The Saudi Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi held no private meetings, was involved in no organizations, and made few public statements. The Kuwaiti Hamed al-Ali owned large media publications, in which he put out numerous criticisms of ISIS so his opposition of Baghdadi was well known. The Moroccan Omar al-Haddoshi was difficult to get in contact with because he resided far away and ISIS had no contacts that were close to Haddoshi.
After a series of failures in going after these figures, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ordered that the cell stop its work. Abu Bakr al-Qahtani told all cell members to stand down for the time being.
Abu Bakr al-Qahtani's second project was to use the media to attack those against ISIS. How did al-Qahtani put his plan into motion? Who worked with al-Qahtani?! We will stop here!! And complete the answers for you in a coming meeting!!
Bye.
30/12/2014
What is the name of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS? Is he from Baghdad? Is he a medical doctor?! Is his nickname real?! Is he Quraishi [from the Prophet's tribe]?! We will answer these questions shortly.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's first name is Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Bu Badri bin Armoush. He has two kunyas [nicknames] the first is Abu Awad and the second is Abu Du'a. The kunya [nickname] Abu Bakr is made up.
The title of al-Baghdadi is just for appearances and is not his real name. Ibrahim Awwad [Baghdadi's real name] is not from Baghdad. He and his tribe are from Samarra. He worked in Fallujah, and was an imam at a mosque in Diyala.
Al-Baghdadi does not hold a medical doctorate degree. He applied but was denied admission to an Iraqi academy.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi belongs to the Bu Badri tribe, which is part of the Albu Abbas tribe in Samarra. They claim lineage to Al Hassan bin Ali, but this is not true. In 2009 the Association of Noble Descent from Tribes stated that there is no evidence that the Bu Badri tribe can trace its lineage to Mohammad al-Jawad nor can it truthfully trace its lineage to Qasim bin Idris from al-Hassanein. Al-Ashraaf Online which represents the Supreme Commission for genealogy published the above statement.
We'll stop here!! And complete our previous series in the coming meeting.
Bye.
31/12/2013
The second project for Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani was to undermine the opponents of ISIS. He formed a secret council charged with this task.
Since opposition to ISIS was growing, and support of ISIS rapidly falling, Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani instituted two teams on this secret council.
The first team would focus on undermining the legitimacy of their opponents. This team consisted of two individuals: Hamoud al-Mutairi and Alioui al-Shammari. Hamoud al-Mutairi was chosen because he is proficient with the internet and had anonymous social media accounts. He had previously been imprisoned for his use of numerous fake social media accounts in support of ISIS and Baghdadi. Alioui al-Shammari was also formerly imprisoned for his support of ISIS and al-Baghdadi. Shammari was chosen because he had strong relationships with takfiris and was able to recruit them. Their team began their work. Al-Mutairi used his real name as well as pseudonyms in his work, while al-Shammari only used pseudonyms. They worked by using religious evidence to support ISIS and Baghdadi. They also responded to anyone critical of ISIS, and used religious justifications to recruit those defending ISIS online.
The second team on Qahtani's secret council consisted of activists across the internet. Their task was to stir up rumors against influential people critical of ISIS and Baghdadi online. The team was led by al-Girees Abu Omar Najdi. He was a Saudi and he worked with other Saudis like 'Hydra' (@hydra_q) and managed the account of Abudall al-Qasim. Al-Najdi also worked with another Saudi named Abdullah al-Faiz (@a_alfaiz), who managed an account in his own name, and directly supervised several other accounts that attacked the so called "al Sroria" [disunity?]. Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani mentioned al-Faiz in a meeting attended by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Haji Bakr. He claimed that al-Faiz was the most influential active figure on the internet, and he even claimed that al-Faiz was the creator of Twitter and WhatsApp, and the effort he was putting on behalf of al-Baghdadi must be appreciated. After this al-Faiz received special thanks through al-Qahtani from Colonel Haji Bakr regarding his efforts to confront the so called "al Sroria" on the internet.
The two teams started two paths:
-A religious path responding to their opponents with Quranic evidence
-A media path: distorting any opponent by saying that he is an intelligence agent.
This was based on the permissibility (by religious reasons) of intimidating and tricking opponents in times of war. Al-Qahtani allowed them to be cunning with the adversaries and opponents and terrorize and intimidate them by a torrent of rumors so they will keep silence from attacking IS.
Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani asked the Saudi al-Subaie also known as al-Sampateyk (@ ntfooosh) to try to use his account on Twitter to attack opponents of IS, because he had many followers and al-Qahtani told him that he may enter Paradise by using his account to serve al-Baghdadi. Al-Sampateyk tried to help but was criticized by his own family, so he had to apologize to al-Qahtani telling him that his father didn’t allow him to support the State. The Saudi (@AbuAlwalidMhajr) Abul Waleed al-Muhajir al-Qosaimi mediated to put pressure on al-Sampateyk, telling him that it was allowed to disobey the parents because as they claim the obedience to the Commander of the Faithful, al-Baghdadi, comes first.
The most important sheikh s with influence on the State were the Saudis Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi , Suleiman al-Alwan, Yousef al-Ahmad and the Moroccan Omar al-Haddoshi. Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani met with the shura council headed by Colonel Haji Bakr to speak about how to eliminate the influence of these four dangerous sheikhs. Several scenarios were placed to confront and bring down those by an organized campaign by a dedicated team.
The Saudi spying team who was mentioned before was monitoring the Saudi senior Sheikh Yusuf al-Ahmad, and several calls and conversations were sent to al-Baghdadi, so they could be used as means of pressure and threat from talking against the leadership of al-Baghdadi. These calls and conversations included criticize of the Sroria and praise of al-Baghdadi and the State of Iraq and its work. But Abu Bakr al-Qahtani said to the Council of Colonel Haji Bakr that al-Ahmad personality is Sroria and that they can’t be sure about his future actions.
The Saudi Abul Walid al-Muhajer with the help of the Chechen Abu Omar al-Shishani had recorded a call of religious questions and answers for the Saudi sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi. The recording was handed to al-Baghdadi, Haji Bakr and al-Qahtani, but Colonel Haji Bakr said it was not enough to do something and al-Qahtani suggested attempting to bring down everyone under the principle of them being agents of the Gulf tyrants and of foreign intelligence and agents for Al Sroria.
What did al-Baghdadi do after the start of the defections from inside the state of Iraq?! And what did Haji Bakr said to al-Qahtani for insults and cursing?! What are the steps of Haji Bakr to prevent defections?! The idea of withdrawing mobile phones from the members of the state so as not to be affected by sheikhs?! The withdrawal of passports in fear of the escape of the State soldiers?! We will stop here!! We will answer that in coming meeting.
Bye
01/01/2014
As IS began to crack from the inside when his soldiers began talking about defections and the projects of Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani to protect IS began to fail, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Colonel Haji Bakr heard that Abu Omar al-Shishani, the leader of Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar was thinking about defection. Al-Shishani leads the largest group belonging to ISIS, with a strength of 1650 fighters, of which he is the top military commander. Just the defection of al-Shishani from the State would mean the collapse and cracking of the whole project.
Colonel Haji Bakr ensured to take over the matter of Commander al-Shishani, and his first step was to put a Saudi spy companion to al-Shishani who was Abul Waleed al-Muhajer (@AbuAlwalidMhajr). Al-Muhajer informed al-Shishani that he is just a religious Mufti accompanying him for religious consulting only, that he will go with him everywhere and record all his words. Al-Shishani became comfortable and informed al-Muhajer that he is seriously considering leaving ISIS, so al-Muhajer was sure that this possibility existed and that it may happen any second.
Colonel Haji Bakr and al-Baghdadi summoned al-Qahtani and the Colonel insulted him and said: the State is splitting and you are sleeping! This is when al-Qahtani directly asked the Saudi Othman al-Nazih to meet with Commander al-Shishani and talk to him in a way that does not make him lose confidence on his companion Abul Waleed al-Muhajir. Al-Nazih told al-Shishani that it was obligatory to pledge bay’ah to al-Baghdadi, that the sheikhs made it obligatory and IS is the only hope for the project of the Islamic Caliphate.
After this al-Qahtani informed al-Baghdadi and Haji Bakr that they had made al-Shishani understand that he had to stay, but a few days later al-Muhajer send a message to Haji Bakr explaining that al-Shishani was still undecided and did not take the pledge of bay’ah to al-Baghdadi seriously. Due to this, Haji Bakr called Abu Bakr al-Qahtani, scolded him and threatened him with prison and isolation as al-Julani had done. He said that the State doesn’t respect those who do not work hard enough for its success.
Al-Qahtani decided to send another Saudi figure, Abu Ali al-Najdi (@aboalialsultan) whose name is Ibrahim Ali Sultan. He asked him to deliver an explicit and clear message to al-Shishani: if he is seriously thinking about defecting he will be killed because he will break the rule of obedience, and the sentence to that is death. Al-Qahtani demanded the message to be delivered on the lips of the soldiers of IS and not the leadership.
