Introduction

                The study of parliamentary politics in Canada often centers upon the behaviour of parties and politicians and how their decisions are made, and what effect they have.  However, there is also a body of literature that focuses specifically on how the voter’s decisions are structured and how institutions work to refine their decisions when selecting those legislatures.  It is the electoral system that is the starting point for all other politics. The composition of the legislature, the relative strength of parties, the campaign behaviour all relate to how the vote is structured.  It is the purpose of this paper to review the literature surrounding electoral systems and electoral reform in Canada through a comparative lens.  In order to accomplish this, this review will examine the major theoretical debates surrounding different electoral system and focus on the nuances within each system.  The literature on Canadian electoral reform has been surprisingly devoid of such nuanced discussion and it is the opinion of this author that further examining the literature of electoral systems abroad could enrich the discussion of electoral reform in Canada.  

Why Electoral Systems Matter

It is important to discuss, if only briefly, just why electoral systems matter. Indeed it is long been noted among scholars that the study of electoral institutions is important because of their political consequences (Reeve and Ware 1992, 7-10; Grofman and Lijphart 1986, 2-5; Duverger 1965, 207-280; D. W. Rae 1967; Blondel 1970, 177-206; Mackenzie 1958).  Just what these “political consequences” consist of varies.  One stream of literature tends to focus on the effects of electoral systems on legislative assemblies.  Lijphart (1994), for example, looks specifically at the effect of electoral systems on political parties, and argues that electoral formula combined with district size has the potential to increase or decrease the number of parties in parliament.  Similarly, Rae’s (1967) seminal work on electoral systems proposed a myriad of political consequences including the effect of electoral systems on the relative strength of parties and electoral “thresholds” that must be crossed to garner seats in the legislature (153-154).  Conversely, other work has focused on how electoral systems effect the calculation of the voters themselves.  Duverger (1951) first discussed the “psychological factor” in Political Parties: their Organization and Operation in the Modern State, arguing that “ambiguous” psychological factors drive constituents to vote for the most viable party if the electoral system affords their first choice of party little chance at success (226).  He concludes that the psychological factors coupled with (or cultivated by) the institutional design of the system will determine whether a legislature is fractionalised and the vote polarised (226-228)[1].  Although Riker (1986) was critical of Duverger’s work he, through a comparative review of national election results, confirmed Duverger’s assertions, insisting that it was “undeniable” that an electoral system alters the way people vote (39).  More recently, Blais and Carty (1991) empirically tested this hypothesis through an examination of the distribution of votes in different electoral systems and found that, indeed, psychological factors may be present (83, 93).

Continuing with this trend this review will focus on the literature surrounding electoral systems and the effect they have on political life in Canada.  Specifically this review will examine the literature on how electoral systems affect political life within a state, and the discussion of reforming the Canadian system to counter its perceived deficiencies.  The work of David Horowitz (2003) illustrates why electoral system design matters when he insists that reformers of electoral systems must examine both the “vital details” of an electoral system, and the goals in which those systems are meant to achieve.  In addition to focusing on the specifics of the institutions, he argues, one must also pay attention to the political culture of the state in which reform has been discussed:

In every analysis, the way to proceed is to ask what goals should be fostered, which goals should be preferred over others, and what the likely effects of various alternatives really are. No one can answer these questions without an extended analysis that links electoral reasoning to the party system and the pattern of social cleavages. (126)

Specifically, he forwards six values-based “goals” that designers of electoral systems must balance when choosing how to structure an electoral regime: proportionality of seats to votes (116), accountability to constituents (117), durable governments (117-118), victory of the Condorcet winner (118), interethnic and interreligious conciliation (118-119), and minority office holding (119).  He argues that balancing between these goals is required for any political body looking to reform its electoral institutions, as such institutions have the potential to shape political life in a given state –even if those changes are “incremental” (116).  On the other hand, Horowitz insists that attention to “vital details” of the institutional design when discussing electoral systems is important (125-126).  Following this line of reasoning this paper will be broken into two major sections: the first half of the paper will focus on the literature surrounding the institutional design of electoral systems. The second half will focus on the themes of representation often referenced in literature on Canadian reform, and point out that a discussion of the “vital details” is crucial to a discussion of reform in Canada and has not been adequately addressed in the current literature.

Structure of the Paper

The first chapter of this paper focuses on the literature surrounding the “elements” of an electoral system.  It will begin with a brief discussion of ballot structure, and what constitutes the defining elements of an electoral system.  The purpose of this chapter is to set the parameters of “reform” for the remainder of the paper, and overview just how scholars have conceptualized the issue.

 The second chapter of this review centers on the differing families of proportional systems.  The purpose of the detailed discussion of these families is to demonstrate that literature on electoral reform in Canada has been surprisingly devoid of discussing how different proportional formulas shape political life, and which would be the best “fit” for Canada[2].  This section demonstrates that the nuances of proportionality must be discussed further in Canadian political science, as the downstream effects of these systems mitigates some of the concerns often voiced with introducing proportionality in Canada. 

The third chapter of the paper overviews the plurality systems commonly referenced in literature regarding electoral systems.  It will provide a mechanical definition of the alternative vote, the two round system and the single member plurality.  A brief literature review of the resulting effects of each of these systems will be provided.  The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that, despite proportionality often being cited as an alternative to plurality, there are varying plurality formulas that may quell some of the concerns reformers in Canada have regarding the current use of the SMP.

The fourth chapter of this paper gives a brief overview of how mixed member proportional systems have been conceptualized in the literature, and what their effect is on voter behaviour and legislative politics. It breaks the classification of mixed systems into independent and dependent, and discusses their subcategories.  It then examines how these systems have been tailored to fit the political culture of different states.

            The fifth chapter of this paper addresses the literature surrounding the theoretical effect of the single member plurality in different states.  By examining the seminal works of Duverger (1965), Riker (1986) and Cairns (1968) this chapter will establish the institutional effects of the SMP.  Moreover, a look into the debate on the sociological effect of the electoral system reveals that the SMP affects voters directly.  This chapter concludes by identifying two large streams in which the remainder of the paper can be divided: into the institutional (party and legislative level) analysis; and the sociological/psychological level (affect on voter) analysis.  Analysis of proposals for reform will be divided into these two streams, and how the status quo and proposed reforms –according to the literature—may affect these facets of political life in Canada will be examined.

            The sixth chapter will focus on the themes surrounding the institutional effects of the electoral system in Canada.  It will take each of these themes in turn and discuss how the literature has discussed reform of the issue and where the deficiencies in the literature have arisen. It will begin by discussing the maintenance of two and a half party dominance in Canada at the federal level and the exclusion of a substantial portion of the electorate. It will also look at the SMP’s regional concentration effect while at the same time excluding the “third” founding nation of Indigenous peoples.  Also, the oft-cited value of “stability” in the Canadian Parliament and how it is (often incorrectly) cited as an argument against a degree of proportionality at the Federal level.  And lastly, the problem with the SMP generating a “wrong winner” phenomenon, effectively alienating the majority of Canadians from the ruling party at the federal level.

            The seventh chapter will address the sociological effects of the Canadian electoral system and how the SMP has affected the voter in Canada.  It will begin with a discussion of the SMP’s impact on the democratic deficit, and how disenchanted voters have abandoned electoral politics.  The representation of minority, ethnic, and females in Parliament as a consequence of introducing “list” systems into the Canadian system.  Moreover, there has been some discussion of turnout decline in Canada as a result of the electoral system, and a discussion of how the institution if proportionality may quell this.  Finally, it will examine the increasing concern with the legitimacy of having an electoral system designed by those who are most likely to benefit from its nuances: the politicians.

Chapter 1: Electoral Elements  

The discussion of electoral reform necessarily begins with the definition of an “electoral system” and what constitutes differing electoral regimes.  “Reform” of the electoral system could entail widespread  changes including, but not limited to, voter eligibility requirements, universal suffrage, Senate reform, or electoral regime change, among others.  The broad nature of electoral reform is demonstrated, for example, by Fishburn (1983), who outlines twelve “dimensions” of election procedures including nomination procedures, campaign financing, voter psychology and candidate strategy, among others (379-387).  Since this review is primarily concerned with the electoral system the definition electoral reform for this review will revolve around reforming how voter preference is recorded, and how the preferences of voters is translated into representation in the legislative body.  In other words: what is the effect of the electoral rules on political life in Canada, and what suggestions have been forwarded to counter the commonly perceived deficiencies of the status quo?  

The study of electoral systems is infinitely complex, due in large part to the countless combinations of electoral “elements” that can be applied to differing regimes.  Identifying what the basic elements of electoral systems consist of is the topic of a body of literature in itself.  Reeve and Ware (1992), Lijphart (1994), and Rae (1967), for example, examine the component parts of electoral systems in their discussion of reform.  Together their analyses posit that electoral systems occur in infinite varieties; however, these varieties stem from a several basic elements which make up the “building blocks” of electoral systems.  It is useful to outline these, as they provide a foundation for the discussion of electoral systems, and the different variables within the systems proposed.  Both Reeve and Ware and Rae’s discussion regarding the construction of electoral systems splits the operation of electoral regimes into two parts: the way in which a voter may express preference and the way these preferences are aggregated and translated into seats in the legislature (Reeve and Ware 1992, 143-144; Rae 1967, 17-63).  Splitting the operation of electoral systems into these two pillars allows for a clearer analysis of electoral regimes. 

Voter’s Expression of Preference

Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of elections is the structure of the ballot, the “touch point” between citizen and electoral system.  The differentiation between categorical and ordinal ballots was first discussed by Rae and is perhaps the most fundamental aspect of the ballot structure.  The categorical ballot allows a voter one choice without “being able to qualify his decision” and is commonly used in the SMP system (D. W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 1967, 17).  A voter is given only one “vote” and is unable to express how strongly they support a candidate, or their second or third choice.  Both candidate centric and party list ballots can fall into this category (Ibid).  Conversely, ordinal ballots allow a voter to rank their candidates based on preference and allow a voter to act “less decisively” if they desire.  (18). This dichotomy between categorical and ordinal ballots, however, has not been without its critics.  Blais (1988), for example, insists that Rae’s categories are “not exhaustive” and is lacking other dimensions ballot structure (104).  Rae’s classification does not take into account the use of approval voting or a point-based ballot, which allows a voter to indicate all candidates they approve of or how strongly they approve of each –two types of ballot that sit uncomfortably within Rae’s framework (Ibid).  Blais argues that the dichotomy is thus inappropriate, and suggests that a third category of numerical ballots, which take into account how strongly a candidate is supported be added to the framework (105).   

Reeve and Ware somewhat expand on Rae’s initial categorization and address some of the concerns of Blais.  They forward six “elements” of ballots: the extent of a voter’s choice, how many choices the voter is allowed, whether the voter votes for party or individual, whether the ballot it categorical or ordinal, whether a voter can record the intensity of preference, and whether abstention an option (144-146).  They note that some systems allow for preferences to be ranked with a measure of intensity as well (directly addressing Blais “numerical” category) allowing a voter to allocate “points” to each candidate.  A ballot with ten candidates, for example, is given ten points.  A voter may give ten points to Candidate A, and none to the rest; or, may give five points to Candidate A, three to candidate B, and two to candidate C –allowing the voter the capability to express just how much support is shown for a particular candidate or party (Reeve and Ware 1992, 145).  In effect, the voter is not forced to be so finite with their expression of preference and is, arguably, allows the ballot to more accurately reflect the preferences of a voter. 