Al-Shishani understood the thread and that he was walking a dangerously thin line. After this he started to tell everybody around him that he wasn’t going to abandon al-Baghdadi. He knew that those around him were a great danger and that they could kill him and accuse al-Nusrah Front for his death.
In the meantime, Colonel Haji Bakr sent a message to al-Shishani, asking him to declare the bay’ah in the media. Omar al-Shishani then met with the other Chechen leader Salahuddin al-Shishani, and with two Saudis leaders: Abu Azzam al-Najdi and Abdul Wahab al-Saqawb (@ abdulwhabSaqawb). Everyone agreed that they should leave IS, based on the opinions from accredited sheikhs and having asked for the advisory opinions of the Saudis sheikhs al-Alwan and al-Tarifi al-Ahmad.
Omar al-Shishani explained to Salahuddin al-Shishani that he was going to be in great danger if he did not pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi as Haji Bakr had asked. He also explained the Colonel that if he pledged allegiance he was going to lose half of his 1650 soldiers, but Haji Bakr insisted on the public declaration. He reminded al-Shishani that if they refuse to pledge allegiance he will declare them dissenters and sentence them to dead.
Under all this pressure Abu Omar al-Shishani pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi, and immediately Salahuddin al-Shishani left with 800 of their fighters. His departure was one of the biggest disasters for IS, and they tried to hide it from social media. To contain the disaster Colonel Haji Bakr sent al-Qahtani, Abu Ali Ibrahim Ali al-Sultan, Othman al-Nazih and the Iraqi Abu Ali al-Anbari to go and meet with the deserter leaders, and to tell them that anyone who talks about the withdrawal online will be killed. Everyone got the message and stopped talking about the withdrawal and Colonel Haji Bakr ordered to celebrate across the media the pledge of allegiance of Omar al-Shishani. After this, al-Baghdadi ordered to take all the weapons from the deserters and expel them from their houses.
There were many departures after this. Everyday 5, 6 or 10 fighters left IS and Haji Bakr and al-Baghdadi felt intense fear. Colonel Haji Bakr suggested the requisition of the passports from all the immigrants and of any document in their hands for fear of desertions. The Colonel also suggested recruiting Iraqi spies urgently in all groups in Syria, so that they could be informed about any person who intends to defect to take the necessary actions. Everyone agreed on this suggestion, and it was also suggested the intensification of visits to the Muftis so that the soldiers where reminded of the rule of obedience and intimidated by hell and death. Abu al-Atheer, the Syrian, suggested the requisition of all personal communication devices from the soldiers of the State, so they could not receive information from opposing sheikhs or from deserters that could incite them to desert, but everybody agree that this would be difficult to accomplish. Colonel Haji Bakr suggested preventing Twitter and Facebook by preventing the use of smartphone devices and laptop computers from the soldiers but there was also an objection to this.
Are there spies for Colonel Haji Bakr within the other battalions?! And who are they?! And what the Colonel and al-Baghdadi did when they heard about the possibility of the establishment of the Islamic Front? What are the plans to foil the project of the Islamic Front from the inside?! Who killed Abdul Kader Saleh?! What is the relation of Abu al-Atheer, the Syrian, with that?! We will stop here!! We will complete the answers in a meeting soon.
Bye.
05/01/2014
Colonel Haji Bakr began planting spies in the rebel groups that were more worrisome for IS and they tried to buy off soldiers to get news about their leadership decisions. The Colonel was especially interested in Ahrar al-Sham, because it was the most dangerous/powerful group impacting the expansionist project of al-Baghdadi. He planted several spies but they did not reach the leadership and the news always arrived too late to be of some use. Haji Bakr and al-Baghdadi were very keen to get rid of Ahrar Al-Sham and demolish them because they saw that they were the most dangerous and numerous group in their path. The Colonel managed to get an agent in Ahrar Al-Sham, and this spy told him information that could be exploited to strengthen the State.
The most important news that reached al-Baghdadi and Haji Bakr was the idea of merging Ahrar al-Sham with Liwa al-Tawhid and Suqour al-Sham. This came as a shock and an urgent meeting of military and religious leaders of IS was requested. The meeting was attended by al-Baghdadi, Haji Bakr, Abu Ali al-Anbari, Abu Bakr al-Qahtani and Amr al-Absi among others, and they agreed on taking the following paths:
-The first path: media work by trying to foil the project, saying that it was project of awakenings and foreign agents and intelligence. A big amount of energy was put forward in the media, trying to distort the project through the Internet, intimidating and publicizing any defections within them.
-The second path: increasing the size of IS to project of Caliphate and it was also proposed to name Amr al-Absi (his real name is Abu al-Atheer al-Shami) the governor of Aleppo.
Amr al-Absi had a brother called Firas al-Absi (named as Abu Mohammed al-Shami, was born in 1973 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia), a dentist. The two brothers were pursuing the takfiri ideology very extensively and Amr al-Absi was for a time a prisoner in the prison of Sednayah in Syria, where he made takfiris of all the salafists that were with him in prison.
Firas al-Absi was the first person to declare that his group was IS in Syria, and that it was under the authority of the shura council of the Islamic State. His group was 180 men strong. However, Firas al-Absi was killed in the crossing with Turkey in Bab al-Hawa, after raising the flag of al-Qaeda causing the closure of the crossing. The flag caused the closure by Turkey, so several people asked for the flag to be removed. Firas al-Absi refused and as a result he was killed. There were several suspects of his murder: Abu Sayeh Osama Sayeh Geneidi and Hamza al-Shamali Abu Hashim. The area was controlled by the Farouq Brigades and by Ahrar al-Sham, and as a result Amr al-Absi (brother of Firas) holds a grudge against these groups, considering them responsible for the death of his brother as accomplices.
Amr al-Absi took control of the group after the death of his brother and started to work in the project of IS and in increasing the number of soldiers under his control, he went from 180 to 540 fighters. He also began to work against other rebel groups that he saw as enemies, talking with al-Baghdadi in Iraq even before this one came to Syria. He wanted for them to be a single entity. This is how the group of Amr al-Absi was the first branch of al-Baghdadi in Syria. He called his group The Shura Council of the State of Islam, changing it later to the Shura Council of the Mujahedeen.
In the meantime, before the arrival of al-Baghdadi to Syria, Amr al-Absi was seeking to strengthen his group to attach strongly with al-Baghdadi if he finally came. He was trying to find Saudi supporters using connections of his father, who had worked in Saudi Arabia in the past. The takfiri reputation of Abu al-Atheer al-Absi in Syria and the killing of his brother were reasons for the fighters to leave his group and his image tarnished in Syria to the point of despair. So he began seeking to win sheikh supporters abroad, especially in Saudi Arabia, finally sending a commission to Saudi Arabia made up of 4 people. This committee, led by one of his brothers, met with several Saudi sheikhs to support his group: Sulaiman al-Alwan, Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi, Abdul Rahman al-Barrak, Abdullah al-Ghunaymaan and others.
The brother of Amr al-Absi met with Al-Alwan, but he refused to support them until he comes with a well-known personality of the group.
Al-Tarifi objected to the designation of State, saying that it was needed a shura with other mujahedeen to create a State, after which he expelled Amr al-Absi’s brother.
Abdul Rahman al-Barrak and Abdullah al-Ghunaymaan apologized for not being able to receive him and hear his topic.
Abu al-Atheer (Amr al-Absi) talked with Baghdadi and tried to encourage him to come to Syria and stand together against other groups. He always remembered the dead of his brother Firas (the former commander) and wanted to take revenge, so when al-Baghdadi finally came to Syria he was one of the first to visit him and pledge bay’ah, first in private and later in public, waiting for the opportunity to avenge his brother. He always talked with Haji Bakr and Abu Bakr about the pain and misfortune due to the dead of his brother.
About this time the Islamic Front was formed, being composed of Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Suqour al-Sham and al-Tawhid brigade. Baghdadi and Haji Bakr felt the danger and as previously suggested the idea of proclaiming the Islamic Caliphate began to grow in power. Everybody agreed with it, but what steps should they take? Amr al-Absi suggested to al-Baghdadi to ask for pledges of allegiance for the Caliphate from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Sinai. Al-Baghdadi formed a committee to summon people who have joined IS with experience in those countries. They would have to bring videotaped copies of the pledge of bay’ah so that they are published at the same time when the Caliphate was declared, as if these pledges came from everywhere non-stop.
Al-Baghdadi sent a message to Nasser al-Wahayshi, the leader of Al Qaeda in Yemen, and he refused the idea, and the same happened in Afghanistan and Morocco, but he did receive pledges from anonymous jihadists in Sinai, Tunisia and Libya. The recordings were disappointing and frustrating for Haji Bakr and al-Baghdadi. Al-Qahtani requested from the Saudis support for the Caliphate and told them that its announcement is imminent.