Reeve and Ware’s variables are relatively self-explanatory, however require some elaboration.  Extent of voter choice refers to the ability of a voter to express their support for differing candidates.  So, does the ballot allow for a voter to simply “write in” whom they would vote for, or are the locked into a choice by those listed on the ballot itself (Reeve and Ware 1992, 144)?  The number of choices refers to a voter’s ability to express support for multiple candidates or parties.  In some systems, for example, a voter may be given the ability to support two or three candidates –listing only those they support—in others they may be forced to choose only one candidate they like the most (or dislike the least) (144).  Moreover, some systems employ multi-member constituencies, which allow a voter to express support for multiple representatives as each constituency elects several representatives (Ibid).  Whether a voter can vote for an individual candidate or party list refers to how a voter expresses support for a party:  does the voter choose a candidate first, or a party who selects candidates from a ranked list (145)? 

Indeed, when considering electoral reform the discussion of ballot structure is important, as it is the touch point between a voter and the electoral system.  A voter’s ability to express preference, and what information said voter takes into account, is only the first half of the dichotomy, however.  How these votes are translated into seats in a legislature can be just as impactful –if not moreso—than the ballots themselves. 

Refining a Voter’s Will

Lijphart’s seminal study Electoral Systems and Party Systems examines the effect of electoral systems on the composition and behaviour of parties within specific regimes.  Since Lijphart’s analysis is focused primarily on the effect of electoral formulas his analysis is required to deconstruct what electoral systems are composed of, and provide an overview of the basic components of electoral formulas.  The result is a four-pronged framework for examining different aspects of electoral regimes, which will be adopted by this paper to structure the review: electoral formula, district magnitude, electoral threshold and assembly size (Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A study of Twenty Seven Democracies 1945-1990 1994, 12-13). 

Electoral formula refers to the distinction between majoritarian regimes (SMP as an example), proportional systems and semi-proportional systems, as well as the distinction within these broader frameworks themselves.  Most literature on the topic of electoral reform begins with a discussion of the different systems commonly suggested by reformers, and these systems are often divided into some degree of proportionality, plurality, or a semi-proportional  systems (Law Commission of Canada 2004, Reeve and Ware 1992 147-156; Shugart and Wattenburg 2001, 19-24;).  The discussion of electoral reform is not this simple however, as significant distinctions within these families exist. 

Chapter 2: Proportional Systems

The proportional system, at first glance, seems relatively self-explanatory.  A voter is presented with a categorical ballot listing the parties in the running and chooses the which they support.  The electoral district is, necessarily, a multi-member one in which several candidates are sent to the legislature once elected.  Intuitively, the percentage of votes a party receives should correlate perfectly with the percentage of seats awarded.  However, as was first discussed in detail by Rae, and again by Lijphart, the effect of the formula used to calculate how seats are apportioned in a proportional system varies, and these differing formulas can have tangible downstream consequences.  Perhaps one of the most comprehensive studies of the subject was conducted by Gallagher (1992) forwards eleven different methods of calculating electoral returns in a proportional system stratified into the categories of largest remainders methods, highest averages methods, and single transferable vote.  Most methods of proportional representation require the generation of electoral quotas, discussed below.  

Largest Remainders Method

            The largest remainders methods operate on the principle generating electoral quotas, where they differ is how these quotas are calculated (471).  A quota is generated, in its most basic form, by dividing the number of votes cast in an election by the number of seats.  A party is then awarded a seat for every quota it can fulfill, until all of its votes are “used up” (Ibid).  Although the possibility for electoral formulas is literally endless, scholarship on the subject tends to focus on the commonly accepted Hare, Imperiali, and Droop largest remainders methods; and the Saint-Laguë, and D’Hondt highest averages methods (Lijphart 1986 171-174; Rae 1967 25-39; Gallagher 1992 469-485; Hanby and Loosemore 1971; Blondel 1970 188-195).  The most basic formula for the calculation looks is known as the Hare Formula, where V is the number of votes cast, and D is the number of seats within a district. 

 

So, for example, if in an election 10,000 votes were cast, and 5 seats were at stake, a basic electoral would consist of 2000 votes.  Variations on this do exist, however.  The Droop Quota, for example, is constructed in such a way that it lowers the “price” of a seat by modifying the electoral formula slightly, as shown below:

 

Therefore, if the same district’s votes are applied using this formula, 6 rather than 5 would divide 10,000 votes, and the electoral quota would lower from 2000 votes under the Hare to 1666 votes under the Droop.  The Imperiali Method is similar to the Droop Quota, working to further lower the quota by changing the denominator to (D + 2), which would result in an electoral quota of 1428 votes.  The generation of a quota is thus the first step in allocating seats, however, does not encompass the entire process.  What, for example, happens if the vote splits in such a way that an extra seat is left and no single party has the votes to meet the final electoral quota?

            The largest remainder method, in the most basic sense, calculates an electoral quota and each party that meets this quota in full is rewarded with a seat (Lijphart 1986, 172).  Once all the votes are “used up,” if any seats remain they will be awarded to the party with the largest remaining share of votes (Ibid).  Returning to the hypothetical district with five seats, a vote share may have a breakdown in which party A has 6000 votes, B has 2400 votes and C has 1600 votes.  The resulting breakdown of votes, under the Hare Method (with a quota of 2000), would allocate votes to all three parties, as demonstrated in Table 1. 

Party	Votes	Quota Seats Awarded	Remainder	Remainder Seats Awarded	Total Seats Awarded
A	6000	3	0	0	3
B	2400	1	400	0	1
C	1600	0	1600	1	1
TOTAL	10,000	4	4000	1	5

Table 1: Allocation of votes under the Hare Method, where the electoral quota (10,000/5) is 2000.  Adapted from Gallagher 1992, 471

Notably there is some disagreement among scholars about which formula for calculating the electoral quotient is considered the “most proportional,” which will be discussed later.  What is important to note is that the distribution of seats under the Hare quota can differ from the distribution of seats under the Droop or Imperiali method.  If the Imperiali quota of 1428 were to be adopted (V/D+2), for example, Party A would have received four seats before any remainders were calculated, and party C would receive no seats.  The result is that different proportional formulas can have effects on the “proportionality” of the system.  Moreover, the allocation of the largest remainders is not the only way in which proportional systems apportion seats to parties, the alternative being the highest average method. 

Highest Averages Method

            The highest averages method operates on a different principle than the largest remainders altogether.  Whereas the largest remainder method relies on the generation of an electoral quota, the highest average method, in the most basic sense, awards seats “sequentially” based on the average of each parties vote total, and is calculated using various electoral formulae (Lijphart 1986, 172; Gallagher 1992, 170; Rae 1967 29-32).  In the highest averages method there is no award for the “highest remainder,” instead a party’s votes are divided after each seat received to come up with the next highest “average.”

            The difference between these systems is based on the divisor used in each “round” of awarding seats.  Gallagher’s analysis of proportional representation focuses on seven varieties of this system and goes into some detail about the downstream effects of each of these systems (Gallagher 470)[3], while Rae focuses specifically the d’Hondt formula, and Lijphart focuses on both the d’Hondt and Ste-Laguë methods.  A detailed discussion of each of these methods is well beyond the scope of this paper, however, three highest average methods are consistently referenced in work on electoral reform, and warrant some elaboration: the d’Hondt, Imperiali and Ste.-Laguë formulas (Rae 1967; Loosemore and Hanby 1971; Lijphart 1986; Gallagher 1994; Pippa 1997).   

 What all the highest average methods hold in common is that the denominator changes after a party is awarded a seat.  The use of new denominator generates the next “average” a party has and if that average is higher than any of the votes of the parties in the first round, the initial party will receive a second seat.  If not, the next seat is awarded to the party with the next highest “average,” accordingly.  The electoral formulas differ, and the sequence in which the vote does as well.  The three most common formulas are summarized in Table 2. 

Variant	D’Hondt	Imperiali	Sainte-Laguë
Formula
Divisor	1,2,3,4,5	1, 1.5,2, 2.5,3	1,3,5,7,9

            Returning to the hypothetical constituency used in the largest remainders method, one can see that the application of highest average formulas (in this example, the Sainte-Laguë versus the D’Hondt method) can result in different seat allocations, regardless of their common label of “proportional,” demonstrated in Table 3. 

Sainte-Laguë	Total Votes	First Divisor 1	Second Divisor 3	Third Divisor 5	Seats Allocated
Party A	6000	6000 (1)	2000 (3)	1200 (4)	3
Party B	2400	2400 (2)	800	480	1
Party C	1600	1600 (5)			1
	10, 000
D’Hondt	Total Votes	First Divisor 1	Second Divisor 2	Third Divisor 3	Seats Allocated
Party A	6000	6000 (1)	3000 (2)	1000	2
Party B	2400	2400 (3)	1200 (4)	800	2
Party C	1600	1600 (5)			1
	10, 000

Table 3: A Comparative application of the D'Hondt and Sainte-Laguë highest averages method.  The numbers in brackets indicates in which “round” that seat was awarded. 

Again, this example demonstrates that, despite these methods all being considered “proportional” they have different threshold of representation, which can have very real effects on how seat are allocated and the “political life” in each state.  The final “type” of proportional system requires its own category distinct from those discussed thus far, as it differs not only in the translation of seats through its electoral formula, but also that it allows a voter to indicate which candidate they support –instead of only which party. 

Single Transferable Vote

            The single transferable vote (STV), although conceptually different than the systems already discussed, are often grouped into the category of “proportional” in discussions of reform (Law Commission of Canada 2004, 20-23; Irvine 1979, 39; Gallagher 1992 480-483; Lijphart 1986, 175-177; Lijphart 1994, 23-25).  Perhaps the most salient difference between the proportional systems mentioned before and the STV, is that the STV presents a voter with an ordinal ballot listing the candidates, not the parties (Irvine 1979, 39).  Like the systems mentioned before, the STV uses a quota and distributes the first round of votes to those who meet that quota.  If any seats are left over, the surplus votes from elected candidates are redistributed based on the second choice listed on those ballots (Law Commission of Canada 2004, 22; Gallager 1992, 480).  The STV usually employs the Droop Quota (Q=V/S+1) when generating a threshold for representation (Lijphart 1986, 175).  Since the STV operates within multi-member districts it falls under the family of proportional systems.  Again, the salient difference is that it becomes candidate centric, rather than strictly adhering to a party list system. 

Evaluating  Proportional Formulas

            Scholarship on proportional representation is somewhat split on which of these methods is considered the “most” proportional.  Moreover, there is some disagreement as to which formula is more “generous” to smaller and larger parties, or even how to measure proportionality.  Intuitively, the normative standard for a proportional system of representation would be how closely the percentage of seats awarded to a party in the legislature follows their percentage of votes earned in an election.  Gallagher (1991), however, points out that the choice of how one measures proportionality matters as much as the choice of electoral system, as different measures of proportionality will “implicitly endorse a method of seat allocation” (Gallagher 1991, 38).  It is because of this that one must look critically at literature endorsing one sort of proportional system over another. 

Measuring Proportionality

Blondel (1970) argues that the electoral systems could be placed in a rank order from “most” to least proportional, arguing that (of the proportional formulas) the largest remainders method were the least proportional, followed by the d’Hondt and Ste-Laguë being the most proportional, respectively (189-191). Blondel’s analysis., however, was somewhat problematic in that it analysed proportional formulas according to the somewhat ambiguous measure of “coefficient of proportionality” without taking into account district magnitude or assembly size; rather, opting to purposefully exclude mitigating factors and keep “all other things equal” (191).  Thus Loosemore and Hanby (1971) rightfully criticise Blondel’s analysis, as they argue it failed to indicate whether his observations were “actual or potential” or whether empirical or purely theoretical, as Blondel provided no specification of either (468).  Hanby and Loosemore’s index, on the other hand, determined the proportionality of a system by simply summing the discrepancy between vote share and seat share for all parties within a state and dividing it by two in order to generate a distortion “index” (476-477).  This index held that plurality systems were the least proportional and, although the difference in proportionality between electoral formulas was minimal, the d’Hondt was least proportional followed by Ste-Laguë and largest remainder –differing from Blondel (477).  Douglas Rae forwarded a slightly different index than Loosemore and Hanby, by summing the  average deviation of a parties’ seat to vote share (D. W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 1967, 84).  His analysis found –like Hanby and Loosemore—that the largest remainder was the most proportional, followed by the highest average methods. 