Abu al-Atheer Amr al-Absi was the most frustrated member in the State of al-Baghdadi because he was waiting for the moment of revenge. He was by then the proclaimed governor of Aleppo, a reward from al-Baghdadi for his early support, and was worried about the al-Tawhid brigade, the strongest rebel group in Aleppo with 20.000 fighters, five times as many as they had. He saw this group as an obstacle, even more because their leader Abdul Qader Saleh was very popular with the people of Aleppo.
When the al-Tawhid brigade joined the Islamic Front Amr al-Absi felt even more threatened, although he knew about it beforehand thanks to the informants of al-Baghdadi. He decided to get rid of Abdul Qader Saleh for being a member of the “awakening”, and an apostate. It wasn’t mentioned how he was going to do it, until the news of his death arrived.
Who is the member of the state of Al Baghdadi the Iraqi commander Abu Ayman?! What is the new mission of the Saudi Othman al-Nazih?! Did Al Baghdadi thought about going back to Iraq?! And why?! We will stop here!! We will complete the answers in a meeting soon.
Bye.
08/01/2014
We confirm this news:
The killing of Colonel Haji Bakr, the first man and the mastermind in the IS of al-Baghdadi, and that al-Baghdadi has asked to conceal the news and deny it.
Amr al-Absi gave orders to execute all the prisoners in Aleppo and not to leave anyone alive in prison.
Before these events Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi thought about going back to Iraq out of fear of the unknown fate, but three dangerous Iraqi figures rallied on him: Colonel Haji Bakr, Abu Ali al-Anbari and Abu Ayman, an Emir of the State in Iraq. Abu Ayman was selected by al-Baghdadi as governor of the Coast, he is from the clan al-Bdour from the south of Iraq and he was a Shiite recently converted to the Sunni sect.
These three figures are the most dangerous in the organization of al-Baghdadi, and the most dangerous of them is Colonel Haji, who was recently killed. The second danger comes from Abu Ali al-Anbari because he represents religious depth and legislative power for al-Baghdadi and can choose influential religious figures.
After the killing of Colonel Haji Bakr, Abu Ayman al-Iraqi and al-Anbari approached al-Baghdadi fearing of his return to Iraq and fearing the cracking of IS and the dispersing of the soldiers after the recent withdrawals. Abu Ali al-Anbari feared the withdrawal of the Saudis and knew that Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani was thinking about escape and to withdraw from the State. He asked al-Qahtani directly about the news, and al-Qahtani told him that it was true, but for family reasons. Al-Anbari said to al-Qahtani: “we entered together and we will die together or live together, and you kill me if I withdraw, and I will kill you if you withdraw”. After that he put al-Qahtani under surveillance by order of al-Baghdadi.
Abu Ali al-Anbari asked to bring the Saudi Othman Al-Nazih and asked him to teach all immigrant fighters to fight the apostate and the Awakening. Othman al-Nazih is a weak personality by testimony of al-Baghdadi and Abu Ali al-Anbari and he is not fit for the leadership but he is fit enough to deceive the Saudis and influence them. Ali al-Anbari in the past several months appointed several tasks to Othman al-Nazih namely:
1 - Talks on the groups and encourage them to remain steadfast with al-Baghdadi.
2 - Visit Omar al-Shishani and emphasize to him religiously that al-Baghdadi is right.
3 – Talk to the prisoners of IS and advise them and draw up a list of those who
deserve to repent and those who deserve a dead sentence in the field or to stay.
Al-Baghdadi was increasingly convinced that his presence in Syria was a fatal error, but his council composed of the most dangerous Iraqis made him retreat whenever he thought about returning to Iraq. Al-Baghdadi is usually accompanied by the Iraqi Abu Yahya and he is a silent man, no one understands his role in the leadership except that he does not leave al-Baghdadi in any place and any time, but the strong interdependence between the Iraqi Abu Yahya and Abu Ali al-Anbari made the closest people talk about that the Iraqi Abu Yahya is a tool for Abu Ali al-Anbari and a spy for him who tells him what is happening in the shura council and any meetings that take place behind him and the feelings and developments of al-Baghdadi.
Amr al-Absi Abu al-Atheer presented to al-Baghdadi a list of assassinations for leaders from the Islamic Front and the Free Syrian Army, justifying killing them to dismantle the awakening.
How was the planning to kill the leaders of the Free Syrian Army?! Did al-Baghdadi thought in bombing outside Syria?! And Where?! We will stop here!! And will answer you in coming meeting.
Bye.
12/01/2014
News: Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi is now in Raqqa.
The Prince of Iraq and al-Sham Daesh Abu Awad and Abu Duaa Ibrahim Awaad al-Samarraie named as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi meet many times in the day with his leaders due to the difficult circumstances that IS lives these days having lost a large number of its men.
Al-Baghdadi asked two days ago for the number of his followers. Abu Ali al-Anbari informed all the groups of IS that are dispersed through Syria, asking to inform him about their number and the total number was 1757 fighters, most of them from three countries:
-The first: Tunisia
-The second: Saudi Arabia
-The third: Libya and Algeria
Al-Baghdadi requested statistical analysis of the nationalities with more defectors. It was reached that most of the defectors are from Saudi Arabia and that they usually defect to the al-Nusra Front. Due to his, al-Baghdadi ordered to put protective measures to this crisis and he asked to work on reviving IS by any means necessary to show their power. It was ordered to demonize the rest of the fighters and bring advisory opinions and intensify the efforts of the media and the military.
Al-Baghdadi ordered to bring advisory opinions, especially from Saudis, proclaiming the apostasy of Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic Front in order to convince the fighters to fight them and leave Bashar and his army. The advisory opinions were brought by the Saudi Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani, and they were from three Saudis and one Bahraini. Al-Baghdadi asked al-Qahtani to try to protect these advisory opinions from any sheikh opposition to it with a huge media distortionary campaign.
Back in the day al-Qahtani was the most enthusiastic man about the project of al-Baghdadi. He even changed his surname from Abu Hafs to Abu Bakr. He said to al-Baghdadi and his Iraqis companions: I wish to change my name so I can to be like our Emir al-Baghdadi.
Abu Bakr Omar al-Qahtani contacted the committee managed by the Saudi Abdullah al-Fayez to intensify the media campaign to save IS. Al Fayez was trusted by al-Baghdadi personally, because he is former Saudi fighter in the ranks of ISI who was injured in the leg, after which he entered Saudi Arabia disguised to be treated from his injury. The hospital informed the Saudi government that they had a patient injured with a gunshot, so he was imprisoned for years.
The Saudi Abdullah al-Fayez has intensified the media work in the Internet and put new members for his committee in the new task. Al-Qahtani requested from al-Fayez to not include any people for the work in the media department unless he had raised their names to him to approve them in the shura council of al-Baghdadi. The reason for this is that he will provide them with very important news, so it is important for them to be on high level of confidence. Abdullah al-Fayez send the names of active members, being the most prominent the Saudis Abdul Rahman Sultan al-Mojil, Ryan Abu Himd, Adnan al-Shaalan al-Khalidi and Tamim al-Qadi.
The committee took over the intensification of the support to IS by confronting the sheikhs of the opponents of al-Baghdadi under fake accounts and fighting what is called Al Sroria, and al-Baghdadi ordered Abu Ali al-Anbari and the former solider of the Georgian army Omar al-Shishani to leave the fighting against Bashar al-Assad and work on fighting the apostates (and they mean by apostates al-Nusra Front and the Islamic Front). Abu Ali al-Anbari requested from Al Baghdadi to order the Saudis Muftis with a serious order and requested from the Saudis and most especially al-Qahtani and Othman al-Nazih to pass it to the fighting groups, urging them to blow themselves against al-Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham and that this is the greatest type of martyrdom. The two did pass the information to the groups and urged them to register a list with the suiciders and their names were handed over to al-Baghdadi.
Al-Baghdadi said in front of his council five days ago: “You cannot defeat the apostates except by two things: suicide attacks against the groups and bombings in Turkey and the Western world for their support to the awakening groups. Al-Baghdadi saw that the future of the State was at risk unless they take actions to end the foreign support to the Syrian revolution. The work on the suiciders for Syria was done, and the thinking for the attacks in Turkey and the west is still in progress.
We will stop here!! We will talk about more details in the next meeting.
Bye.
19/01/2014
There were about twenty to thirty fighters who split from the ISIS on a daily basis. After the large number of defections in IS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi requested a statistical study with the most defecting nationality and the less defecting nationality. They found that most of the defections were from Saudi nationality and the less is Tunisian nationality. Al-Baghdadi ordered to prioritize the Saudis in the suicide operations against apostates and maintain Tunisian nationality as a solid base.