            Rae’s index, however, has been found to be overly sensitive to the presence of smaller parties.  As pointed out by Lijphart, by averaging out the discrepancy between vote share and seat share, the index had the potential to favour systems with multiple smaller parties (Lijphart 1994, 59-63).  If, for example, an electoral system contained numerous small parties who received zero percent of the vote, and zero seats, the disproportionality index would be artificially suppressed by the seemingly “accurate” allocation of seats to these marginal parties (60).  Lijphart thus writes approvingly of the Loosemore-Hanby index, insisting that the index’s use of summing deviations avoids this problem; however, points out that the Loosemore-Hanby index may also exaggerate the disproportionality of a system with many parties, as the index would rise with every party that receives any deviation (Ibid).  Lijphart attempts to find a middle ground between these two indices by calculating the average discrepancy between the “effective” parties in a system (62).  Lijphart, however, was somewhat ambiguous about what constituted an “effective party,” stating that it can be defined by receiving “more than, say, 5 or 10 percent of the vote” (Ibid). 

What Lijphart’s index does not take into account is the underlying values associated with the electoral system.  It fails to recognize that the same sized discrepancy between the seats and votes of a smaller and larger would have a greater impact on the smaller party than the larger.  So, if the larger party received 45 percent of the vote and 40 percent of the seats it would only constitute an 11 percent discrepancy of that parties vote to seat share.  On the other hand, if a smaller party were to receive 5 percent of the vote and no seats, it would constitute a 100 percent discrepancy.  Moreover, and what all the indices fail to address, is that the electoral system itself may factor into why marginal parties receive little support.  If a voter is given the institutional incentive to vote for a larger party, as the smaller one may stand little chance of success in certain proportional regimes, then it would stand to reason their vote would be changed to a more effective party –a strategic voting effect[4].  The indices would thus fail to recognize how proportionality would work to suppress a minority party’s ability to function, and would work to make systems that are most fair to “effective parties” more desirable. 

            Gallagher (1991) uses an index that finds a middle ground between the deficiencies of all of these measures: the least squares index.  This index works by squaring the vote-seat difference for each party, summing those values; and then dividing them by two and taking the results square root (40).  Gallagher points out that the rationale behind the Rae index is preserved: that the aggregate disproportionality works to hide salient problems with the system, and a measure accounting for every party’s inconsistency is better suited to measuring proportionality (40).  Moreover, the Gallagher index not only takes into account the vote-seat inconsistencies in a system, but also takes into account the intensity or degree of the discrepancy, providing more weight to larger discrepancies, rather than falling subject to the distortions inherent in the Loosmore-Hanby or Rae indices.   

            Notably, Gallagher asserts that the very meaning of “proportional” should be questioned, and that systems are not necessarily “fairer” than each other; rather, that each system is based on different values that dictate how to measure what is truly “proportional” (50).  So, for example, some formulas may work to lower the threshold of votes a party must cross at the expense of exact proportionality.  Several studies have looked at the impact of formula on the support requisite to garner a seat in the legislature (Hanby and Loosemore 1971; Rae, Hanby and Loosemore 1971; Lijphart, 1986; Cortona, et al.  1999 44-47).  Gallagher stresses, however, that when discussing proportionality it is essential that the normative measure of vote share correlating perfectly with seat share is an insufficient measure as “different PR methods should be seen not as being more or less proportional than each other but as embodying different ideas as to what maximizing proportionality means and, by extension, what minimizing disproportionality means” (Gallagher 1991, 30).  Thus, it is important to note the observed effects of electoral formula rather than focusing on the simple vote-seat share measure.  These effects centre on thresholds of representation (the second pillar of Lijphart’s framework), which is mitigated somewhat district size. 

Effects of Proportionality: Thresholds and Electoral Engineering

            F.A.  Hermen’s seminal critique of PR makes its case against the adoption of PR by arguing that the fragmentation of political parties within the legislature brought on by the influx of smaller parties receiving seats will result in a myriad of problematic effects.  Hermen argues that because proportionality’s ultimate goal is a perfect seat-vote ratio, seats in parliament “are regarded as some kind of cake which must be divided in exact proportion to their numbers among those who are strong enough to demand it” (Hermens 1972, 84).  Because of this fragmentation, he argues that a proportional system will result in numerous negative effects:  parties will cease to govern “nationally” and appeal solely to their base (84); that the fragmentation of votes will remove the incumbents fear of a “landslide” loss and make them less accountable (72); that it dilutes the power of the prime minister to the point of being ineffective (70); and that the list-system will result in politicians on the top of the list that becoming so comfortable that parliament will lose its “vigour” (59). 

            What Hermen’s critique ignored, somewhat negating the entire underlying premise of his analysis, is that the different formula’s of proportional representation coupled with the mitigating factors of assembly and constituency size have the ability to create thresholds of representation and exclusion; rather than all systems of PR creating a doomsday scenario in which parliament fragments to the point of being an ineffective body.  Rae, Hanby and Loosemore (1971) noted that an electoral system could act as a “gatekeeper” by establishing thresholds of inclusion and exclusion due to their institutional design (479-480).  Threshold of exclusion are defined as the maximum vote share a party can receive without receiving a seat; while thresholds of inclusion are the minimum vote share a party can obtain and gain a seat (Ibid).  Their analysis focused specifically on the former and found that an SMP system’s threshold of exclusion can be (under highly improbable conditions) as high as 49 percent of the national vote share (481), while the d’Hondt can run as high as 14 percent (482), with both the largest remainder and Ste-Laguë being lower (483-484).  Lijphart and Gibberd (1977) built on the study of Rae et al., modifying their assumptions and finding the threshold of exclusion higher in Ste-Laguë (221) and the highest remainder methods (224).  So although Rae et al found there was some difference between systems (especially d’Hondt compared to the others), Lijphart and Gibberd argue that there was “no, or only relatively slight, differences among the thresholds of exclusion under the three PR systems” (228).

            Nonetheless it has been argued that the choice of the specific proportional formula can have a direct impact on the viability of smaller parties within a state.  Rae has suggested, somewhat intuitively, that the lower the quota the more favourable the proportional system would be to smaller parties as it makes a quota easier to obtain (D. W. Rae 1967, 34-36). Gallagher, (1992) however, argues that the opposite is true, pointing out that a low quota “helps larger parties, because it makes it more likely that all seats will be awarded in the first stage and no remainder will be awarded, smaller parties will this be disadvantaged” (472). Indeed Gallagher goes on to rank the systems in order of “which is most favourable to large parties,” the Hare  quota –which is effectively larger than the Imperiali, or d’Hondt methods—ranks near the bottom, indicating that larger quotas may advantage smaller parties (490).

            But the electoral formula alone is not the only decisive factor in determining whether a party will be represented within the legislature or not. Rae et al, argue that thresholds of exclusion are affected by district magnitude (the number of seats being contested in each constituency) in that “thresholds of exclusion are inverse functions of the numbers of seat allocated in electoral districts: the threshold decreases at an decreasing rate with the expansion of districts (Rae, Hanby and Loosemore 1971, 486). This same proposition was confirmed by Lijphart and Gibberd who theorised that the larger a district is, the closer the results of an election become truly “proportional” (Lijphart and Gibberd 1977, 233).  More recent research has confirmed these hypotheses and found that the threshold of exclusion becomes effectively lower as the district magnitude increases (Benoit 2001; Benoit, 2000; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, 105-111). Where this becomes salient to the discussion of electoral reform, and has been noted by scholars, is that by tailoring the size of electoral districts in conjunction with proportional formula, reformers are able to shape electoral systems in such a way that party systems will not change radically . This concept of “electoral engineering” has been discussed relatively recently by Rae (1995) who argues that electoral reform involves two conflicting goals: minority representation and defractionalization (D. W. Rae 1995, 66).  Rae points out that the use of district magnitudes as a policy instrument can nurture large parties, or allow the proliferation of smaller interest based parties to emerge based on the preferences of those reforming the system (69-71). More recently, Carey and Hix (2011) have argued that an electoral “sweet spot” can be achieved for states that value a defractionalized legislature, inclusiveness, and effective representation (27).  They conclude that:   

…relative to single-member district systems, low-magnitude PR is almost as effective as high-magnitude PR at reducing disproportionality in legislative representation,  whereas increases in party system fragmentation at low-magnitude PR are less pronounced, which in turn simplifies the coalitional structure of governments. (Carey and Hix 2011, 4)

This discussion of electoral engineering is salient to the discussion of electoral reform in Canada as the unique nature of the Canadian political system requires that any attempt at reform include a discussion on how the political of culture of Canada can best be complemented by the design of any future institutions.  Indeed, literature on Canadian electoral reform has focused on “Canadian values” but has been somewhat silent on the how the nuances of proportionality and institutional design can complement these values.  A discussion on the Canadian status quo reveals where the deficiencies of the system lay, and what has been suggested to quell these. The current literature on Canadian reform that this paper now turns to is thus complemented by the preceding discussion on the nuances of proportionality.

Chapter 3: Majority-Plurality Systems

            The majority-plurality systems operate on the fundamental principle that the candidate with the most votes receives a seat in the legislature.  Newland (1982) further breaks this classification down by noting that plurality systems that fill a single seat per district (as Canada does) can require a candidate received an absolute majority (fifty-percent plus one) or a relative majority (the most out of the contenders) (11-13).  Several families of these systems arise from these to basic criteria, as is outlined succinctly in the Canadian Law Commissions’ Voting Counts: Electoral Reform for Canada.  Their analysis forwards four types of plurality systems, three of which are commonly discussed as viable in Canada: first-past-the-post; alternative vote systems, and the two-round system (Law Commission of Canada 2004, 20-21).

Single Member Plurality

            Canada currently employs the first-past-the-post system, which holds that candidates contest single-member districts and they only require a plurality of votes to win a seat (Newland 1982, 11).  It is for this reason that a riding with three or more parties running the threshold of exclusion is effectively raised and the threshold of exclusion lowered (Ibid).  A hypothetical district with three parties running illustrates this point, as demonstrated in Table 4.

Table 4: Hypothetical Race in Single Member Plurality

As can be seen here the Candidate A would receive the seat with only 35 percent of the vote, representing a relatively low threshold of inclusion.  On the other hand, both Candidate B and Candidate C are excluded from the legislature with a relatively high share of the vote.  The proposed consequences of this type of voting is discussed in detail in the second chapter of this review, however it is important to note that  some votes in this situation are “wasted” as more votes are “against” the winning candidate than for.  Newman points out that these results are “suspect, and cannot be relied upon to reflect the choice of the electorate,” and as such “other methods [of plurality systems] have been proposed” (Newland 1982, 12).

Two Round System

            In the post-communist wave of democratization the two-round system of voting has been touted as a way to maintain a geographic link to a candidate, encourage a “compromise candidate” and prevent the election of “extreme candidates” (Birch 2003, 324-326). The system achieves this by requiring that a candidate receive an absolute majority of votes before being awarded a seat in the legislature (Newland 1982, 12).  This system operates on the same principle as the single member plurality in that a single candidate is elected in each constituency. Where it differs, however, is that it requires the candidate to receive fifty-percent plus one in order to be declared the winner (Ibid).  If no candidate receives an absolute majority of votes after the first round of voting, then the weakest candidates are eliminated and voters are then forced to choose between the remaining candidates.  This process is repeated until one candidate receives an absolute majority.