There were desperate attempts from IS to bring pledges of bay’ah to cover the daily shortages and all of it ended in failure. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ordered to establish a gathering campaign for the Tunisian nationality because of their loyalty (they obey and rarely defect from him because they are dominated by ignorance). This campaign was put under the control of Abu Jafar, a Tunisian who was provided with money for his mission. Work began and he used representatives in Tunisia, Libya, Turkey and Egypt to facilitate the movement without being noticed from the intelligence services.
Al-Baghdadi ordered Syrian representatives belonging to IS to try to offer money to subsidiary junior leaders of the Islamic Front, especially Ahrar al-Sham, to make them defect and join him. The amounts reached to $ 1,500 monthly salary and with the expenses for his family including 200 riyals per month they have been working, but all of this with no result.
Al-Baghdadi ordered to put a spy (Tunisian or Iraqi) with each field commander to fortify IS from any defections and have early notification to try to dissuade the dissidents or liquidate them.
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi considered Hassan Abboud one of the most dangerous leaders to IS. He recruited a Jordanian by the surname Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (to show the affiliation to an ancient jihadi leader, although this person had no history with jihadism). The task of this man was to bring news about one of the most dangerous rebel groups: Liwa Dawood. For this, he grew his beard and went with the Syrian group as a religious consultant with a jihadist history. This character brought a lot of information about the Islamic Front and Liwa Dawood, but this did not satisfy al-Baghdadi because this did nothing to stop the division and desertions in IS.
In recent weeks, some influential people have left the group, among them the Saudis: Abdul Wahab al-Sqaub, Abu Al Bara al-Zahrani, Abu Azzam al-Najdi. Also Abdullah al- Qasim, known as Hydra, who joined al-Nusrah. Many others from other nationalities also defected: the Egyptian Abu Ibrahim, the Tunisians Abu Saad and Abu Yman and Abu Abdul Rahman al-Qayrawani, and the Libyan Abu Isra and some Gulf figures especially Kuwaiti and Emirati.
People close to al-Baghdadi provided him with the names of some of the figures responsible for the defections in the group. There was a consensus on two persons: the Saudi Dr. Abdullah al-Muhaysini and the Kuwaiti Hajjaj al-Ajmi, due to their influence in the field and their relation with senior sheikhs. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi directed the creation of a private security detachment to get rid of the two characters through skilled Iraqi snipers. This was advised for the public interest and to stop the division in the Muslim community.
Again, al-Baghdadi took several precautionary measures to treat the cracks of IS and asked them to work to restore the confidence in IS through legitimate influencers from outside of Syria. He requested to bring in new supporters and that they should express their support explicitly. Amongst the possible new supporters where the Saudis Abu al-Zubair Alhaúla and Adel al-Murshidi.
The first, Abu al-Zubair, was a former fighter in several countries close to some prominent jihadi figures, but he refused to support the group publicly. Nonetheless he promised to bring Saudi jihadists to pledge allegiance. He contacted several groups, including the Green Battalion, led by a person named Abu Nasser Hossam al-Shammari. He asked them to join al-Baghdadi’s group but they refused arguing they would not join except with advisory opinion from the Saudi sheikhs al-Alwan and al-Tarifi. He also contacted a group called Hawks of al-Ezz which consisted mainly of Saudis, but the response was the same.
Al-Baghdadi noted the lack of supporters at home and abroad, especially with the religious leaders closest to the group apologizing for not declaring their support, like the Saudi Nasser al-Thaqeel, who sent a message telling that he is unable to support publicly and that he can’t continue his activity because as he allegedly afraid of the Saudi government.
The Saudi Adel al-Murshidi is not a prominent figure but the Saudis in Syria said that he is a sneaky jihadist supporter with old relations with people like Abdul Aziz al-Ttawelai and Abdul Aziz al-Muqrin and senior leaders. He refused to support them with his own name but ensured to use anonymous alias to help and support them, and this was really done. Al-Murshidi realized intensive visits to persuade sheikhs to support or at least be silent about the State of Iraq and at least not to speak negatively or positively, which is the lesser of two evils. He put on the list of supporters of al-Baghdadi two previous characters: the first al-Alioui al-Shammari (who still supervises two fake accounts). The second figure was the Saudi Hamad al-Reyes, a supporter of al-Baghdadi who communicates with him only through his two sons: Omar y Moaaz. The supporters of al-Baghdadi think that the personality of Hamad al-Reyes can be exploited easily, that he doesn’t allow his sons to attend the government education of Saudi Arabia. His sons joined IS and are proud supporters of al-Baghdadi. There was an attempt by Hamad al-Reyes of showing public support, but he finally declined for fear of the Saudi government. Also, news have reached these days that al-Reyes has been talking with his sons about them coming back, not because of a lack of support for al-Baghdadi, but because he doesn’t want them to die in the confrontations.
We stop here! We will continue in a very close meeting.
Bye
24/01/2014
In confirmation of what we explained previously, Amr al-Absi Abu al-Atheer, the Syrian, and his thoughts and his mentality, he controls IS jails and is responsible for the killing of prisoners in Aleppo.
The Saudi Omar al-Qahtani is doing the role of giving the advisory opinion and judgments of murder and torture with electricity and suspending sentences as we have explained in this confession. http://t.co/6sX66btuxq A few months ago there was information that the Saudi al-Qahtani may marry several Syrian, some of them relatives of the Syrian Abu al-Atheer, as he came to Syria single and unmarried.
The decisions of the young Saudi al-Qahtani started with the matters related to prison and deciding about torturing with electric shock, suspending and execution after viewing the conditions of the investigation.
Talking about these details soon.
Bye.
17/02/2014
We confirmed for you the killing of Iraqi Colonel Haji Bakr before the announcement this month. The concealment of the news about his death was a desire of al-Baghdadi until the release of the dead Colonel’s picture.
Haji Bakr was the most dangerous figure in IS and he greatly influenced al-Baghdadi, because Hajii Bakr gave to al-Baghdadi the Emirate of IS and was his right hand. Now the shadow government for IS has changed:
-The place of the Colonel has been taken by the Iraqi Abu Ali al-Anbari. He is a 50yr old violent Iraqi who entered into a position of influence in the Baghdadi State.
-Two old Baathist officers have come to a leadership position and are working in the shadows. They are Major General Mohammed al-Douiri and Major General Saeed Mohammed al-Dgyeman.
All of this is an evidence of the large changes incoming in the politics of IS and al-Baghdadi. The new officers are not affected by religion, so the religious turbulence during this period didn’t affect them as it did for example with the departures of the Iraqis after the killing of Haji Bakr, when they lost faith in the current leadership and were afraid of the future of IS, which lead to them leaving after the Fatwa of the Saudi sheikh Abdul Aziz al-Tarifi, which caused the desertion of approximately 30% of IS troops, as the fatwa forbade the affiliation to al-Baghdadi.
There was a large campaign to compensate for the loss and to maintain the remaining fighters but there came explosions, bombs and [audio/video] clips of the Saudi cleric Dr. al-Muhaysini which disrupted the movements to compensate for the loss fighters. All of these increased the withdrawals on a large scale, and the Baghdadi State’s leadership became angry, which make Baghdadi approve without any feeling the dangerous offer from Amr al-Absi, this is, to implement bomb attacks and suicide missions against “awakening” groups like the al-Nusrah Front and the Islamic Front.
Al-Baghdadi ordered to stop the attacks against the Syrian Regime, focusing the attack on the other two groups. Al-Baghdadi consulted Abu Ali al-Anbari about the bomb and suicide attack operations, and al-Anbari told him that the use of the fighters in martyrdom operations against awakening groups was better than this fighters deserting them, and due to the remaining crisis, al-Anbari ordered the Emirs of IS to emphasize the supervision of the soldiers and the security of what was being played in the media, and to emphasize the use of guards in the fighter groups, so that no one of them should leave alone unless it was to carry out a suicide attack or under intense supervision. […] The departure without permission is considered a departure from obedience, and IS has the right to kill them immediately for that crime.
This order minimized the splitting of the state and the desertion of the soldiers, but complaints arrived to al-Baghdadi from Abu Bakr al-Qahtani, explaining that there is a campaign of arrests in Saudi Arabia against IS supporters, which had lessened their media support and the popularity was at its lowest level. The jurist Hamoud al-Mutairi apologized to al-Qahtani, and the same did Abullah al-Fayez, Allioui al-Shammari and Abu al-Zubair. There was a state of fear to the Saudi government, and two influential Saudi figures of ISIS were arrested: Bandar al-Shaalan and Ryan Abu Himd.
Due to this problem, an alternative figure has appeared, and this is the Saudi Abdul Rahman Sultan, which took control of the administration of the Saudi Arabia media wing committee, where he supervises the accounts which attack Syrian rebels and al-Nusrah Front and the Islamic Front continuously. He supervises many accounts and feeds with information from Syria through al-Qahtani to intensify the media work and revive the slow death of the State of al-Baghdadi, and to distort enemies with influence over IS like al-Muhaysini. Now al-Anbari has suggested fighting influential leaders whether inside or outside Syria, and these are the three most dangerous figures for IS:
-Abu Maria al-Qahtani, commander in the al-Nusrah Front.
-Hassan Aboud.
-Abdullah al-Muhaysini, the Saudi cleric.
[…]
And during this period Amr al-Absi proposed to al-Anbari and al-Baghdadi to move the war to the Gulf and to target Saudi Arabia. To justify it, al-Absi said that all their previous support from the Saudis in terms of fighters and else has stopped due to the fatwas of their sheikhs, so there is no benefit to them in the security of Saudi Arabia, and they must move the war to confuse the enemy.
27/02/2014
The assassination of Abu Khalid al-Suri was completed by a security force composed of three individuals who are:
- Abu Ali al-Anbari
2. Amr al-Absi Abu al-Atheer
3. Abu Asama al-Iraqi
Abu Asama's mission was to recruit 5 people: 2 Libyan individuals and 3 Tunisian individuals under the supposed mission of assassinating Jamal Ma'arouf, and the 3 suicide bombers won't know that they will target Abu Khalid al-Suri and if their mission doesn't succeed behind them there will be 2 other individuals in a car that has 10 tons of explosives for storming the center and what is in it. The specific location of Abu Khalid al-Suri was known by al-Baghdadi through an Iraqi officer that is his friend, and the information came from the Iraqi and US intelligence because there is a table for the liquidation of jihadi leaders, including al-Julani and al Hamwi.
A report was released by request of al-Baghdadi with the title [Stop with the Islamic Front], created by Abu Sa'd al-Najdi, who is a Saudi.
Ali al-Jabali led the leaders of IS to Turki al-Binali, which is the guy who releases reports supporting IS under the name of Hussam al-Majid.
Lastly, al-Baghdadi ordered the placement of all the wives of the immigrants/foreigners under surveillance to avoid dissidence amongst them and so that they can't leave with their families.
14/03/2014
A Saudi who is associated with al-Baghdadi made a suggestion to the organization leaders to kill the Saudi cleric Abdullah al-Muhaysini and to take care of him. Al-Baghdadi agreed to this mission and created a team with him made up of several individuals and the group took off a few days ago and is now in Huraytan (Haritan, Syria).
The Saudi that proposed the assassination is from the same town/village as al-Muhaysini in Saudi Arabia.
1/04/2014
Islamic organizations usually rely on secrecy in their work in order to safeguard the lives of its members. This secrecy is the indispensable element of the integrity of the organization. This secrecy is reinforced by a security department in the organization, known as the Security Committee. This committee structures the organization and its administration. Those who control [this committee], control the organization, as said by Judge Abu Shuaib al-Masri in an audio recording after the half mark on the security [operatives] he met in Daish [link from source]
The security operatives are found in Daish starting by the general command, and under the general supervisor (Abu Muslim al-Turkmani), to whom the Baathist Haji Bakr - formerly, he died – reported, and who has been succeeded now by Al-Anbari. The direct head of the Security Committee is Abu Ahmed al-Alwani, the mayor of Diyala. He was a lieutenant-colonel in the [military] intelligence of Saddam’s army and until now has got connections. Al-Alwani was held for a while in Iraq and was released like the rest of the Baathist prisoners, who fled when the American invaded. He remained a Baathist while in detention. After his detention ended, he was part of the choir that joined Daish by recommendation from Haji Bakr and other Saddam’s Baathists. Given his experience, he was tasked with the Security Committee. He structured the organization in Iraq and later in the Levant [Syria] to cells and units, run by security operatives loyal to him and whose faces were never revealed and identities were never known. Like other Baath officers, Al-Alwani had connections with the Baath leadership in Syria before and after the revolution. He was leading the coordination with the [Syrian] regime. We have valuable evidence on the collaboration of Al-Alwani with the Syrian regime and the handover of nearly 100 Mujahedeens from Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar at the beginning of the revolution. Initially, the Syrian regime relied on the likes of Al-Alwani to hand over the Mujahedeen before they multiplied [in numbers]. After they became so many, they deliberately let the Mujahedeen reach IS. The aim was to use them in fighting the Mujahedeen from other factions by controlling them through their collaborationist leaders such as Al-Alwani. The proof we have on the collaboration of IS will be presented to any faction which arrests and interrogates Al-Alwani.
Now we move to his [Alwani’s] deputy, the head of IS security in Aleppo Abu Ahmad Haa’ut. He is a Syrian officer and used to be in charge of [Syrian] State Security Intelligence in Aleppo. Before the revolution, he remained at his position for over two and a half years. Then he suddenly defected and fewer than 30 days later, he joined IS and swore allegiance after serving more than 25 years in the intelligence services of the Syrian Baath [regime] and after the executions of Palmyra [prison], the rape in Aleppo, and the crackdown in the Levant [i.e. Damascus]. After two years and a half of the revolution’s start, he repented. After all of this record, and less than a month of his repentance, he joined IS and was assigned with a similar [security] role. It was the head of IS security in Aleppo. He committed massacres similar to his old days in the Baathist regime.
Abu Ahmad Haa’ut executed his nephew Nur – may the mercy of God be upon him – himself after torturing him and his friends for long. They were arrested only for saying that [Haa’ut] was with IS. Al Haa’ut tortured and passed capital punishment verdicts against many of the Muslim youths, such as Dr. Abu Rayyan – whose bodies were found in a mass grave upon the withdrawal of IS. Haa’ut deliberately sought to create security incidents which caused major problems for IS, such as the leak of the infidelity [sic] of Muhammad Faris in the hospital [translator: an Ahrar al-Sham member who was reportedly beheaded by IS for being a Shia] even though this [charge] was a total lie as he did not do that.
The IS operatives now are playing the same role played by [Prophet Mohammed-era double-agent Abdullah] Bin Sabaa and his soldiers when Ali [Bin Abi Taleb] and Muwaiyah [Bin Abi Sufyan] mended their ties but [Bin Sabaa] fabricated a discord. We still have a lot on IS security operatives and about the real reason for the killing of Abi Sa’d al-Hadrami, the emir of al-Nusrah Front in al-Raqqah. We will publish that in due course.
04/04/2014
We’ll start our topic today about the killings that targeted the mujahidin of Ansar al-Islam in Iraq that were done by ISIS, as narrated by Abu Ahmad Al-Iraqi:
Sheikh Abu Al-Hareth Al-‘Uwaysi was a student of knowledge, a mujahid, a tribe leader and a caller to Allah (missionary). He was imprisoned by the Americans in the year of 2005 with the suspicion that he belonged to the Ansar Al-Islam. He left the prison in the year of 2010, and after that he -Sheikh Al-‘Uwyasi- got imprisoned by IS and after that he was killed and his body got disposed of. IS denied -like always- their responsibility of killing him, and after a while it was confirmed that they were indeed responsible and behind the killing of Sheikh Al-‘Uwaysi. IS admitted after that, that indeed they were behind his killing and they justified his killing by saying that the Sheikh was an apostate and that thereby it was obligated to kill him, and they didn’t mentioned the reasons for his apostasy.
Abu Huda was a student of knowledge, he had a doctorate in military science and he was very popular within the society/with the people. IS killed him and like the custom within the Batiniyah (shia sects) today, is that they denied the fact that they had some connection to his killing. After a while it was confirmed by Ansar Al-Islam that they (IS) were behind the killing of Shaihk Abu Huda. ISIS admitted it and they justified the killing by saying that he was an apostate and they didn’t mention –like always- the reasons of his apostasy. After that they killed Abu Mohammed Al-‘Uwaysi, the leader (Emir) of Ansar Al-Islam in Kirkuk, and they also denied the fact that they had a connection to his killing. After that they killed an Imam of a mosque who left working under Ansar al-Islam and he (the Imam) focused all his time on missionary work in the outskirts and IS killed him also.
And all these killings were the leaders and the sheikhs of Ansar al-Islam were killed, it was all done by the IS leadership of Mosul on that time, and his name is Abu Aqil Al-Iraqi. Abu Aqil al-Iraqi was an officer in the Baathist intelligence under the Sadam ruler ship of Iraq. And he was also the one who caused the most damage against Ansar al-Islam in the era of Saddam Hussein and also in the era of the Husaini the Quayshi!!! (he means Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi). While the reality was that most of those whom were killed of Ansar al-Islam were pretty sympathetic towards the agenda of IS and they would think good of them, they (Ansar al-Islam) underestimated them because they would see them as brothers and mujahidin and so they became their (IS) sacrifices.
After this they (IS) started with security raids against the Ansar al-Islam to stop them from existing, they started with killing Salah Al-Ansari, the military Emir within Ansar al-Islam of Mosul and they killed many other brothers. After that, the Baathi Abu Aqil together with his criminal raid group within ISIS started to raid, kill and blowing up the houses of our brothers from Ansar al-Islam with their families in it, many of them were killed. And the worst of all that they’ve done is the following: They requested the soldiers of Ansar Al-Islam to fill in a personal information paper with the following information:
- The real name of the soldier.