            The effects of this system have been debated in recent scholarship. Birch (2003) argues that the institution of a two-round system works to fragment the party systems by marginalizing smaller parties forcing them to seek rather ambiguously defined “other means” of representation (328-329).  Moreover, having two rounds of election may allow the domination of larger parties –rather than the intended effect of compromise—as a larger pool of resources allows them to reallocate efforts to areas more strategically after having observed the first round of balloting (328).  Birch’s analysis focuses specifically on weaker and developing democracies and finds that the presence of TR correlates with a low democratic “polity score” (331).  She does acknowledge whether the presence of TR is causally related to this is debateable (335), but stresses the correlation between two-round systems and more “unstable” democracies, including the more “mature” democracy of France (339).

            Blais and Indriadson (2007) take a different tack, arguing that the two-round system in France is demonstrative of the conscious effort of parties to make rational calculations.  They hypothesize that parties closely affiliated through ideology are more likely to form pacts and work together to avoid their ideological opponents a chance at second round seats in competitive districts (196-200).  By analysing the election results in France they do indeed find that a degree of cooperation among parties is likely to occur, and that such cooperation is a rational response “created by the institutional framework they operate in” (202). This somewhat tempers Birch’s assessment of the system and reaffirms the idea that a second round may encourage conciliatory action on behalf of the actors within a two round system.  

Alternative Vote

            The alternative voting (AV) system is not one alien to Canada.  Both Manitoba and Alberta employed AV from 1920 to 1955 to elect MLA’s in their provincial legislatures from rural areas (Jansen, The Political Consequences of the Alternative Vote: Lessons from Western Canada 2004, 650).  The AV employs an ordinal ballot and is used to elect a single member in a constituency (Newland 1982, 13-15). In an AV system a voter is presented with a list of candidates and they are rank ordered.  If a candidate receives fifty-percent plus one in the first round of tabulation, he/she is elected.  If not, the weakest candidate is eliminated and the second preference on those ballots is automatically distributed to the other candidates until an absolute majority is achieved.  Like the two-round system, AV requires that a candidate obtain an absolute majority of votes before being declared elected (Ibid).  Unlike the two round system, however, the AV ensures that the “need to hold successive ballots in order to ensure election by absolute majority is avoided” (13).  

            The downstream effects of this system are a subject of debate within the literature.  Rae argues that the “Australian system” (AV) provided little difference to the party structure of a state when he concluded, based on a comparative analysis, that “Values for fractionalization, deviation of vote and seat shares, the numbers of elective parliamentary parties, the strength of the first party and the first two parties and the magnification of the changes in elective strength all suggest that the Australian formula behaves like an ordinary plurality formula” (D. W. Rae 1967, 108).  This assertion was confirmed by Jansen (2004) in his study of the Western Canadian experiment with the AV.  His analysis looks at the fractionalization of parties, “ballot plumping”,[5] and coalition building.  Although Jansen finds that the implementation of AV correlated with the proliferation of Western protest parties, he is quick to point out that the system’s adoption may have been a response by the traditional Liberal and Conservative powerhouse to the rise of viable electoral alternative; rather than the system causing the proliferation of these parties (650-654, 661).  Evidence for coalition building between parties was also weak, as the provinces adopting these did not demonstrate any significant change in their behaviour once elected (660-663).

            Despite the seeming non-effect of the AV on the composition of the legislature and the parties, however, the system does allow a voter the capability to vote for their first choice –regardless of the voter’s perception of the chance their party stands at winning the election. Cox (1997) argues that the incentive to vote strategically and abandon one’s first choice is removed by the presence of the ability to vote for their second choice, which allows “small parties to be viable” under the AV system.  That viability may only stand as an electoral party (capable of carrying their message to the electorate during elections) rather than a legislative one (capable of garnering significant seats in the legislature) (95).  Indeed, the mix between the ability for voters to express their support for more marginal parties while at the same time avoiding a fragmentation of the legislative parties has led some scholars to support the AV as a favoured option for reform in states that have traditionally used the SMP system (ie: Flanagan 1999).

Chapter 4: Mixed-Member Proportional Systems

            The final classification of electoral system that this paper deals with is a mixture of the two categories of plurality and proportionality outlined above.  Much discussion of electoral systems has focused on the effects of either plurality of proportionality exclusively; however, a mixing of the systems has received more attention in recent scholarship (Shugart and Wattenburg 2001, 9).  The classification of mixed member proportional (MMP) electoral systems is discussed at some length by Shugart and Wattenburg (2001), who point out that the system is “not as simple” as it is often portrayed in scholarship. These systems,  however, can be classified broadly as a one with overlapping constituencies, in which one tier of candidates is elected through a nominal voting process (vote cast for a candidate) and  the other through a list system (votes are cast for parties and candidates drawn from a party-generated list) (10).  

            This definition is taken a step further by Massicotte and Blais (1999) in their discussion of the lack of precision in the definition of mixed-member systems in seminal literature on electoral systems (343-345).  They divide the classification of mixed systems into two categories by their trait of either mixing or keeping independent the two tiers of voting: independent combinations and dependent combinations (346).  Some variation within these broad categories exist, as outlined below.

Independent Mixed (Mixed Member Majoritarian)

            The two “halves” of the independent system operate entirely parallel to one another. This opposed to the “dependent” in which the second tier’s application rests upon the results of the first.  Massicotte and Blais divide the independent category into three categories: coexistence, superposition, and fusion.  Each of which slightly different than the other, however, retaining the quality that each tier does not interfere with each other.

            Coexistence was employed in Canada in Alberta from 1924 to 1956 and Manitoba from 1920 to 1949 (Massicotte and Blais 1999, 349; Jansen 2004, 650).  Systems of coexistence operate with “one part of the territory is subjected to the plurality or majority rule, and the other part to PR” (Massicotte and Blais, Mixed Electoral Systems; a Conceptual and Empirical Survey 1999, 347).  Superposition, what Massicotte and Blais call “the most popular” mixed system, in which each elector has two representatives, one elected from a PR system, the other from some form of plurality. Importantly, the two tiers operate in parallel, with no linkage between the votes (349).  Lastly, fusion, currently employed at the municipal level in France, combines plurality and proportionality in one district (352). A party which receives one half of the popular vote or more upon first round of voting receives  half the seats, and the rest are distributed using the d’Hondt formula. If no absolute majority is received on the first round, a runoff election is held and the process is repeated (Ibid). It is important to note the underlying rationale behind the existence of independent systems. Shugart and Wattenburg emphasize that independent systems are majoritarian, in that the “typical majoritarian boost received by larger parties is not likely to be wiped away by proportional allocation of the list tier” (13). The preceding discussion in this paper demonstrates that, indeed, the application of a proportional formula does not always result in representation for the smaller parties. On the other hand, dependent (or correctional systems) are “mixed member proportional” as the underlying rationale behind their existence is compensatory, in that they assure a party receives a share of the votes that it may otherwise be denied under a system of plurality (14).

Dependent Mixed  (Mixed Member Proportional)

In the dependent category of mixed member systems Shugart and Wattenburg stress the “proportional” aspect of these systems, as the rationale for their existence is based on the rationale that “prioritize the list PR”  ensuring that the large parties do not receive a boost in “overall seat allocation,” thus giving stressing representation for smaller parties (Shugart and Wattenburg 2001, 16). What separates the dependent formula from the independent formula is that how one formula is applied is dependent on the results of the other formula (Massicotte and Blais, Mixed Electoral Systems; a Conceptual and Empirical Survey 1999, 353).  A detailed discussion of the various formulas is beyond the scope of this paper (Massicotte and Blais categorizing 32 systems under this category), however, one system is commonly referenced as the seminal corrective formula: Germany.  

The German system is largely considered the first mixed member system and represented a compromise between the value of proportionality and the aversion to fractionalization that characterized the Weimar republic[6].  The formula allocates 328 seats in the Bundestag for election through a SMP system and 328 reserved for the PR (353). Electors are provided with two votes, one for a candidate and one for a party list. Unlike the independent systems, however, PR seats are distributed “so as to correct the distortions created by the first-past-the-post” and are allocated in order to make the distribution in the legislature more closely resemble the popular vote (Ibid).  The result is that the “corrective” seats are most often distributed to smaller parties who are likely to be marginalized by the institutional deficiencies of the SMP (353).  Just like the other systems outlined above, both the dependent and independent mixed member systems present a unique set of incentives to voters and parties, and the downstream consequences of these systems has been a subject of debate in the literature.

Consequences of Mixed Member Systems                                

            The German’s enactment of the MMP has been characterized as a system that deliberately compromises between legislative stability and a degree of proportionality (Klingemann and Wessels 2001, 280-284) as well as a balance between the interests of smaller and larger parties (Scarrow 2001, 60-66).  Klingemann and Wessels (2001) study of the effect of mixed member proportionality on the German political system provides a unique case study, as Germany has altered its electoral formula, legal threshold of inclusion, and district magnitudes since the systems inception (281-282).  

Their empirical analysis of the effect of  these changes echoes the observations made by both Rae and Lijphart outlined above: that the changing of district magnitude and electoral formula in the MMP has significantly correlated with the change in the number of effective parties in the German Bundestag (284). Although Klingemann and Wessels point out that the change in party system cannot be attributed to institutional changes alone, they do stress that “the statistical relationship between the [change in district magnitude and effective number of parties] is rather strong and statistically significant, 75% of the variance is accounted for” (Ibid).  The New Zealand MMP system has similar results. Barker et al.’s (2001) analysis of the elections before and after the enactment of the MMP in 1996 saw a rise in the effective number of parties in parliament, and a decline in the (somewhat flawed) measure of the Loosemore-Hanby disproportionality index from 26.2% under SMP, to 7.6% under MMP (Barker, et al. 2001, 300-306).  

Despite the high correlation of institutional change to an increase in effective parties, debate on the MMP has focused on whether or not the proliferation of these parties has been a conscious effort on behalf of voters or the result of being “confused” with the presentation of a ballot with both an ordinal and categorical component.  Gschwend (2007) argues that strategic voting in the German MMP system has been characterized by voters actively splitting their votes by supporting their first two choices of a coalition government (18-20). Under the SMP system their first choice may be unlikely to win, so they would strategically vote for their second choice to avoid a “wasted vote,” which is evidenced by increased split ticket voting in competitive districts (14).  Similarly Karp et al. (2002) measured the viability of parties in New Zealand by their campaign expenditures and by using the 1996 New Zealand Election Study data found that voters were more likely to “abandon” their first choice in competitive districts in favour of more viable parties (18-21). However, those with a partisan attachment to their party were unlikely to split their vote, but those with higher education (a measure they use as a proxy for political knowledge) were likely to (18).

Conversely, other scholars have argued that the incidences of vote splitting are not entirely a rational process; rather, can be attributed to “voter confusion.” Jesse (1988) points out that, among German voters, mass confusion about the operation of the electoral system could lead one to question the hypotheses that voters are making informed, strategic, split ticket choices:

…it is more reasonable to assume that unusual combinations of votes stem from the ignorance of the functioning of the two-vote system. In fact, many [voters] do not understand the functioning of the electoral system at all as opinion polls have repeatedly shown (Jesse 1988, 119)

Jesse does not, however, systematically test this hypothesis. Schoen (1999), however, does test this theory by examining the German voter data (which makes all data on ballots available) between 1953 and 1990 (478).  Schoen constructs what types of ticket splitting would be considered “rational” in the German system (based on a historical analysis) and compares this to aggregate voter behaviour (480). Although the results did not rule out all evidence of strategic voting, less than half of voters split “rationally” leading Schoen to recommend that scholars “abandon the over-optimistic” portrayal as MMP voters being inclined to vote entirely strategically (492).  In effect, mixed-member proportional does have the final result of increasing minority party representation in parliament; however, it is not entirely agreed upon whether the proportionality is a conscious effort on behalf of voters, or a product of ignorance. Regardless of which, however, one could make the normative argument that the conscious levels of support for the smaller parties would warrant they receive some representation in parliament. A study comparing electoral results to the actual preference of the voter through survey data may prove fruitful here.

            The preceding discussions of the different electoral systems have demonstrated that there are, indeed, significant nuances within each system. This “sampling” of the literature on each system has demonstrated that there is no widespread agreement on all of the effects of differing electoral systems.  However, most importantly to this paper, it is crucial to note that there different institutional designs of electoral systems have the capacity to produce very real downstream effects.  Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence presented above it would be reasonable to assert that any discussion on electoral reform in Canada need to take into account the possible consequences of electoral formulae, and heed to the lessons of other states employing these systems.  This paper now turns to a discussion of how the Canadian SMP system has affected domestic political life, and a discussion of the literature regarding reform in Canada which, for the most part, fails to take into account the nuances of differing electoral regimes.

Chapter 5: Overview of the effects of the SMP on Canadian Political Life  

Theoretical Effects of the SMP Electoral System

Literature on electoral reform on Canada has focused around the deficiencies of the SMP and how it works to shape Canadian politics[7].  The observation that the SMP has very real effects on a state’s politics is not new, and the effects of the SMP electoral regime have long been a concern of scholars of political science (Riker 1986, 22-24).  Most early work focuses specifically on the electoral regimes’ “downstream” effects on the legislative process, and can be split into two broad narratives: the institutional effect of the system on party behaviour both in and out of the legislature; and the sociological effect the electoral system has on voter behaviour and a voter’s perception of their democracy.  It is from this review of early work that one can see the emergence of theory of two-party dominance, regionalised politics, voter behaviour and both an institutional and sociological explanation for the downstream consequences of an electoral system.  This two pronged approach will remain consistent throughout this paper, as it has through the literature as well.

Institutional Effects of Plurality Systems and Two-Party Dominance

One of the earliest empirical studies on electoral systems was conducted by Maurice Duverger (1951, 1954).  Duverger split the discussion of electoral systems into two distinct streams: the effect of the electoral system on the parties, and the effect of the system on the voter.  The former an “institutional” approach, the latter a “psychological” or “sociological” approach  (Duverger 1951, 315).

In terms of institutional effect, Duverger hypothesizes that the nature of political competition within a state can be a product of the electoral system, as a SMP is likely to produce and sustain a “duality” or two-party dominance:

The influence of ...  national factors is certainly very considerable; but we must not in their favour underestimate the importance of one general factor of the technical kind, the electoral system.  Its effect can be expressed in the following formula: the simple-majority single-ballot system favours the two party system.  Of all hypotheses that have been defined in this book, this approaches the most nearly perhaps to a true sociological law (Duverger 1965, 217; emphasis original)

In addition to the “law” of SMP systems, Duverger also forwarded a hypothesis that the existence of a proportional system will have the opposite effect on the party system as SMP (248).  In his examination of states prone to “multi-partyism” Duverger comparatively assessed Belgium and Britain’s experience with multi-partyism and concluded that, despite the temporary spike of socialist parties in Britain in the early 20^th century, that proportional systems are “put an end to any tendency towards a two-party system: in this respect it may be considered a powerful brake” (248).  He credits this to the institutional factors of proportional representation allowing smaller parties a degree of success when consolidating not afforded by the SMP system, as well as brokerage parties being able to split into smaller parties without fear of electoral defeat (249). 

            Both Duverger’s sociological “law” and “hypotheses” have been challenged by William Riker (1986) on the grounds that Duverger’s law did not demonstrate a sufficient degree of causality; rather, was “deliberately ambiguous” and unable to accurately determine if plurality voting as “a necessary condition of the two-party system or a sufficient condition or both or neither”  (Riker 1986, 20).  Riker challenges both of Duverger’s arguments, contending that the “hypotheses” of the link between PR and multi-partism was extremely weak, while the law of SMP creating a two party system remains viable. 

            In terms of the hypotheses Riker’s analysis raises numerous counter examples of proportional representation not leading to the rise of a two party system including Australia a three party system with one of the parties being an “appendage” of the big two;  Austria having employed PR since the second world war and maintaining a strong two-party system; Germany with the introduction of PR after the second world war and the maintenance of a two-party system in the Bundestag and most critically, Ireland which has seen a sharp decrease in the number of parties since the inception of PR in 1927 (27-28).  These counter-examples led Riker to dismiss Duverger’s hypotheses since “these four counter-examples appear to have nothing in common, it seems impossible to save [Duverger’s] hypotheses” (Riker 1986, 28). 

            Riker, however, did not give adequate weight to Duverger’s acknowledgment that certain “national factors” can play a role in the formation of party system in addition to the electoral regime.  Moreover, Duverger was careful to qualify his hypotheses as not entirely deterministic, instead stating that the affect of a proportional electoral regime is “very limited; on the whole P.R.  maintains almost intact the structure of parties existing at the time of its appearance.  It never has the disintegrating effect as some people claim it” (252).  In fact, Duverger insists that states have often taken an active role in designing their electoral regime to avoid the appearance of numerous new parties.  Riker does not acknowledge this in his analysis which is somewhat troubling to his rebuttal, as his use of counter examples does not address Duverger’s proactive defence of this critique. 

            Moreover, in his discussion of Duverger’s “law” of the effect of SMP systems, Riker cites Douglas Rae’s (1967) comparative analysis of electoral systems as evidence that Duverger’s law is not absolute (Riker 1986, 31).  Rae’s analysis looks into the Canadian exception to Duverger’s law and concludes that “seven plurality elections failed to produce two-party legislative competition, and all of them were Canadian” (D. W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 1967, 94).  Rae attributes this to the “intense hostility” between overlapping regional, cultural and linguistic groups in the Canadian federation (Ibid).  This leads Rae to modify Duverger’s law to fit the Canadian exception, contending that: “Plurality formulae are always associated with two-party competition except where strong local minority parties exist, and other formulae are associated with two-party competition only where minority elective parties are very weak” (95).  Although Riker is critical of Rae for inferring causation between the SMP and a two party system (Riker 1986, 32-33), Riker fails to recognize that the causal effect Rae inferred was somewhat tempered, as Rae specifically asserted that plurality systems were not sufficient for the creation of two party systems, thus “a simple causal explanation must accordingly be discarded” (D. W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws 1967, 95).  Rae’s explanation that a divided Canada is responsible for a two-party system, however, ignores the fact that a divided Canada may actually be a product of the two-party system, a reversal of causality.  And that the two-party system may indeed be caused by the SMP, a point addressed by both Duverger and Alan Cairns. 

Canada and the Effects of Plurality

Duverger specifically references the rise of the Canadian protest parties (the Social Credit and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation) as the exception to this “law,” he points out that only the Liberals and the Conservatives have achieved national prominence and relegates third parties to more “local” interest parties than national governing ones (Duverger 1965, 223).  By comparatively examining states with a SMP system, Duverger notes that at the national level a duality of parties becomes almost an axiom (222).  The caveat to this, however, is that protest parties are often able to garner some traction at the sub-national level, as the SMP allows a geographic area with a concentrated harmonization of concern (usually rooted in local issues)  “makes possible the creation of a two-party system inside the individual constituency; but the parties opposed may be different in different areas of the country.  The simple majority system therefore makes possible the creation of local parties or the retreat of national parties to local positions” (223). 

            Duverger’s assertions are further tailored to the Canadian case by Alan Cairns, who echoes many of the observations initially made by Duverger.  Specifically Cairns observed the effect of the SMP system on Canadian politics, and how conflicting values of representation between advocates of proportional representation and those of the SMP system leads them to different conclusions about when evaluating the electoral system (Cairns 1968, 55).  The former placing value on parliamentary stability through strong majorities and geographic representation; the latter on equality of each vote (Ibid).  Cairns’ work does not forward a value judgement on the electoral systems themselves, but does present several observations about how the SMP electoral system affects political life in Canada. 

Both Cairns and Duverger’s work predicted that as parties shift from focusing on localised campaigning to a national, two effects emerge that act as broad frameworks for the effects of electoral systems.  The first is a product of the rational calculation by parties as to how to focus their resources in campaigns (Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State 1965, 223).  If three parties contest a particular riding it is likely that the two parties who share the same area of the ideological spectrum are likely to “split” the vote and allow the third party to capture the plurality of votes.  The result is that a party is inclined to either “reach an agreement” with the other party with withdraw candidates, or the system will eliminate the weaker of the two and “the two party system will be restored by elimination” (224).  The result is that an electoral system can have the effect of influencing how parties behave when making calculations regarding their campaign strategy.

            Cairns echoes the claim that a SMP is likely to produce a strong, albeit false, majority at the national level and to overemphasize the support for third parties (59).  When referencing the Social Credit Party he too points out that the Liberal and Conservative party of Canada –whenever they were considered the “strongest” party”—were most likely to benefit from the electoral distortion produced by the SMP (58).  Moreover, Cairns’ work confirms Duverger’s hypotheses that the SMP is likely to produce a dualist system of parties, as Cairns credits the rise of the third parties at the federal level to the “favourable impact” of the SMP toward regional parties that “concentrated their efforts in their areas of strength (59).  The result is that, at least in Canada, the electoral system has the effect of advantaging the smaller, regionally concentrated protest parties, over the parties with a more dispersed base of support (60).

In terms of Canada, the SMP’s effect on different two-party races in separate areas of the country indicates that, indeed, certain political parties were more viable in specific regions of Canada.  This point was picked up on by Cairns who argued that this fact was recognized by the party elite, and that the effect of the electoral system to make a party more viable in one region than another greatly affected campaign strategy (Cairns 1968, 67).  A political party, Cairns argued, is likely to make a cost-based decision about campaigning in a region that is likely or less likely to produce favourable results due in part to the structure of the electoral system and prospect for electoral returns.  The basic formula for how party resources are allocated is based on a “business transaction” and is as follows:  if a party is extremely likely to win a seat (a safe seat), then little resources will be allocated to that geographic area during an election.  If a seat is highly contested it is likely a party will focus their energies on that seat in an effort to capture the riding.  If there is little chance a party will capture the seat, little effort is put into that riding and resources are focused on more “battleground” ridings (66-68).

            The result of this affects how parties structure their policy platform.  In essence, the composition of the party of representatives from specific regions, as well as a party’s reliable drawing of support from consistent geographic areas, results in their policies being tailored to represent their own geographic base rather than a “national” policy reflecting the will of “all” Canadians (68).  Cairns cites the example of the Conscription crisis and the antithetical positions of the Ontario-based Conservatives and the Quebec-backed Liberals as evidence that policy positions of parties becomes reflective of their geographic base (70-71).  The result, Cairns continues, is that Canadian parties have become increasingly concerned with regionally-based concerns –what he calls “sectionalism”—at the expense of other cleavages in Canadian society (76).  Sectionalism, which is directly related to the effects of the electoral system, can be harmful to “national unity” for two reasons.  First, a party seeking elected office will tailor their policy to areas to the realities of the electoral system and “alienate” areas that they are unlikely to capture, which magnifies regional cleavages in Canada (75).  Second, that sectional politics marginalizes class politics forcing class-based grievances “to work through existing instrumentalities” as their spatial distribution does not allow them adequate representation (75).  This concept, however, need not be exclusive to class based interests.  This paper will take this theoretical concept and expand it to include other cleavages in Canadian society as being marginalized by the electoral system, and examine the effects this has on different groups. 

Psychological/Sociological Effects

            On the other hand, the SMP can have a “psychological” effect on the voters.  This theory rests on the assumption that a voter is cognizant of the effect of the electoral system, and that their awareness of the effect of vote splitting with incentivise them to vote for the party that is most likely to win –even if that party is their second choice (Duverger 1965, 224-225).  The result is that a third party is likely to be absorbed into the duality system (Duverger 1951, 316).  Although there can be a period of “confusion” in which a third party may rise to temporary prominence, Duverger posits that it is likely that an ideological offshoot of a party is likely to return to a two party system once temporary grievances of the electorate have subsided (Ibid).  Duverger again references Canada as the exception to this rule, however, notes that national appearance of additional parties (at this time the Unionists, Labour, and the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation) masked the two-party competition at the local level –as each riding usually contained only two serious contenders in each individual election (Ibid).  The electorate, in this case, was aware of the relative strength of the third parties in their district and were likely to vote for them if they were likely to win –even if the party was Liberal or Conservative. 