- What group is affiliated to.
- The payments he gets.
- A declaration of aversion against Ansar Al-Islam
And after that he (the soldier) would stamp it with a stamp of aversion against Ansar al-Islam and they would stick a copy of all the information on the mosque of the city and another copy would go to IS, and this copy would also have a photograph of the soldier (of Ansar al-Islam) and a video with flash memory where the brother would be shown without any cover on his face, he would say his name, position and his aversion to Ansar al-Islam straight to the camera, and this would be send to them (IS)!!! Isn’t this what you call a decent work of intelligence within IS? And almost everyone whom they captured (of Ansar al-Islam) and whom these videos of have been recorded were after a few days of this happening imprisoned by (Nuri) Al-Maliki and most of them also have been executed or they still wait to be executed and you’ll see that IS is also full with prisoners. And they (IS) became so (full of enmity) that one day when Ansar al-Islam placed an IED bomb, and they started to camp for it (waiting until an enemy vehicle will pass the IED), and there was an IS soldier and he came and he changed the position of the IED so the (enemy) hummer would not be exposed to the explosion of it. After that the brothers went back to the bomb to correct it’s position and an ISIS vehicle approached the brothers while shooting at them and then the vehicle would escape to a barrier of the Rafidi (Shia) military (He means the Iraqi army of course)!!! And they would pass by it (the writer is indicating that there was some truce between the army and ISIS)!!!
And also in Kirkuk, the soldiers of Ansar al-Islam went to throw mortars on the army (Iraqi) and then a vehicle of ISIS came as they made auto light contact with the Iraqi army and they would together fight (against the Ansar al-Islam). And all these kind of operations that have been conducted against the Ansar al-Islam, they were all done because Ansar al-Islam refused to take part in a project that had been commanded by a formal Baathi and a current powerful men in the government of Maliki, (the command) went through Abu Aqil the leader of ISIS in Mosul. And this project was going about a partnership with some members of the Maliki government against some other members of the (same) government. They wanted from Ansar al-islam while giving them a sum of money their partnership in killing some governmental members and letting some others alive. And this offer of money is the same as with ISIS, they partner up with some members of the government against other members of the government. And I will now talk about them with a small example:
Atheel and Usama al-Nujaifi pay ransoms to ISIS with in return that ISIS will not target them. With the fact that they (Atheel and Usama) are a part of the Maliki government. Atheel Al-Nujaifi ruled Mosul 3 periods after each other and all that time that he ruled Mosul he was never a targeted to be killed by ISIS while in Anbar the opposite happened with the governor of Anbar. ISIS performed 7 operations against the governor there with 1 of the operation to be as a suicide mission to kill the governor. As regard Ansar al-Islam then they conducted 5 operations against Atheel (the governor of Mosul) and Allah didn’t estimate those operations to succeed. And every time ISIS comes with threats and that they want to take revenge on them (Ansar al-Islam) because they try to kill him (the governor). These are just some of the stories between Ansar al-Islam and ISIS, and it were the Ansar whom received and welcomed Shaihk (Abu Musab) Al-Zarqawi May God have mercy upon him in the training camp of Jibaal Kurdistan (the mountain of Kurdistan) before the start of the American invasion in Iraq. Some leaders of Ansar Al-Islam went before the (American) invasion to Afghanistan and they would request muhajirieen (foreign Islamic fighters) to come to Iraq for the establishment of an Iraqi Islamic state, so they choose Al-Zarqawi and so Sheihk al-Zarqawi went along with the mujahidin of Ansar al-Islam to Kurdistan and they opened a training camp under the supervision of Nurudeen al-Ordoni (the Jordanian). May Allah lead him/show him the good wherever (the good) is. And Ansar Al-Islam were great people that welcomed the muhajireen (foreign Islamic fighters) and they were the reason for the beginning of the Iraqi Jihad right after the invasion. But IS never and never will preserve the good as it is the custom of the Baath. Some people even think that we are against the uprising of an Islamic state and this is a wrong understanding. We are against the oppressing of muslims in the name of the Islamic state, and we are against the Baathist infiltration of an Islamic entity and that they (the Baath) will rule the Muslims in the name of religion.
08/04/2014
We have received news from a survivor of #Daesh Baghdadi's prisons that Sheikh Abu Abdulaziz al-Qatari was kept as a prisoner in Al-Atrab's [a city in Northern Aleppo] prison, and then he was transferred to Al-Raqqa, and Sheikh Abu Abdulaziz al-Qatari remained alive, and the last news is that last month, in Raqqa, we called to negotiate for the clearance of his charges and to negotiate its release, but remained differences that caused the abduction from Daesh.
09/04/2014
Sheikh Abu Abed al-Aziz played a pivotal role in the global jihad (effort) in general, and the Levant jihad (effort) particularly. He is in the Levant a defense line; the Sheikh undertook decisions that undermined ISIS and showed its true nature, that was hidden from Sheikh Abi Abed al-Aziz, as others from "al-Qaeda" (or "headquarters", need context check). Abu Abed al-Aziz reported what he saw and heard from the leaders of ISIS to the factions that he mediates between, most notably the Al-Nusra Front. Al-Baghdadi's anger towards Abu Abed Al-Aziz is like his anger towards any other Islamist that the parties gather around, which makes it hard to gather them in the hard times when needed.
ISIS has two faces (sides), one is Takfiri and external, and the other Baathist and holds no values to it. Both of them are totally refused by society. For both the faces of ISIS have benefit in fighting the leaders and gives them up to the regimes, as they did before with Sheikh Abi Saad al-Hadrami.
Bashar Al-Assad announced, in an interview, the arrest of his intelligence of Abi Saad Al-Hadrami through his loyals in Al-Raqqa. And after three months, his arrest was discovered that it was from ISIS not from the regime. And when they were exposed, ISIS announced a report that it had executed Abi Saad (Al-Hadrami) because he rebelled. It deliberately forgot the fact that they gave him up to the regime as it never happened. ISIS never gave any picture of Abi Saad Al-Hadrami when he was executed, although they boasted killing muslims and that proves his delivery to the regime of Bashar.
When Abu Safiyya Al-Yamani investigated the two security guards of ISIS, and tried to hold them accountable for breaking the laws, citing murders and assassination, he received an order for his arrest. And then a statement for his martyrdom came up.
When Abu Shaayb Al-Masri investigated the security guards of ISIS, he was arrested and was awaiting his execution like the rest who was executed without reason.
The Sheikh Abou Abed Al-Aziz met Jamal Maarouf and then went to mean the leaders of ISIS. And then he went out of the controlled regions of the criminal Maarouf and disappeared. The criminal Jamal Maarouf admitted publicly the killing of the immigrants and throwing them in dug-up trenches (or "wells") because they are the followers of ISIS. So why deny? ISIS is the only one benefiting from hiding the Sheikh. That is despite it delivering him to the regime of Bashar so he can give him as a bargaining chip to the Americans.
The news of the hostages were worrisome, that they got out by a deal stricken with ISIS, that they heard the title of the Sheikh being thrown around by his takers (prison guards) and that they never saw him with their own eyes. We ask the security of ISIS that took part in killing and kidnapping the leaders of the Mulims that they release Abu Abed Al-Aziz Al-Qatari, and show his corpse, and Abu Saad Al-Hadrami, if they were to true to their word that they killed him.
12/04/2014
Al-Ajeel tribe was one of the government’s main columns in Azaz (Rural Aleppo). One of ‘Ajeel’s tribal leaders whose name is Rajab Eissa is one of the biggest drug dealers, he is also a known Baathist. This tribal-leader’s children have been also known as Baathists, Shabiha and government supporters since the 80s. #ISIS_emirs Rajab Eissa had a son called Fawaz. Fawaz is the leader of their family in crime and thuggery. Fawaz appeared in a video at the beginning of the revolution where he was dragging a Muslim attached to the back of his car through the streets of #Aleppo. Fawaz Rajab Eissa also led a convoy composed of more than vehicles belonging to the government’s military and political security forces into the protesting areas (this was before the war started).
Fawaz kept murdering, and arresting the Muslim youths until the fall of Azaz on the hands of the rebels. The arrested protestors would be delivered to various Syrian security agencies. After the fall of Azaz Fawaz fled and starting working as a brigand for ISIS, he then went on to join Northern Storm Battalion (NSB). It’s known that there are some honourable people in NSB, however, most of them are thieves, shabiha and brigands (like the Daeshi Fawaz, for example). Fawaz very leniently killed people and especially when he’s stealing from people.
When ISIS and NSB had an altercation due to ISIS attempting to steal NSB’s share of the spoils from Menigh Military Airbase among other reasons. When ISIS successfully managed to take over the spoils, a fight happened between the two groups that forced NSB to flee to Turkey. ISIS proceeded to take over NSB’s bases and weaponry caches. This event caused the NSB related shabiha cliques to collapse, it also caused Fawaz to disappear.