            The rational calculation of the voter based on the incentives provided by the institutional structure of the electoral system was first outlined by Down in the seminal Economic Theory of Democracy. Downs posits that a voter in a multiparty state, under and electoral system that provides them with a single vote and faced with the realization that his or her first choice of party is unlikely to be successful may force a rational voter to vote for their second choice (45-49; 148-149). Notably Downs qualifies this by stating that rational voting is contingent on the assumption that a voter is aware of “how other citizens are likely to vote” (149).  

Indeed, it has been shown that in Canada, a voter may vote strategically based on the information of a party’s electoral viability presented to them in the media (Pickup 2010).  Measuring this strategic voting effect in the Canadian context, however, has been a subject of debate in the Canadian literature. Blais, Nadeau et al. (2001) conducted a study comparing the Canadian Election Survey (CES) data, which measures a voter’s preference toward party and leader, to the results of the 1997 Canadian federal election and found that perceptions of the local race were likely to affect vote more than federal perception (somewhat verifying Duverger’s assertions of a local two-partism) (345-350). Merolla and Stephenson (2007) confirm this finding by conducting a temporal analysis of Canadian elections from 1988-2000 using CES data and find some strategic voting does occur (240, 244).  They argue that this confirms Duverger’s law despite  the fact that “Canada is often considered an exception to Duverger’s law” (245); however, Duverger’s own discussion of Canada was confirmed by both of these findings.  Carty and Blais (1991) measure the impact that the electoral system has on the tendency to encourage strategic voting and find that, indeed, given the electoral viability of parties in SMP systems compared to PR arguing that:

…the psychological factor seems unambiguous in plurality systems, working exactly as predicted by Duverger. It does appear as if both elites and voters anticipate the mechanical effect and behave accordingly. The former seem more reluctant to form new parties, the latter more reluctant to support third parties. Moreover, the greater support given to the major parties is split between the leading and second parties, as Duverger expected. The psychological effect of the plurality formula should not be interpreted as favouring the leading party; it is biased against third parties. (Blais and Carty 1991, 89)

Indeed, there is strong evidence that the impact of the electoral regime can affect the way a voter casts their vote, often encouraging them to cast a vote for their second choice.  Some disagreement with this exists, however.

            Blais (2002) argues that strategic voting is not as widespread as the literature would suggest. His analysis focuses on the support of third parties in Canada, and seeks to answer why it is that third parties have remained viable despite the institutional incentive to vote strategically (446-447).  He contends that –although strategic voting may occur— third party support is due in large part to the “wishful thinking” of “sincere voters” (450).  Blais’ analysis, however, is problematic in that the data used to come to these conclusions are “on average” and aggregated at the national level (249). However, as shown by Duverger’s theory and the data presented by Merola and Stephenson, strategic voting is more evident when analyzed as a local level. Similarly, Blais, Turcotte and Young (2005) took a more “direct” approach to measuring strategic voting in Canada through the provincial election by directly surveying voters and asking whether or not they voted for their first choice and if they did not, asked their reasoning (172).  They found that strategic voting in Ontario to range from 3.6% to 5.5% (171), which is significant however not overwhelming.

Duverger’s acknowledgment of particular “national factors” alludes to sociological factors is echoed by V.O.  Key in Politics Parties and Pressure Groups.  Although Key stresses the importance of institutional factors for the proliferation of “dualism” in a political system, he also includes a sociological approach and discusses specific national attitudes toward democracy as a causal factor in the proliferation of dualist party systems (Key 1964, 209).  Key’s analysis specifically centers on the United States, and holds that, in addition to institutional factors; a two party system is further facilitated by the absence of “groups irreconcilably attached to divisive of parochial beliefs” and argues that the moderate nature of an electorate as a whole encourages a “clustering of opinions” (210).  The result is that an environment exists where a two party system is sustained due to a lack of extreme opinions becoming part of the mainstream political discourse.  This may be due, in part, to the desire of the electorate to “throw out” the incumbents in the face of poor performance, even if they do not “set an entirely new policy orientation” (206).  Although at first brush this approach may seem to contradict Duverger’s focus on institutional factors, it is possible that both the sociological preferences of the electorate coupled with the electoral system can work to shape how the legitimacy of the system is viewed by the electorate, and affect the prospects for reform. Both the institutional and sociological effects of electoral institutions are, thus, topics of scholarly debate. Indeed it has long been discussed that the institution has a very real effect on Canadian political life. This begs the question: what have been the concerns often voiced with the Canadian SMP system, and how has literature approached the topic of reform?  

Chapter 6: Institutional Problems and Reform Suggestions

            As the literature on electoral systems has demonstrated above, a significant portion of scholarly attention has been devoted to the institutional effects of the electoral system on legislatures.  Similar discussion has occurred in the Canadian context.  As first discussed by Cairns, the electoral system has the effect of regionalizing Canadian parties and contributing to the two party dominance at the federal level. In addition, the electoral system has the tendency to generate a “wrong winner” or provide an inflated mandate (as was the case in the 1997 Federal election) to specific parties. Proponents of the Canadian electoral system often cite the value of “stability” as trumping these problems and thus favour maintaining the SMP, however, the discussion above reveals that stability can be coupled with a degree of electoral reform. Each of these themes is addressed below. Notably, it is difficult to discuss each of these themes in total isolation from each other, however, some division into different sections provides for organization.

Regionalisation of Canadian Parties

            Cairns first noted that the lack of extra parliamentary party activity placed “little constraint” on the ruling party’s ability to formulate policy (Cairns 1968, 68). He noted that, because of the SMPs tendency to award only one seat per constituency (discussed above) the makeup of the party elite themselves become regionalized (69).  Because of this, the policy reflected by the parties tends to reflect a regional bias: the Conservatives became a “British Ontario based party,” the Liberals a French Quebec party, the CCF and Social credit based out the prairies (71).  Although he acknowledges that there are other factors that play into the formation of party policy:

…the electoral system must be given high priority as an influencing factor. A strong deductive case therefore can be made that the sectional bias in party representation engendered by the electoral system has had an important effect on the policies of specific parties and on policy differences between parties.33 Additionally, the electoral system has helped to determine the real or perceived sectional consequences of alternative party policy decisions. (Cairns 1968, 71).

Jansen  and Siaroff (2004) expanded on this theory and simulated how commonly suggested reforms to electoral systems would have affected the regional composition of the party caucuses in the 1980 and 2000 Federal elections (44).  They simulated the election results has Canada of used a list proportional system (Droop quota), mixed member majoritarian and mixed member proportional as well as the alternative vote.

              Jansen and Siaroff’s construction of a list-PR simulation used exceptionally large district magnitude –the entire province (46-48), as well as the Droop quota.  The result, they point out, would have been “highly proportional” with a minority liberal government, and the Canadian alliance picking up seats in Ontario (49).  Similarly they run the same simulation using the MMP and compensatory system and find that “the most proportional electoral systems –list PR and MMP—eliminate regional distortions most completely” (62).  This attempt at running a “proportional” simulation is problematic in a few ways, however.  As the discussion of proportionality revealed above, the size of the districts can have significant consequences on the proportionality of the system, as well as establishing what constitutes a threshold of exclusion and inclusion.  Their use of the Droop quota is not justified which in itself is problematic. As the discussion of measuring proportionality reveals above, different formulas can work to include or exclude particular parties.  The Droop quota using the largest remainders method, being an artificially inflated quota, has the potential to advantage smaller parties by “using up” the votes of larger parties in the first round, which may artificially inflate PRs ability to combat regionalization and somewhat skew their conclusions[8].  

              Similar calls for the use of proportional representation to combat regionalism have been made by Milner (1997), Massicotte (2004, 67-68) as a way to combat the problems associated with regionalization of Canadian politics –however—neither go into much detail about how the specific design of the system would work to include or exclude parties. Irvine (1979), on the other hand, specifically addresses proportional formulae and their thresholds of inclusion and exclusion and argues that the selection of formulae can affect which parties are allowed into parliament using any form of PR, and reformers must be careful to consider the effects of those formulas because:

  …it is possible to engineer limits to the degree to which any electoral system will reward the political organization of currents of opinion. The precise rule chosen to allocate the seats will also affect the degree of facilitation afforded to the emergence of new parties. (Irvine 1979, 22)

Irvine’s analysis does a good job of introducing the concept of engineering Canada’s electoral system to combat the unique nature of the Canadian polity. However, he insists that the d’Hondt formula provides the lowest threshold of inclusion and the largest remainders method does not favour smaller parties (20-22).  He also downplays the importance of district magnitude as a “independent facilitating factor” (22).  As the discussion of indices used to measure proportionality reveals, however, the largest remainders method can actually work to favour smaller parties (as revealed by Gallagher’s least squares), and Lijphart’s analysis demonstrates that district magnitude can be more important that formula, although both play an important role.

              Moreover, it is important to recognize that a party with regional interests is not entirely a bad thing.  Although Cairns insists that “sectionalism” caused by the electoral system can lead to a sectional-polarization (similar to class polarization), which is inherently unstable (75). Conversely, one could argue that regional interests in Canada are not necessarily a product of the electoral system, rather, as Irvine (1979) contends “These [interests] are more fixed in size and more clearly defined than are ideological preferences.  They certainly have a long history and cannot be considered artefacts ---though they may, as Cairns has argued, have been overemphasized in Canadian politics” (19)[9].  Irvine continues by emphasizing that defining a party as representing “regional interests” does not detail “which interests,” and points out that the nature of the SMP  can moderate these effects, and the selection of PR formulae can do the same. Cairns references this moderating effect as “brokerage politics” and insists that the brokerage centers on the “reconciliation of sectional racial and religious divisions, the latter two frequently being regarded as simply more specific of the first” (63). More recently, however, the idea that the brokerage model reflects strictly regional divisions has been challenged.  Cross and Young (2002) analyze the Canadian party system in terms of ideological consistency and found that the parties’ members are bound together by common beliefs on many issues with no real regional basis, namely: social tolerance, laissez faire economics, and populism (870).  They find that coherence within the parties is strong evidencing a more “ideological model” (876); however,  they also find that attitudes toward “provincial power” is a strongly coherent among different parties –indicating that regionalism still plays an important role (878).  Nonetheless, this speaks to the complex nature of the Canadian brokerage model as more than just a “regional” issue.

            Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the impact of electoral systems on the regional interests of provinces within Canada was conducted by Massicotte (2004). Massicotte constructs a hypothetical analysis of a compensatory MMP system and its possible effects on the Quebec provincial legislature.  In his discussion of the regional distribution of seats Massicotte conducts an in depth comparative analysis of different “computational” formulas (Imperiali, Droop, etc) as well as the effects of a district magnitudes as either “territory wide” (the entire province) or “regional compensation” (regions within the province) (24-26).  By examining the experience of Germany, Scotland, Italy, Mexico, and Venezuela Massicotte concludes that “The whole territory forms a single constituency for computation— the surest way to minimize distortions. It then becomes very secondary whether one uses the D’Hondt technique, the Sainte-Laguë technique, or the Largest Remainder technique” (29).  Although this analysis is constructed for provincial electoral reform, it provides an extremely comprehensive framework for analyzing how engineering the different facets of the proportional or semi-proportional system can affect the downstream effects it has on the composition of the legislature. In terms of the effect of regionalization, Massicotte’s analysis of how district magnitude coupled with electoral formula would affect the legislature in Quebec should be carried into a more comprehensive analysis of how engineering a federal system could impact Canadian regionalism.