Upon Fawaz’s return, he realized that he was wanted by all of the rebel courts and organisations. In-order for Fawaz to protect himself, he contacted ISIS, and ISIS saw in Fawaz the type of misguided person who would attack rebel groups, islamists and other Jihadi organisations in the name of Islam. ISIS demanded Fawaz to pledge allegiance to their state and to formally join them. Fawaz a former Shabiha, drug-dealer and brigand proceeded to join the terror group and become the Emir of Azaz in-order to uphold Allah’s law and spread the correct faith (it’s written sarcastically in Arabic).
Today Fawaz Rajab al-Eissa is one of ISIS’ main ‘columns’, he has become a military commander in ISIS. And Fawaz is a person who has taken part in killing the Islamic Front’s rebel commanders and soldiers. We have already spoken about a number of ISIS’ shabiha like the ilk of al-‘Alwany, Fawaz al-Eissa, Saddam al-Jamal and Abu ‘Aqeel. Soon we will talk about Abu Mariam al-Iraqi and Abu al-Atheer.
17/04/2014
Al-Milbiyah checkpoint [near Regiment 121] of Bashar [al Assad’s] regime at the entrance of the city of Al Hasakah facilitated the passage of a Daesh column [of vehicles/armour..etc] to enter al-Shaddadi to fight the Mujahideens. Meanwhile, al-Sukhnah checkpoint facilitated the passage of a Daesh column during their attempt to break into al-Bukamal to fight the Mujahideen who put pressure in Der al-Zur.
Al Baghdadi is entrenched among the people of Raqqah. He sends most of his mercenaries to fight the Mujahideen in Der al-Zur and other [towns] because he feels safe in al-Raqqah among the civilians.
As we mentioned before, the Baathists of al Baghdadi send the Muhajireen to die on the hands of the Mujahideen so as to be depleted in order to ease [the pressure] on the regime of Bashar from the fighting against the truthful [mujahideen]. The deaths among Al Baghdadi’s [men] in Der al-Zur alone reached 566, while 700 were injured, over the past few days. Their health conditions are very bad, especially the Muhajireen of them. Did Daesh kill in all of Syria and Iraq 566 in a whole year of war against the infidel regimes? Or is fighting the Mujahideen a worthier pursuit?
To the families of the Muhajireen, did you send your sons to fight for the sake of God and enter paradise or for the sake of al-Baghdadi and the Baath and end in hell? For Jihad to stay on the right path, globally and in the Levant, the head of the snake in al-Raqqah has to be eliminated, and the style of security operations must be used against them.
20/04/2014
Daesh released the French journalists in return for money without an attempt to free a single Muslim from its two states – Iraq and the Levant [who’re in detention]. We call on Daesh to free Sheikh Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Qatari in return for money – the way they did with the French – and they can demand any sum on the condition he is released safe and sound in Syria.
Quoting jihadist factions in Syria, Brother Abu Ahmad al-Iraqi offered an open sum to any [Daesh] member who turns himself in and give information on the whereabouts of Sheikh Abu abd al-Aziz and documents proving his information are correct in addition to [indicating] who took part in the arrest of Abu Abd al-Aziz al-Qatari.
If he turns himself in and pointed to the location he will be safe and will get a huge financial sum on the condition of having evidence as to his truthfulness.
26/04/2014
There are news that Al Baghdadi and Al Anbari have exited Raqqa and are heading to Iraq with 300 of their gang, leaving all the immigrants [foreign ISIS members] in Deir Ezzor to die without any direction or plan.
There are news that the Baathist Bashar regime [Syrian regime] will be handed the whole of Raqqa soon, and it's now amassing around it, that in coinciding with cutting the electrical power suggests that this is a plan by the Ba'thist Bashar regime and the Ba'th State in Iraqi and Levant [meaning ISIS] to hand Raqqa over to the regime after the withdrawal of Al Baghdadi.
All the jihadist groups in Syria and especially in Raqqa should mobilize their fighters and prepare them to abort that plan and liberate Raqqa once again and storm it before it's handed over to the regime as precautionary measures to prevent the regime from returning to Raqqa after emptying it from ISIS thugs. There must a real operation room with authority and supply lines to return Raqqa to the real Islam [writing implying comparison to ISIS's Islam] and preventing its handing over to Bashar et al.
03/05/2014
After al-Zawahiri's leaked speech by hackers of Al Fajr Centre, in which the sheikh [Zawahiri] has answered sheikh Saba'i's questions asked about a month ago. After this speech was leaked, ISIS has attacked Deir Ezzor from multiple axes (Bariha and Al Subha), so Jabhat Al Nusra responded to the attack to repel them, without Nusra attacking ISIS first.
Al Nusra has killed 30 ISIS thugs and liberated Al Subha and Bariha and repelled the attack on these two axes. Al Nusra as well repelled an ISIS attack in Deir Ezzor on Al Shamyya axis and killed 40 of ISIS Ba'th thugs. Also on Ruawyshed axis, Al Nusra repelled an ISIS attack and killed 22 of them and the rest fled and left anti-air weapons.
Another new old news in Deir Ezzor is that some thugs from Thiban have pledged intelligence to ISIS, including an Assad regime operative called Adeeb Mas'oud. After Thiban pleged allegiance, ISIS has attacked Al Nusra again, and the attacked was repelled and 40 ISIS were killed and the rest have fled. Total ISIS killed in the attacks yesterday and today on Deir Ezzor has reached at least 120, and now they're requesting a truce with Al Nusra to evacuate their dead. Most of ISIS leaders in Deir Ezzor are thugs who deal with Bashar's regime, and they throw the foreign fighters into this needless war. ISIS leaders, who are operatives for the Ba'th regime, work on the attrition of foreign fighters to shift the focus from fighting Bashar to fighting the Mujaheddin, which is what's happening now.
12/05/2014
Some ISIS defectors have told us that the "Sururi Wikileaks" Twitter account [@SROOR800] is actually an account maintained by ISIS activists where they publish disinformation [pretending it's coming from anti-ISIS activists]. Those who maintain the account all have the ISIS mentality and have secret communication with ISIS leadership.
The account's maintainers are three:
- Abdulaziz Salem al-Omar (Intelligence source)
- Abdulrahman Sultan al-Mu'ajjel
- Abdullah al-Fayez (most dangerous of them, both financially and ideologically)
The first one, Abdulaziz Salem al-Omar, is in an old man in his seventies, his task is collecting intelligence. The second one al-Mu'ajjel, his task is spying intel. The most dangerous one is the third, Abdullah al-Fayez. According to the intel [we received], his roles are in media, agitation [encouraging for jihad], and financial. He works for ISIS in secrecy and lives in Saudi Arabia in Riyadh. He stopped using his real name on Twitter and his secret activities are strong to unit ISIS [supporters] in Saudi Arabia.
17/05/2014
According to the information coming to us from many ISIS defectors, we'll soon publish a detailed exposé of the activities of ISIS's 20 most dangerous activists in Saudi Arabia. Those characters [the activists] have various tasks, some in media, some in religious matters, some are agitators [encouraging for jihad], and some do intelligence work, of different ages, and many of them are ex-cons. There also other ISIS characters about whom we received very detailed information, but the information suggests that they're not currently active, so we won't publish any information on them until we're sure they're back working for ISIS.
23/05/2014
We start with our information on character #1 that works for ISIS in Saudi Arabia, but this doesn't mean we're starting with the most dangerous one, but rather according to the information's availability. This character is Abdulaziz Salem al-Oma, Saudi, older than 60, and used to work in the Saudi Ministry of Education as an accountant. He was active [politically] until he was imprisoned for a few months due to his political writings. During his imprisonment, he met people who have Al Baghdadi's ideology.
A famous Saudi sheikh, Abdulrahman, has negotiated his release, after which he started abandoning his previous relationships and started new relationship with Takfiris. He had many relations with many Saudi sheikhs and Imams, he made enemies out of them, and started leaking their information to ISIS. He was fighting against the most Saudi anti-ISIS sheikhs and Imams claiming they're Sururis [followers of Muhammad Surur]. He used to tell his buddies: "My mission for the rest of my life is to expose them, especially Naser Al Omar". He because like a godfather for Al Baghdadi's group in Saudi Arabia, and a central source for information on accounts claiming to be against ISIS under Sururis names.
He gathers around him many ISIS supporters such as Abdulrahman Sultan Al Mu'ajjel, about whom we'll dedicate future episodes. Abdulaziz Al Omar started using his organizational knowledge to unite ISIS supporters and activists, and bring them to him, such as Hamoud Al Mateeri, Naser Al Thaqeel, Al Fayez, and Alewi Al Shummari. Abdulaziz Salem Al Omar is an expert on electronic publishing as he was previous imprisonment was due to him writing on internet forums, and was released with the mediation of Saudi sheikhs, after which he declared them as enemies.
ISIS in Saudi Arabia has many branches with which Al Omar is linked, such as in Riyadh, and Tameer town (close to Riyadh), Al Kharj, Ha'el, Al Sharqyya, Bareeda, Sharura, Al Ta'ef, and Mecca. Abdulaziz Salem Al Omar is essentially the leader and godfather of the group in Riyadh along with Ali Al Jabaali (known as Abdulrahman Al Mu'ajjel), Abdullah Al Fayez, and others.
As for the group in Al Kharj, it's lead by Hamoud Mu'eed Al Mateeri along with obscure characters. The group in Tameer town is lead by Hamad Rayyes Al Rayyes, and he's considered as a religious symbol in ISIS in Saudi Arabia, and he has mobile phones [could be phone numbers] supporting the groups in Al Kaseem and Ha'el, the details of which we'll mention later.
The group in Al Ha'el's leader is Alewi Al Shummari and Khaled Abbas, and others we'll mention details about them in future episodes according to the information we received from ISIS defectors. The information is mainly about the spiritual, media, logistics, financial, and intelligence leaders, and how the whole operation is managed. We received many requests to stop publishing some of the names because they stopped supporting ISIS, and some of the requests told us that this is private secrets. We'll stop mentioning any character on whom we have information that they stopped supporting ISIS, and those who go back to supporting ISIS we'll publish all the information we have on them, especially those who are active in the media, intelligence, and agitation, because ISIS uses a lot of media and intelligence deception against whom they call their enemies, and they have fatwas that lying is halal if its for their own good.
03/06/2014
Today's personality is Abd al-Rahman Sultan Mohammad al-Meaagal (Me-a-gal), he has belonged to Baghdadi's state organisation for many years. Even though he didn't have much contribution militarily, he had very strong connection with the organisation and provided large financial support, he was seized by Saudi authorities for his connections, he used to work in the Saudi ministry of health and after serving his jail time he resumed his communication with the organisation through a middle man. Al-Meaagal adopts the ideas of all the Islamist leaders and blasphemes al-Qaeda and many sheiks and permits killing them and setting off explosions inside Muslim countries, he became extreme over point to the point that his family completely disowned him, to this day he has strong relations with activists of Baghdadi's state abroad.
He received thousands of hundreds (money) from the internal affair ministry after being jailed for years and he kept it secret because he was scared that he would be blasphemed by the followers of al-Baghdadi. In order to maintain the support to al-Baghdadi he continued his financial support during these pasts’ months. He also recruited (brainwashed) people and youths to participate in meeting run by Saudi sheiks to record their opinions and views.
The Saudi sheiks had a meeting in the house of the Saudi Mohamad al-Arify, one of the Saudis was Mohamad Faraj, as well as many others, one of the attendees was a young man called Amr Abd al-Aziz al-Arify, al-Meaagal exploited this young man and took information off and published it with his colleagues in an account for disputed sheiks called the Sororyeen.
At the age of 50 al-Meaagal still recruits (implied brainwashing in the word used) young men and sends them to Saudi sheiks to gather information regarding them, he convinces the young man that what they're doing is a jihad through a fatwa he declared! El Meaagal pretends that he has stopped after his Saudi friend Bandar al-Shaalan was arrested/apprehended ( word used implies sudden/disappearance in secret without anyone knowing, no court etc…) in fear of his own safety, however he still continues his work with al-Baghdadi organisation with strength.
Al-Meaagal suffers from his social isolation, especially from his sons who altogether disagree with his ideologies and the distancing of Daeshenians (ISIS members) from him because his works and outspoken opinions were exposed, in fear of getting arrested (Extracted/disappearance etc… same as above). Al-Meaagal has a strong connection to Abd al-Rahman al-Marzooky who is the most dangerous Daeshian (Isis member) in Syria, who considers al-Meaagal the eye of Daeshian ideology in Saudi Arabia.
The Iraqi branch of Daesh considers him one of the most important who will organise the work inside Saudi Arabia through cooperation with Abd al-Rahman al-Marzooky with whom al-Meaagal meets up frequently together with the Senior Saudis of Daesh in complete Secrecy at the Rests (word in Arabic implies rests presents on Roads between two major cities) East the City of Riyadh, sometimes in the desert and other times in the house of Abd al-Aziz Amr. He also meets up with Daesh member that we are yet to reveal like al-Garis, Tamim al-Kady, al-Shabib Adnan al-Shaalan and some of his family members, Abd Allah al-Fayez, Hamoud al-Motery and al-Gebaly.
Al-Meaagal believes in the Daeshian ideology of assassinating the Sheiks and he goes beyond his believes and assassinates others as well. Now he lives the absolute belief in Baghdadi’s allegiance and propagates this belief. He says In meetings that believe there is no Saudi Religious Scholars except apostates and strays and he mentions Bin Baz and Bin othymin when others are mentioned.
We will mention the meeting places of al-Meaagal and what goes on there and how they plan and execute these meetings.
Soon we will mention the most active member of Daesh in Saudi Arabia and he is the Saudi Abd Allah al-Fayez and his role in the Whatsapp Groups and his Strong relationship with Nasser al-Thakeel and we will talk about al-Fayez’s journeys outside of Riyadh, especially al-Qassim and his silliness by making Whatsapp Groups to amass allegiance towards al-Baghdadi.
We will also talk about his places of meeting with the Daeshy organisation in Saudi Arabia in Riyadh and the desert and the personalities that he communicates with from Daesh in Syria and his dismissal by the Saudi sheiks Egs. Sheik al-Alwan and al-Tarifi and his relationship with the Saudi Sheik Fahd al-Kady who gave him his daughter to marry. We will also talk about his financial relationship with Daesh and his role in organising demonstrations through what’s app groups for young men and woman in the Saudi cities Riyadh and al-Qassim. We will also talk about his fatwas to the followers of Daesh on twitter by banning requesting the release of the Saudi Sheik al-Alwan for he is an enemy of Daesh and Sorory (part of the Sororyeen mentioned above) and the date of joining baghdadi in Iraq, how he was injured, how he entered Saudi Arabia, how he was arrested and his relationship with Daesh today!
05/06/2014
09/06/2014
Ibrahim Awwad Al Sumeiri aka Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi disappeared from the public since 2 months, and sources told us that he used to pray on Fridays with a disguise, no one knowing about this except a few, but he has disappeared completely for the first time. And we're told that he went to take part in military operations. When his absence grew, there were disturbances among IS leadership, which lead to the Iraqi named Abu Ali al-Anbari taking charge, telling people that he is in charge while Baghdadi is taking care of more important matters.
Some IS leadership lead by Abu al-Atheer informed al-Anbari that they wanted clarification of Baghdadi's fate, or else the leadership will have to be decided or there will be defections. Al-Anbari tried to prove that Baghdadi is still in charge. He round up the lower leadership and entered with 5 disguised men. Then he reassured them of their goals and vision and the problems facing IS and what the solutions were.
After the 5 men exited, he told them that Baghdadi was one of the men and that he came to listen to them discuss this and hear their concerns but due to security reasons he could not show himself. This was a step to try to prove he is still in charge, and that the upper leadership is still intact.
New rumors emerged that Baghdadi is either dead or has been seriously wounded in the last two months, and due to the rumors being spread a group of upper leadership went into hiding which included the Saudi cleric Abu Bakr al-Qahtani.
13/06/2016
A meeting between Daesh and the Naqshbandi Army has finished near Qayyarah district, south of Mosul. Representatives from Izzat al-Douri and al-Baghdadi attended the meeting. They discussed administration of battles and that military leadership and civilian project plans are received from a united leadership headed by Izzat al-Douri.
It was agreed to not make the military and judicial leadership of Daesh in Iraq non-Iraqi and the expulsion of any non-Iraqi leader from Iraq. It was also agreed that former officers would be in charge of military leadership in Daesh in Iraq. The military leadership of Daesh of Iraq is previous officer who were nominated before (the entrance) of leaders under Izzat al-Douri, and without permission of non-Iraqi fighters of Daesh of Iraq of more than 20% from their Iraqi group. And that they are but leaders.
Daesh established moving 5% of captured military vehicles from Maliki's army to Syria to protect Iraq from al-Qaeda entering (Iraq) from there. And it was agreed that in the event of the fall of Baghdad, Izzat al-Douri will be appointed as a replacement in case the international community defeats Daesh. And Daesh is to continue the armed work until annihilation of foreigners in their midsts with help from assisting officers in the Naqshbandi army under al-Douri. And any foreigner who stays in Iraq, his purification is by a suicide operation. Or they will move to fight in Syria against al-Qaeda to protect the stability of Iraq from them. Izzat al-Douri's army is charged with protecting with security forces the leadership of Daesh in Iraq and Syria and their safety at the commanding outposts for the success of the revolution.