            Flanagan and Harper (1998) argued that the tendency of the SMP system to regionalize party caucuses also has the effect of fragmenting the parties themselves –specifically the Conservative party’s division into the Reform (based in the West) and the Conservatives (largely out of Ontario) due to their divergent value systems –the former more socially conservative and the latter more economically (175-178).  Flanagan and Harper thus recommended a “split ballot” (or alternative vote) to encourage “cooperation” among the two parties (189).  Flanagan (1999) continued this line of argument, disagreeing with the entire premise of other authors that proportionality would solve the problems of regionalization.  Rather, adopting the AV would “facilitate coalition building between political parties without forcing them to merge” and would require minimal change to the structure of the House of Commons (88-89).  Flanagan, predictably, touts this as desirable as “the obvious candidates for co-operation would be the Progressive Conservatives and the Reform Party” (90).  

Flanagan’s analysis came to this conclusion, however, based on a weak analysis of the alternatives.  He critiques the STV as “too complicated” and because Canada is too “thinly populated”   the size of the ridings would be unreasonable (87).  Flanagan somewhat contradicts himself here, however, as he cites the familiarity of AV in the Canadian West –but ignores the fact that the AV was combined with the STV in rural areas to get around the very problem of “large geographic ridings” (Jansen 2004, 650).  In his critique of MMP he simply states that a degree of proportionality would “make majority governments difficult to achieve” but does not make any reference to the significant distinctions within MMP systems that could mitigate these factors –as discussed above (87).  It is questionable, then, whether Flanagan’s solution to the regional polarization of Canada was designed to reflect the problems associated with the Canadian party system or the problems associated with the Conservative fractionalization.

Sectionalism and Third Party Support

            Flanagan’s arguments dealing with the fragmentation of the conservative movement alludes to the problems associated with the dominance of the Liberal and Conservative parties.  Indeed, Carty, Cross and Young  in Rebuilding Canadian Party Politics argue that the party system has undergone four distinct stages –the most recent characterized by the rise of regionalized parties fuelled by “increased regionalization of party support patterns,” (8) however, in each of the four stages the House of Commons has remained in the control of either the Liberals or Conservatives.  They argue that these parties are strategically inclined to concentrate their message to specific regions of Canada during campaigns so they can “muster enough support to win individual constituencies” (Ibid).   Despite this fact, literature on the topic of third party entry into the Canadian House of Commons from an electoral-institutions perspective has been surprisingly silent.  However, Cairns in his discussion on electoral strategy argues that parties are prone to concentrate their efforts in specific regions, as the SMP rewards this type of behaviour, which leads to a disadvantage for third parties trying to construct a pan-national coalition (67).

Although the nature of third party support in Canada cannot be attributed entirely to the institutional incentives of the SMP[10], the preceding discussion of Duverger’s law reveals that, indeed the SMP can play an important role.  Perhaps the best way to analyze why the SMP in Canada has encouraged the maintenance of either Liberal or Conservative dominance, then, is to review the literature around the inability of third parties to muster significant pan-national support in Canada and become a truly “national” party.

            Indeed, Cairns directly addresses this point in his analysis, contending that the fate of the NDP as a marginalized third party is due, in large part, to the institutional construction of the Canadian system:

…the electoral system positively favours minor parties with sectional strongholds and discourages minor parties with diffuse support.  The classic example of the latter phenomenon is provided by the Reconstruction party in the 1935 election. For its 8.7 per cent of the vote it was rewarded with one seat, and promptly disappeared from the scene.  Yet its electoral support was more than twice that of Social Credit which gained seventeen seats, and only marginally less than that of the CCF which gained seven seats. The case of the Reconstruction party provides dramatic illustration of the futility of party effort for a minor party which lacks a sectional stronghold (59).

This proposition was tested by Johnston and Ballantyne (1977) who, by constructing models of vote/seat ratio and manipulating the results to demonstrate that regional concentration of “smaller party” efforts yields more power in Parliament (860-861). Not only does this speak to the regionalization of smaller protest parties, but it also demonstrates the ability of a third party to develop a pan-national identity.  Since a party is forced to work with limited resources, and can be assumed rational actors, it is sensible that they would be likely to concentrate their efforts in geographic areas most likely to support.  Cairns succinctly expresses this point, contending that “the electoral system is to politicians as the price system is to businessmen” (67).

            The difference in the performance of the NDP and the Reform parties in the 1997 Federal election illustrate this fact.  Nevitte, Blais, Gidengil, and Nadeau (2000) provide a detailed discussion into the appeal of the Reform party in the 1997 election, and how its platform based on a degree of anti-Quebec rhetoric worked to appeal to voters in the West who felt their interests had been alienated by the traditional party system, while at the same time appearing “too extreme” to Ontarian voters who were more ready to compromise on the issue (94-98). The result was that the party was typecast as one that “represented only Western values” –which allowed it to cross the threshold of inclusion in the West, but not Ontario.

            The NDP, on the other hand, had a particular regional appeal to the Maritimes. As Nevitte et. al point out, the NDP had elected their first leader from the province, Alexa McDonough, who scored 10 percentage points higher than any other leader (110). Moreover, their focus on “jobs” and the social-democratic solution to the problem lined more closely with the basic ideology of Atlantic voters (108-109).  Whether this was calculated on behalf of the NDP or not is questionable, however, both the Reform and NDP example demonstrates that third parties are forced to cater to niches in Canadian politics in order to garner electoral success –unlike the more established parties who cater to a more pan-national identity.

            Indeed the electoral system has significantly disadvantaged the smaller third parties, and provided a barrier to their successful entry into the House of Commons.  As pointed out by Weaver (1997), the NDP have consistently scored lower for their translation for seats to votes between 1965 and 1997; while the Bloc (regionally concentrated) has scored above (477-478, 502).  Weaver proposes the institution of a compensatory MMP system to remedy the problem of overcompensating regionally concentrated parties (501). In the case of the 1997 election discussed above, Weaver found that the Reform party would have –in fact—been somewhat overcompensated as their significant support in Ontario would have translated to seats under a compensatory system, rather than be wasted –as they were under the SMP system (501-502).   Furthermore, whereas indices of proportionality (discussed earlier) often calculate the disproportionality index based on an aggregate of a parties vote/seat share, Weaver disaggregates the data and calculates a disproportionality index based on the specific regions of Canada and runs a simulation based on the “simplistic assumption” that voter preferences under an MMP system would not change (494), and finds that disproportionality among all regions would reduce “regional exclusion from governing parties” (501).

            Although Weaver acknowledges his assumption that voter behaviour would not change under different institutional rules is “simplistic” – the discussion on voter behaviour in Germany reveals that some degree of split ticket voting is likely to occur in MMP systems.  It is difficult to say what the change in voter behaviour would be regarding split ticket voting –and how this would affect the regionalization of the parties.  Accordingly, Weaver’s analysis could have been improved by some discussion of  the experience in New Zealand or Germany.  Recalling Geschwend (2007) and Karp et al (2002), both New Zealand and German voters were prone to split their voted based on the incentives provided by the institutional framework of the MMP system, so –in the same vein--  it would be reasonable to assume that the behaviour of voters in Canada would change when provided with different institutional incentives. Indeed the experience of New Zealand demonstrates that vote splitting was not a marginal occurrence after the initiation of MMP, with “37%” of voters splitting their ballot (Barker, et al. 2001, 310). In addition, there is evidence that this was not a product of ignorance or confusion about the system, as “97% [of voters] knew they had two votes and 72% were aware that the party lists were the more important of the two” (310).  Taking into account the variance in voter behaviour that other federations have experienced would have enriched Weaver’s discussion.  Nonetheless, he provides a somewhat comprehensive analysis of the regional effects of the electoral system.

Stability and Accountability

            A common argument against the adoption of any proportionality in the electoral system has been the loss of “stability” in the Canadian Parliament.  Barker (1998) argues that the institution of proportionality would threaten stability from two fronts: weak governments (442), and a decline in responsible government (443-444).  Barker warns that the institution of proportional government would make the reigning government’s guarantee of support from the legislature “impossible” and “forceful and coherent rule would become a relic of the past” (442).   The tendency to produce minority governments would result in short, unstable parliaments without the time to deliberate on sound public policy (443). The second tenet of his argument revolves around the decline in responsible government.  Barker predicts “multiple defeats” of government legislation, as a product of the fractionalization of the legislature due to the institution of PR (444).  

            A similar argument is levelled by Smith (2003).  Smith takes this a step further and argues that, although accountability of government is a universally accepted principle, “the mechanisms used to support these principles are no longer widely admired” (150). Smith defends the status quo in a larger context, and tries to avoid the “cliché” that “more democracy” means better government (157).  Although she only makes brief mention of electoral reform as a means to institute “more democracy” (158), she cautions that the institution of PR –among other reforms—may have unpredictable consequences such as “enhance the political leverage of powerful minority interests at the expense of the majority” (162), effectively reducing the ability of stable majority governments to legislate.

            Finally Courtney (2004) points out that the SMP’s tendency to generate a strong one party government can actually enhance accountability as the formation of policy under a majority government, as “a single party government’s responsibility and accountability to the voters at election time is more likely to be directly established than a coalition governments. [SMP] guarantees that each voter casts only one vote in a single district – either for or against the government party candidate” (138).  This argument echoes the claims he made in 1980, when he pointed out that the ability to hold a leader of a party to account is enhanced by such clear lines of accountability:

...it  is  when the  great majority  of  voters in  a  region  view a party leader with  suspicion  (seeing him  perhaps  as non-conciliatory, or as indifferent to  that  region’s concerns), and  when such  a  view  coincides with  that leader’s inability or unwillingness to form political alliances with important  groups or parties in that  region, that the  party  he leads is  certain to pay a heavy electoral price in the province or region directly affected. (Courtney 1980, 452).    

The defences of SMP, however, are nowhere near as prevalent in the literature as the calls for reform.  Nonetheless, these authors do make some points that provide the strengths of the SMP system[11].  However, the strengths that these authors outline in their defence of SMP suffer from two key flaws: that they assume with little evidence that minority government would result in “unstable” government; and that minority government under all forms of PR or reform would be inevitable.

            The “threat” of minority governments that defenders of SMP disparage has been argued to be overblown by Peter Russell in Two Cheers For Minority Government. Russell’s overarching thesis is that minority government has actually been a good thing for Canadian democracy. Although Russell explicitly states that his work is “not to make the case for changing … first-past-the-post” his analysis does counter the underlying premise that defenders of SMP base their analysis upon: that minority governments are ineffective.  Russell points out that of the (at the time of publication) 12 minority Parliaments that Canada has experienced “only three were real duds” (63).  Russell points out that minority government forces the government to “build consensus” and take into account the views of other parties which, in an electoral system prone to false majorities, may not be such a bad thing (64).  Russell points out that defenders of the status quo often invoke normative arguments that any fractionalization of the legislature is a threat to how “Westminster democracy works” (120).  But he is also quick to point out that Westminster democracy has only been so effective because of its ability to adapt (121-123).  Russell argues that some reform may be needed to enhance the stability of minority parliaments –namely fixed election dates (134-142) or a stronger role of the Governor General (142-151)—and that such change would enhance the concept of “Parliamentary democracy” over the increasing tendency of “prime-ministerial government”   (128-129).  The argument that SMP is the best preserver of “stability” and “accountability,” then, is somewhat undermined when one questions the underlying premise of the argument.

            Moreover, the argument that stability is threatened by instituting a degree of PR into the Canadian electoral formula completely disregards the idea of electoral engineering that the encompasses the first half of this review. As the discussion of electoral thresholds revealed, the size of district magnitude coupled with the use of proportional formulae has the potential to raise or lower the threshold a party must cross in order to obtain seats in the legislature.  Lijphart addresses this point directly in his analysis of comparative proportional formulas, arguing that the use of a d’Hondt formula in comparison to  a Largest Remainders Hare Method actually enhance legislative stability as “[d’Hondt’s] very bias in favour of large parties may be regarded as an advantage since this reduces party system fragmentation” (Lijphart 1994, 64)[12]. Lijphart’s comparative analysis of 12 countries who had “fine tuned” constituency size, electoral formula and assembly size found that while changing the factors did not affect the number of  elective parties, it did affect the number of effective parties (80-90).  This leads Lijphart to ultimately conclude that electoral systems can be fined tuned to elicit more or less proportionality (140-141).  This point is salient to this analysis as it demonstrates that a balance can be struck between the normative value of enhancing proportionality in the Canadian system; and the attachment to legislative stability as demonstrated in the literature. Whether using a compensatory MMP system with few list seats, or tailoring the proportional formula to raise the threshold of exclusion, or designing district magnitudes to reduce the fractionalization of Parliament.  In effect, the balance can be struck between those who see proportionality as an end in itself and those who feel that the (similar but very different) goal of reforms in Canada should be “to reduce disproportionality” (141).

Chapter 7: Sociological Problems and Reform Suggestions

                Duverger’s initial discussion of the “psychological factor” focused on the impact the electoral system had on the incentives of voters in the polling booth.  As shown in the preceding discussion, a good deal of literature has focused on the “strategic voting” effect that each system has had on voter behaviour.  As Massicotte (2008) points out, however, there has been a shift in the discourse surrounding electoral reform from a from the voter’s perspective (116-130).  Massicotte divides the discourse on electoral reform into three “waves.”  The first of which characterized the debates after the First World War and resulted in the institution of AV and STV in the Western provinces (112-113); the second corresponded with Cairns 1968 article and focused on regional cleavages (114-115) and the third –and most recent—on more sociological issues (116).  The “different discourses” Massicotte cites tend to focus on the problems with the status quo, as “the plurality system is indicted for producing phony majorities, ... for hindering the entry of women and minorities in parliament, for driving turnout down” and that a change to PR would counter these issues (118).  Moreover, the very process for choosing an electoral system has entered into debate, as “the view has spread among reformers that incumbent legislators should be sidelined on the issue, on the assumption that they are sold to existing arrangements and they are in a position of conflict of interest” (121).  As an addition to the earlier discussion of strategic voting under an SMP system it is valuable to thus expand the definition of “sociological effects” of the Canadian SMP to two other commonly referenced categories: the democratic deficit and voter turnout, representation of women and minorities in Parliament.

Democratic Deficit and Turnout

                Literature evaluating the Canadian electoral system often uses voter turnout as a litmus test for the legitimacy of the current system in the eyes of the public.  What causes an increase or decrease in turnout has been a subject of some debate.  Blais, Gidengil, Nevitte and Nadeau (2004)  posit that generational effects, education, and socio demographics all are strong predictors of a constituents likelihood of voting, for example.  They argue that the sharpest decline in voter turnout is due to the “cultural changes” in a younger generation having reduced their perception as voting as a civic duty, and thus reduces their desire to become politically active (226-228).  Moreover they find those in a lower socio-demographic class have a (albeit marginally) lower chance of voting, and those with higher education are more likely to vote (231-232, 232).

            Attributing turnout to cultural changes, however, ignores what may be fuelling this cultural change.  Pammett and Leduc (2003) surveyed those in Canada who abstained from voting in order to determine what factors contributed to their aversion to voting.  They found that the most reason “lower interest in politics” among the disengaged was a negative view of politicians and “voting does not matter, has no effect and makes no difference” (34).  Indeed, when the survey addressed the topic of electoral reform to combat this problem by introducing a degree of proportionality 71 percent of both voters and non-voters supported the reform (47-48). Curiously, however, 74 percent of non-voters agreed that they were satisfied with the current electoral system (47), which suggests that –perhaps—there is a deficit of knowledge about the disproportional effects of the SMP within the non-voting population.

            It is difficult to discern whether the “culture” of the voters in Canada would be affected by institutional reform, however, Blais and Aarts (2006) provide a comprehensive review of the literature regarding the effect of proportional formula, district magnitude, and lower measures of disproportionality and find that, indeed, turnout is higher in systems that are “generally more proportional” (193).  However, and as they point out, attributing turnout to institutional differences runs into an endogeneity issue: it becomes difficult to discern whether the institution of PR is responsible for the increased turnout, or whether the culture of the state that PR arose in is more conducive to voting in the first place.  There is little in the way of literature addressing this topic directly, however, an examination of systems that have recently reformed their SMP to include a degree of proportionality provides some insight into this issue.

            Banducci, Donovan, and Karp (1999) examined the changing attitudes of the electorate in New Zealand shortly after the institution of proportionality in order to discern “how changes in attitudes about responsiveness of government, trust in government, and political efficacy might be associated with electoral system change” (536).  By using survey data from the 1993 election (before the institutional change) and the 1996 (shortly after) they discerned that there had been a significant decrease in the cynical response of the electorate when question on their views of the electoral system and voting (541-549).  Similar studies (Banducci and Karp, 1999; Banducci and Karp 2007) measured turnout directly and attitudes toward voting and found that, although there was a significant increase in attitudes about the value of voting, turnout increased only marginally.

            More recent research has suggested that other factors may be the case of higher or lower turnout rather than just the institutional variable of electoral systems. Geys’ (2006) review of the literature surrounding turnout suggests that socio-economics, population size, population concentration, population stability (home ownership), ethnic homogeneity, campaign expenditures, concurrent elections, and compulsory voting (641-653) have all been shown as “statistically significant” in determining the level of voter turnout within a state. The result is that the switch to a degree of PR as a way to combat declining turnout often touted by Canadian reformers must be done so with the caveat that institutional reform without taking into account the deep seated cultural norms of Canadian society is not sufficient in engaging voters –although it may contribute. As pointed out by Blais (2006) in What Affects Voter Turnout? the canon of literature in Canadian political science –and political science in general—has been  characterized by impressive “gaps in our knowledge” (122).   Blais recommends that reformers “must examine how changes in the party system and/or closeness of the election outcome affect electoral participation, and we should explicitly test whether these factors have a greater impact on new cohorts” (Ibid).

Representation of Women and Minorities

                Although much of the preceding discussion on electoral reform has echoed Cairns by focusing on the regional cleavages in Canadian society, there has been an increased discourse surrounding the inclusion of non-territorial based groups in electoral reform.  As pointed out by Studlar (1999) the debate on electoral reform in Canada has not considered the effect PR would have on women and minorities (128).  He points out that among the most mature democracies, those with a list-PR system has the highest proportion of female legislators in their respective legislatures (129).  The literature surrounding this issue can be divided into two broad categories: those arguing that reform would benefit women and minorities, and those who disagree with the premise that “mirror representation” is effective in itself, and that an increase in ethnic minorities and women in parliament does not equate to a higher standard of “representation.”

            Smith (2008) falls into the latter category, arguing that proponents of electoral reform who insist that designing the electoral institution to reflect the composition of the Canadian public have misplaced their effort (102-103).  Specifically he contests the idea that a female could better represent a female, an aboriginal an aboriginal, and so on:

A crucial point to note about the ‘mirror’ argument is that it is all about appearances: X is not represented is X’s member does not look like X. Yet there are other ways of contemplating representation: as an activity –‘My member works for me’; or as a matter of choice –“X is my member because I voted for him or her’ ... Barring a change in attitude towards nominations on the part of parties, it is not all that clear that any PR system –top up or total—will achieve the proportionality its proponents desire... (Smith 2008, 101)

Flanagan (1999) who argues that the recent unpopularity of “affirmative action” will hurt the prospects “selling” of electoral reform to Canadians levels similar scepticism (85).

                        On the other hand, however, Young (2006) points out that the Canadian public does not share this sentiment.  Although she finds that the electorate does not discriminate against women candidates in the SMP system during an election (51-53), she does find substantial support in the Canadian electorate for increased nomination of women and minorities (52).  Moreover, while Trimble (2006) agrees with Smith’s argument that X doesn’t always represent X and that “women’s interests” in Parliament can never be quantified as a “set of political goals” (122); she points out that women share a “social perspective” that can affect their decision making process (122-124).   When it comes to the electoral institutions, however, Young echoes Smith in arguing that “if some form of PR is adopted without mandatory quotas for women’s representation, it will affect the number of women elected only to the extent that political parties are concerned with increasing women’s representation” (53). These same concepts are, indeed, transferable to the case of both natives and ethnic minorities.  As it stands parties tend to disproportionally nominate women in “no hope” ridings in Canada, which contributes to their underrepresentation in Parliament (60), which can work to institutionalize a male “social perspective” in the Canadian legislature.

            It is difficult, if not impossible, to discern how electoral reform would affect the parties’ nomination processes in Canada at the federal level, however, studies of New Zealand’s experience with MMP, France’s experience with quotas, and Nunavut’s experience with “gender parity” provide insight in a comparative and Canadian context.  Both Mcleay (2006) and Barker et. al (2001) point out that that there has been a significant increase in female representation in the New Zealand House of Commons after the institution of a list system (Mcleay 2006, 76-78; Barker, et al. 2001, 308-310). Importantly, as Barker points out, the increase in “district magnitude” has been a factor crucial in ensuring that parties are given the incentive to “balance their ticket” by presenting both males and females to “maxamize their support” of the different cleavages in society (308).

            Indeed the Royal Comission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Lortie Comission) touched on the issue of female representation in the House of Commons insists that “systemic discrimination” of an “unitentional” nature has been a major factor in the barrierto female representation in the House of Commons (97).  Moreover, the Commission found that evidence was not “suffciently strong enough” to discern whether the elctorate discriminates against women (96). The commission specifically addressed electoral reform as a common suggestion to this issue, but quickly dimissed the idea:

…[an] argument in favour of proportional representation is that it promotes the representation of major segments of the population or groups that are not geographically concentrated, such as women or ethno-cultural communities. Women, for instance, tend to have greater representation in countries that use proportional representation. Contrary to what some have claimed, however, international experience clearly indicates that this outcome is a consequence of political parties adopting male-female quotas or other measures of strengthening the position of women candidates. In countries that use proportional representation but whose parties do not take such action, the representation of women is similar to the Canadian record or worse. (Lortie 1991, 20)

It is troubling that this was the treatment of the issue of electoral reform as a solution to female and minority representation received in the official reccomendations to Parliament.  First, as was shown above, there is significant support among the Canadian electorate to see more representation in Parliament for women and minority interests. Indeed, any party that acts as a rational actor would be likely to act upon this and adjust their nomination processes accordingly. Moreover, proportional representation with a significant change in district magnitude –lining with Barker-- would allow parties to nominate females to the ticket and increase the desiablilty of their list portion. The comparative evidence of New Zealand demonstrates that, indeed, more females in other states have seen this occur and it was not a product of “quotas” alone.

Conclusion

            The purpose of this literature review has been to demonstrate the nuances of electoral systems and how they can be applied to Canada.  This paper began with a discussion of how the literature conceptualizes electoral systems, and the different “elements” of proportional, plurality, and mixed systems can be “engineered” to “fit” the state in which the system is implemented.  The common criticisms levelled against adopting some form of proportional representation in Canada has been the downstream effects that such a system would have on  the party system and the institutions of Parliament in Canada. These critiques, however, often do not take into account the very significant differences within the proportional family itself, and how the system could be designed to preserve some of the values Canadian’s hold about the operation of their institutions. In addition, recent discussion on electoral reform has moved to focus on enhancing “representation” of non-geographically based groups.

            What this paper has demonstrated is that the discourse of reform in Canada needs a focus on the nuances of electoral systems before any steps are taken.  Further research into the comparative effects that different proportional systems has on the party system in a state must  become part of the mainstream literature on electoral reform in Canada.  Uncertainty of the consequences of changing the SMP fuel the inability to forward reforms, and this uncertainty could be reduced by further discussion of the evidence presented in the comparative and theoretical context.  It is thus the recommendation of this paper that further comparative research be conducted in Canadian reform literature.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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